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INTRODUCTION 
The past seTeral decades, more than any others, haTe wit-
nessed the fruitful and rapid grewth of experimental psycho-
logy. To strengthen many of the established metaphysical 
concepts of theoretical psychology, we now haTe objectiTe 
laboratory data. Within a comparatiTely short time, experi-
mentalists have made innumerable and invaluable contributions 
to the field of psychology. For a time, these investigators 
confined their researches to the realm of sensory phenomena, 
and for various reasons. On the one hand, were the modern 
sensists who denied the very existence of any but sensory 
processes. On the other hand, the dualists, moderate and 
otherwise, were dubious as to the possibility of any experi-
mental procedures with the ratienal processes. It is true 
that our immaterial powers defy any attempt of direct measure-
ment. These powers, infinite in potentialities, cannot be 
reduced to any quantitative units or subjected to material-
istic confines. However, in their attempt to observe the dif-
ferentiations between sensory and nan-sensory phenomena, a 
1 
2 
particular group of experimentalists, the Wurzburg School, 
took the initial step in the experiment at ion o.f higher thought 
processes. 
Oswald Kulpe, as a. result of his experiments, arrived a.t 
conclusions diametrically opposed to the dogmatic sensism of 
the Wundtian School. When his discoveries were corroborated 
by those of Marbe, Watt, Messe~and others, a reactionary move-
ment was initiated. Experimental investigations had proved to 
K"ulpe and his followers that something above and beyond sensa-
tiona and images existed in the thought processes. The pure 
awareness found in the intro·specti one of the thought processes 
was not identifiable with the image. 
That this distinction must be made 
in much the same sense that we dis-
tinguish between physical phenomena 
and our consciousness of them; that, 
in other words, the old doctrine of 
an inner sense with the involved 
idea. of a distinction between the 
reality of consciousness and objec-
tivity must now have its opportune 
renewal. in the domain of psychology--
this is the principal result tbft I 
would dr-aw from my experiments. 
lversuche uber Abstraktion. Leipzig: 1904, P• 67. ~uoted bf 
Thomas v. Moore in •The Process of Abstraction". The Univer-
~ of California Publications la Psychology, Vol:-! 
{November, 1910), P• 92. 
With these discoveries originated the first formal experimen-
tation of the higher thought processes. Previous to Kiilpe, 
Ebbinghaus had given the famous pioneer experiments on memory. 
But most cammentators think that he did not designate memory 
as a higher thought process in Kulpe's sense. The moTement 
received further impetus from the performance, elsewhere, of 
similar experiments which led to like conclusions. Woodworth, 
Binet, and Thomas V. Moore had offered plausible convictions 
deduced from results in accord with those of the Wurzburg 
School. 
Dr. Moore's work on abstraction has become a classic 
among experiments on the higher thought processes. It was one 
of the first of its kind and gave evidence that psychology 
would profit much by further research in this field. The 
experiment is remarkab1e, not only because it established a 
precedent, but also because it shows considerable ingenuity in 
presenting objective data which so clearly represent the stages 
involved in intellectual abstraction.2 
Foll.owing the example of these pioneers, experimentalists 
produced an abundance of data obtained in research work on 
sensation, perception, memory, and intelligence. But amid all 
2
"The Process of Abstraction", pp. 73-197. 
4 
this progress, there has been a noticeable void, namely, a 
great lack of experimentation and research in the domain of 
rational appetition. The writers of will-psychology have pre-
faced their writings with this complaint together with a plea 
to others for further participation in their work. The para-
mount importance and vital significance of the will has always 
been recognized by scholastic writers, and many others as well. 
Great philosophical battles have been waged over the problems 
of the will. An adequate solution of all these problems may 
have to await the beatific vision. 
One of the foremost reasons for neglect in this type of 
research is theerroneous interpretation which is so frequently 
attached to volitional activities. Modern dynamism is steeped 
in materia1ism. The will is confused or identified with 
instinctive tendencies, drives, or biological urges. No dis-
tinction is made between rational and sensory appetition; a.~l 
appetition is rooted in man's physical nature. Thus, a. wealth 
of psychological research has been devoted to instincts a.nd 
the various other types of sensory appetite. Will, in the 
status of its true capacity and nature, is ignored or denied. 
Wundt's psychology of volition is typical of the many prevalent 
materialistic theories. 
Feeling is not independent of 
volition, as alleged; impulse 
is not a process which can be 
distinguished from will, still 
less opposed to it; and desire 
is not the antecedent of will, 
but rather a process which only 
appears in consciousness when 
some inhibition of voluntary 
activity prevents the reali-
zation of volition preper. 
Finally to define will as the 
capacity of choice is to render 
any explanation gf it impossible 
from the outset. 
5 
Confusion, dissension, and faulty conclusions have resulted 
from such psychological theories; and consequently progress 
oftentimes has been greatly impeded. 
For others, the will, because of its dynamic and imm&ter-
rial nature, seemed too much of an enigma to warrant any posi-
ti"f.'e results from experimental attempts. Other faculties, even 
among the rational processes, seemed more promising to the 
experimentalist. Analyses of volitional activities, which are 
so complex and evasive, seemed beyond the reach or capability 
of most psychologists. •Many men were attracted to other 
fields of research through natural preferen9e, or because they 
were hopeful of more tangible results, or because they were 
unwilling to cop.e with the specific difficulties inherent in 
3Lectures .m Human !!!!9.. Animal Psychology. Trans. frem 2d 
Ger.m •. Edition by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener. Londonr 
Swan Sonnenschein and Company, Ltd., 1896, p. 225. 
6 
the task of investigating the Will.•4 In more recent times, 
however, these same volitional characteristics have proffered 
a challenge to research workers; encouraging results obtained 
from their works have set an example to others. 
In their attempts to study instincts and drives, materi-
alists themselves have been confronted by their inability to 
categorize the truly volitional powers of man. Avoiding the 
term will in its full connotation, they have resorted to the 
use of force, energy, or deterministic impulse. Their very 
in~estigations have led them to the inevitable discovery of a 
power capable of opposing these bodily urges, if man se pro• 
poses. They offer no acceptable explanation of these supra-
instinctive manifestations, and merely speak of will in terms 
of some dominant instinct or tendency. 
One outgrowth of the materialistic interpretation of 
volitional activities is the existing c.onfusion and contro-
versy regarding terminology. As in the case of most disputed 
subjects, clarification of terms will greatly simplify the 
problem of solution. Ambiguity of meanings has oftentimes 
4Ra.phae 1 C • McCarthy • IS! lleasuremen t of C ona. t i em: An 
Enquiry lB1! Velitional Processes. Chicago: Loyolalcrni~er­
sity Press, 1926, P• 6. 
7 
been the source of prolonged philosophical.and psychological 
dissensions. Perhaps the same might be true in will-psychol-
ogy. 
Recently, the term cona.t'io-n has come into popular use and 
is a common source of confusion. The meanings of conation are 
almost as varied as the authors who have used the word. For 
this reason we will attempt to establish a few clarificatiens 
and to distinguish between volition and conaticm. 
For the materialist, volition means conation. Urges, 
impulse-s, drives, and instinctive tendencies constitute the 
various forms of conation. Volitio.n Climceived in any other 
sense is unknown to materialists, since they admit of no higher 
appetitive level. Foremost among this group are the mechanists 
and determinists who hold that man is primarily a creature 
composed either of conditioned reflexes or of instincts and 
desires. Conatien, in this sense, signified any form of 
biological energy; volition is a specific type of impulse or 
energy. •Will, in principle, is organized energy. Van's 
will differs from the energy of a gravitational system only 
5 in a phenomenological sense.• KcDeugall places volition 
alongside of instinctive forces and defines it as •the 
5 Raymond H. Wheeler. The L&ws of Human Nature. New York: 
D. Appleton and Co., 1932-;-p:" 93. 
8 
supporting or re-enforcing of a desire or conation by the 
cooperation of an impulse excited within the system of the 
self-regarding sentiment.•6 Conation and volition differ in 
degree, not in kind. •rt may be fairly claimed, I think, that 
we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be 
accounted for as a special case of conation, differing f·rom 
other conations, not in kind, but only in complexity.•7 
E. H. Wild, in his otherwise excellent experiment on 
conation and cognition, falls into the common error of mis-
taken identity of terms. A comprehensive study was made of 
the influences of conation on cognition in muscular work, in 
efficiency of motor-performance, in learning, in reproducing 
processes of memory, and in performances on intelligence tests. 
By way of explanation, the author explicitly states that cona-
tion is attention; and in so doing, changes the entire signi-
ficance of his experiment. 
Attention then is conation; it 
changes the intensity of cogni-
tion and a change in determi-
nateness follows on this. These 
two changes then constitute the 
T&riation in clearness of cogni-
tion of the sentient produced by 
6An Introduction to Social Psychology. Boston: John w. Luce 
7and co., 1928, p:-255. ~., P• 243. 
. . 8 
variation 1n attentlon. • • • 
sometimes such attending is sus-
tained by an effort of will, which 
derives from the intricately orga-
nized system of conative impulses 
comprising the whole personality. 9 
9 
Attention is neither conation nor volition, though it .is 
perhaps the process most frequently identified with both. 
However, analysis reveals the close relationship existing bet-
ween volition and attention. Attention is an act itself which 
directs our cognitive processes toward some object or activity. 
When attention is voluntary,the object in question is also the 
object of will. The nearest approach which St. Tho~as makes 
to this present-day concept of attention is in his discussion 
of intentio. "The end, considered as a thing, and the means 
to that end are distinct objects of the will. But in so far 
as the end is the reason for willing the means, they are one 
10 
and the same object." This not ion is similarly applicable 
to the object of voluntary attention. However, at other times, 
attention is drawn by external stimuli without any volitional 
direction. "Neither is attention merely a volition, or act of 
8
"Influences of Conation on Cognition", The British Journal of 
Psychology. General Section. Vol. XVI~(l927-28} Oct., --
91927, P• 150. 
10Ibid., P• 149. ~ SUIIJma Theologica .!.!!_:Basic Wri tinss o.f Saint Thomas 
Aquinas edited by Anton c. Pegis. New Yorks Random House, 
1944, I-II, xii, a.4, ad 2um. 
10 
will. On the contrary it is that upon which the conative act 
is exerted.- It is a cognitive energy directed by the will to 
. t" . .11 a.n ex1.s J.ng exp.erJ.ence. 
Some scho~la.stics have strongly opposed the use of the 
word conation in any sense. They have branded the term as a 
tautology, and therefore as superfluous for use in scientific: 
studies. 
Modern psychologists speak of 
conation, conative impulses, 
conative urges, conative ten-
dencies, and so forth, as con-
scious data distinguishable from 
cognitive states, on the one hand, 
and from feeling states, on the 
other ••• Th& division is ••• 
wrong on two scoresr first, be-
cause it is redundant; second, 
because it is unbalanced. The 
redundancy arises from a viola-
tion of the principle of the 
minimum, since feelings and 
conations are both appetitive 
phenomena. The lack of balance 
arises from the fact that, even 
on the assumption that feeling 
here means sensitive appetition 
and conation means rational appe-
tition, there should be a corres-
pending dichotomy of cognition 
i~t? sej~itive and rational cog-
nJ.tJ.on. 
1~ichael Maher. Psychology: Empirical and Rational. London: 
12Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, p. 346. Robert E •. Brennan. Thomistic Psychology. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1942, p. 165. 
11 
Others have used conation in the same sense as appeti-
tion, admitting of a further subdivision. Conation would then 
be either, rational or sensory. Thus, conation refers to any 
of the affective processes as distinguished from the cognitive 
processes. 
Dr. Aveling, Stevanovic, and other British experimen-
talists of King's College, London, have used conation in this 
sense, but have carefully distinguished between conation and 
volition. 
In general, conation is the striving 
by which we seek to satisfy our 
wants, to attain the ends at which 
our natiTe and acquired dispositions 
a.im, to carry out the purposes of 
our will. Such striving may be 
pursued upo,n different levels, high 
or law, of activityt it may be per-
sistent and sustained or fitful and 
easily abandoned.l3 
Dr. Aveling describes volition as a particular type of cona-
tion, as conation of a higher level. Referring to volition, 
he says, 
In general, it may be laid down 
as a principle that the human 
organism tends to strive towards 
any end desired. Strivings of 
this sort presupposes previous 
1~rancis Aveling. Personal.it;y and Will. New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1931, P• 159. 
experience of such ends, or a 
knowledge of it reached by way 
of the principle of correlate-
eduction; and such conation as 
is involved in the process differs 
from that exhibited in instinctive 
reactions precisely in this, that 
it is a conation guided by con-
scious reinstatement or mental 
fabrication, of an end, together 
with a tendency towards it. In 
either case, however, the deter-
mination of the organism to the 
end desired consists radically 
in a connate relation between the 
organism and the end, as is also14 the case in instinctive actions. 
12 
Experimental studies carried out by others have affirmed 
the distinctions as defined by Dr. Aveling. In canducting a 
research on frustration of will-acts and conation, one author 
found that introspective reports revealed that such differ-
ences exist. 
Aveling has by experimental work 
revealed that there is a clear-cut 
distinction 'between conation and 
volition--between striving and 
willing. This distinction is sup-
ported by the data obtained in our 
work. The introspective reports 
• • • show that there is a real 
phenomenological diffe·rence be-
14
"The Psychology of Conation and Volition", ~ British 
Journal of Psychology. General Section, Vol. XVI-XVII 
(1925-192?) April, 1926, P• 348. 
tween the experience of5conation and that of volition.l 
13 
An experimental study on judgment has also produced evi-
dence that there are distinct and essential differences which 
must be considered when referring to volition and to conation. 
Conation of a. physical kind was evident in cognitions on the 
sensory level, while it was noticeably absent during the tasks 
requiring abstrcl.ction and eduction of relations • 
• • • the educing of relations 
and correlates, abstract.ing and 
universalizing, as long as the 
fundaments are given, tend to be 
permeated with less intensive or 
very little conation if any. All 
conation, with regard to cogni-
tional processes, appears to be 
connected with the reproduction 
of items and their clarification 
rather than with educing relations 
and correlates, in other words, 
with operations on the lower, 
rathe: than thl6higher level of conscJ.ousness. 
For these writers conation is a ter.m used to indicate 
general feelings of striving, seeking, and affective activ-
ities; while volition is the movement towards a definite goal 
15Howard L. Philp. "An Experimental Study of the Frustration 
of Will-Acts and Conation", The British Journal of Psychol-
.!2&• :Monograph Supplements,Vol. m (1936) P• 35. 16Borislav P. Stevanovic. "An Experimental Study of the 
Mental Processes Invol.ved in Judgment", The British Journal 
of Psychology. Monograph Supplements, V"'"i":- IV (1927) No. 12, 
P• 119. 
14 
which has already been intellectually perceived. Thus voli-
tion is a for.m of conation only in the sense that it is an 
affective process rather than a cognitive process. Conation 
is never identified with volition. 
In our work, the term conation is used in the same sense 
as that ado;pted by Dr. Aveling, Father McCarthy, and others in 
their experiments on volition and conation. Thus conation 
refers to the strivings of the organism in a broad extent of 
the ter.m; volition refers, specifically, to the movements of a. 
rational nature, as we shall see more minutely in the follow-
ing Chapter. As Wyatt reminds us, •we must carefully avoid 
confusing physical effort with psychic initiative. 1117 Cona-
tion then is the ttexperience of effort.w18 
That volition influences very many internal mental prcc-
esses is a fact known to all from experience. The light of 
intellect becomes operative by means O·f volitional activity. 
St •. Thomas Aquinas, and Aristotle before him, have always 
recognized the impotence of cognitive powers without will. 
"Intellect shows the way and will supplies the driving power. 
Intellect is the light and will the force of life.w19 Differ-
17The Psycholos;y of Intellis;ence and Will. New Yorke Harcourt 
18Brace and Company, 1931, P• 156. Ibid. 
l9Boyd Barrett. Strength of Will. New York:: P. ;r. Kenedy 
and Sons, 1915, p. 74. 
15 
ences between the logical thought as directed by will and the 
revery of day dreams are commonly recognized. Nevertheless, 
by means of objective experiments, we can gain a more intimate 
knowledge of the quality of these vo·li tional effects. While 
their existence is unquestionabUe, it is the purpose of exper-
imental dat& to enhance the evidence already at hand. Our 
purpose then is not to reveal an undiscovered principle, but 
merely to observe and to investigate the quality and nature 
of certain volitional effects. Since the higher processes 
themselves are not quantifiable, the most valuable results of 
experiments involving these activities are largely qualitative 
ones. However, by means of timing responses, temporal differ-
ences can also be observed. 
Experimental procedures do .not constitute the sole pur-
pose of this thesis. Invaluable work has aiready been accom-
plished in will psychology. In order to profit by the methods 
of others and data already secured, we will att.empt to review 
the classic experiments on volitional activities and the out-
standing theories of will a.s well. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF VOLITION 
Will is a dynamic source of many other mental processes. 
Though it is true that a thing must first be perceived before 
it is desired, it is also true that it must be possessed in 
order to be actually enjoyed. 
Whence also intellectual natures 
have a like disposition to good 
as apprehended through an intel-
ligible form, so as to rest 
therein when possessed and when 
not possessed to seek to possess 1 it; bath of which pertain to will 
• • • Will in us belongs to the 
app,etitive part, which, although 
named from appetite, has not far 
its only act to seek what it does 
not possess but also to love and2 delight in what it does possess. 
Intellect and will are cqmpl.ementary powers, the o:ne f'ructi-
fying the other. While intellect perceives the good, will 
moves toward and possesses the good. The act of will is in-
complete and barren without the aid of intellect. st. Thomas 
l. St. Thomas Aquinas. ~Summa Theologica, I, xix, a..l, c. 
trans. by Anton c. Pegis in Basic Writings of' Saint Thomas 
2Aquinas. New York: Random House, 1944. ~·, I XIX, ad. 2um. 
16 
17 
frequently refers to the complementary interaction between 
intellect and will. 
The good co,nsidered under the 
notion of good, i.e., as appetible, 
pertains to the will before per-
taining to the reason. But it 
pertains to the reason considered 
under the notion of the true before 
pertaining to the will under the 
notion of good; for the will cannot 
desire a good that is ~ot previously 
apprehended by reason. · 
The nature of will itself is c.l.o.sely related to the kind and 
degree of knowledge from which it arises. ~us, in man we 
find that there are as many appetitive powers as there are 
cognitive pomers. The movements of sensitive appetite spring 
from our sensory c.ogni tions, while voluntary acts follow 
intellectual motives. Human acts are the end results of this 
complementary interaction of intellect and will; for such acts 
are the outcome of voluntary decisions and choices which, in 
turn, presupposed intellectual. p.erception and evaluation. 
Will is active only because it has been stimulated toward an 
object presented by the intellect. Previous evaluations are 
necessary before any desire is aroused on the pa.rt of will. 
There can be no willing, no final possession of an object 
3 
Ibid., I-II, xix, a. 3ad. lum.; xi, a.l, ad. 2um, ad 3um. 
18 
without previous knowledge of the object, and there can be no 
knowledge unless there is implicit willingness to know. Com-
menting upon St. Thomas's affirmation of the inner relation~ 
between intellect and will Rousselot says, 
He iooked upon will as a tendency 
towards the good in general, and 
consequent1y he had to find in 
knowledge the determining prin-
ciple for each concrete human 
action. Seeing that man's ideal 
was to real.ize himself intellec-
tually, it followed that the only 
way he had of acting volunta.rily 
was by recourse to intellectual 
motives. Will is something deri-
vative: it springs from mind and 
acts for mind. And just as liberty 
has its root and sourc~ in the 
amplitude of inte1lect's proper 
object (Ex hoc enim quod ratio 
deliberans se habet ad opposita, 
voluntas in utrumque potest), so; 
each particular human act must be 
traced to an intellectual percep-
tion and voluntary decisions take 
their rise therein.4 
Because intellect and will are fundamentally of the same 
nature and rooted in the essence of the soul, their operations 
are interdependent. 
The will moves the intellect as 
to the exercise of its acts since 
even the true itself, which is 
4The Intellectualism of St. Thomas. Trans. by Rev. James E. 
O'Mahony. New York:--Sheed and Ward, 1935, p. 200. 
the perfection of the intellect, 
is included in the universal 
good as a particular good. But 
as to the determination of the 
act, which the act derives from 
the object, the intellect moves 
the will; for the good itself is 
apprehended under a special aspect 
as contained in the universal true. 
It is therefore evident that the 
same is not mgver and moved in the 
save respect. 
The cooperative relationship between intellect and will is 
19 
perhaps even more evident in an act of choice. Evaluations 
and counsel are made by intellectual cognition; and will 
supplies approval and makes the final choice. It is clear 
that all such operations are ultimately dependent upon the 
joint operation of both intellect and will. 
While both of these faculties are rational and immaterial 
and therefore essentially alike, they differ specifically fr&m 
one another by their modus operandi. The difference in oper- · 
ation arises from the diversity of aspects existing in all 
objects. Thus, the proper object of will differs from that of 
intellect. •What is apprehended and what is desired are the 
same in reality, but differ in aspect; for a thing is appre-
hended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is 
desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect 
5 !a! Summa Theologica, I-II, ix, a.l, ad. 3um. 
20 
in the objects, and not material diver-sity, which demands a. 
diversity of p,owers. •6 
Will resembles instincts, drives, and impulses in so far 
as all move towards an object. Both will and sensible appetite 
ar~ in the same genera of potencies, i.e., both are appetitive 
in character and are aroused to action by some form of good. 
But the differentiation between these two kinds of p.owers is 
an unbridgable one, for it is a difference arising from the 
essential nature of each. In this distinction lies the crux. 
of the dissensions and controversies which have existed since 
the very beginnings of philosophical inquiries. The everlast-
ing thirst of man :for satisfaction has never yet been quenched 
by the possession of material goods or by indulgence in sensual 
pleasures. Above and beyond these tendencies, the supra-
sensuous power of wi11 seeks a higher good, an object proper 
to its own nature. In this very insatiability of man's 
desires, there is ample proof that some power within him 
strives for an infinite good. Upon this necessary distinction 
rests the whole of will psychology. To understand anything 
about will, we must necesaarily first consider its rational 
6Ibid., I, 1xxx, a.l, ad. 2um. 
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nature. Materialists discuss will in the sense of a dominant 
instinct or tendency, and in doing eo distort the whole pur-
pose of human psychology. st. Th~as explicitly sets forth 
this distinction as an integral factor in the entire field of 
psychology. 
We must needs say that the intel-
lectual appetite is a distinct 
power from the sensitive appetite. 
For the appetitive power is a pas-
sive power, which is naturally 
moved by the thing apprehended. 
Therefore !h! apprehended appetible 
is a mover which is not moved, while 
the-appetite ~ a:Moied mover ••• 
Now things pa.ssi ve and movable are 
differentiated according to the 
distinction of the corresponding 
active and motive principles, for 
the motive must be proportienate 
to the movable, and the active te 
the passive. Indeed the passive 
power itself has its very nature 
from its relation to its active 
principle. Therefore, since what 
i~ apprehended by the intellect 
and what is apprehended by sense 
are generically different, conse-
quently, the intellectual a.ppetfte 
is distinct from the sensitive. 
Concerning will itself there are further distinctions to 
be made. The term will designates the spiritual faculty which 
tends toward some object intellectually perceived as good. 
Some scholastics prefer to include in .their definition the 
7 Ibid., I, 1xxx, a.2, c. 
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twofold aspect of will. • ••• all internal acts of the will 
involve ~ conscious 'inclination' toward !a object intellec-
tually apprehended .!,! good, .2£ .! conscious •aversio·n' ~ .!:!! 
object intellectually apprehended ~ evi1.•8 st. Thomas 
himself refers frequently to the negative aspect of will in 
his various discussions on the object of volition and also in 
his dissertations on the problem of evil. "Accordingly, the 
will is referred both to good and to evil, but to good by 
desiring it, and to evil, by shunning it. Therefore the 
actual desire of good is called will ( voli ticm), meaning 
thereby the act of will • • • the shunning of evil is better 
described as nolition; and so just as volition is of good, so 
no.lition is of evil. •9 
Evil is an absence of some geod; and therefere aversion 
involves at least a negation of a potential attraction. For 
evil is the absence of a reality, a reality which is proper to 
a thing and ought to be present in it. Evil is none other 
than a defect, a lack of something, a privation of a required 
good. If the reality which is lacking in the case of evil 
were present, a. good would result towards which the will would 
8Hubert Gruender. Experimental Psychology. New York and 
9Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1932, p. 397. ~Summa Theologica, I-II, viii, a.l, ad. 1 um. 
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strive. Aversion, then, implies attraction to the opposite 
10 good. 
To shun evil is definitely a movement of will and not 
merely an attitude or state of mind, as is the case of cer-
tain sentiments. One who is in sorrow is concerned with some 
evil which has befallen him and which has caused his parti-
cular state of mind. However, there may be no volitional 
activity involved in sorrow, while an act of will which is 
directed toward the avoidance of evil necessarily involves a 
specific operation of wi1r. 11 
Volition pertains to all appetitions on the rational 
level. Thus, desires of a rational kind are volitions; so 
also are decisions, determinations, choice,and the like. In 
lO"Homo non prosequitur sibi nisi bonum; se non avertit n2s2 a 
malo. ~uae aversio a malo tamquam sui rationem implicite 
continet amorem boni oppositi. ~uamobrem bonum ab intel-
lectu propositwn volunta.ti, est objectum formal.e voluntatis 
••• ~ui abhorret a privatione perfectionis, implicite 
adhaeret perfectioni, eamque concupiscit." Gustavus 
Lahousse. Praelectiones MetaphYaicae Specialis, Vol. II 
Psychologia. Lovanii: Neo-Eboraci, Benziger et Fr., 1888, 
11p. 441. ttin affectionibus quidem habetur oppositio qualitatum gra.-
tarum et ingratarum: contristatio enim est status positivus 
aeque ac delectatio.. In appetitionibus autem non ha.betur 
talis oppositio: nam aversio a malo nihil aliud est nisi 
prosecutio boni oppositi, neque aversio est status positivus 
animi sicut contristatio, sed est mere aspectus negativus 
actus prosequendi bonum. Gerardo Esser, s.v.n. Psychologia. 
Techny: Typis Domus Missionum ad St. Mariam, 1931, P• 350. 
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brief, will refers to the rational appetitive faculty; and 
volition, to the acts of this faculty. 
Volitions differ according to their objects. The will 
tends toward universal good of necessity and because of its 
nature, while the movement of will towards some particular 
object may be free and deliberate. 
Therefore if the will be offered 
an object which is good univer-
sally and from every point of view, 
the will tends to it of necessity, 
if it wills anything at all; since 
it cannot will the opposite. If, 
on the other hand, the will is of-
fered an object that is not good 
from every point of view, it will 
not tend to it of necessity. And 
since the lack of any good what-
ever· is a non-good, consequently, 
that good alone which is perfect 
and lacking in nothing is such a 
good that the will cannot not-will 
·it; and this is happiness. But 
any other particular goods, in so 
far· as they are lacking in some 
good can be regarded as non-goods; 
and, from this point of view, they 
can be set aside or approved by the 
will, which can tend to one and the 
same thing from various points of 
view.l2 
Thus, the will seeks and moves toward universal good by reason 
of its very nature. For will to seek universal good is not 
12~summa Theologica, I, l.xxx, a.. 2, c. 
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to act deliberately or specifically, but it is rather ta act 
in a way which is essential to its very existence. In the 
presence of universal good, there is no alternative for will; 
it is impelled towards it by an intrinsic necessity. However, 
even in regard to beatitude we must be careful to make distinc-
tiona concerning the operations of will. Necessity pertains 
not to the exercise of the act,but only to the determination 
of the act. It is impossible to will the opposite of beat-
) 
itude. But the exercise of will,under special conditions, is 
free in regard to any object; for man is able to will not to 
think even of beatitude. In respect to objects, then, the will 
is always free; for no matter what the object may be it is 
always within man's power not to think of it •13 
As for particular goods, will may or may not tend toward 
them. Man is master of his acts in the presence o.f particular 
goods, since he is not impelled towards them naturally, either 
in the determination or exercise of his will. Only that which 
13Ibid., I-II, x, a. 2, c.; also, ttcum aut em voluntas d icatur 
libera inquantum necessitatem non habet; libertas voluntatis 
in tribus considerabitur ••• Sed quantum ad primum horum 
inest libertas voluntati in quolibet statu naturae respectu 
cujuslibet objecti... Ordinis Praedicatorum Opera Omnia, Tom. 
IX, quaestiones Di~utatae ~ Veritate, XXII, a.6. Parmae: 
Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1859. 
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is necessarily concerned with man's happiness commands his 
will. However, because of the deficiencies of the human 
intellect, the Absolute Good is apprehended in this life only 
14 in an imperfect manner. At other times particular goods are 
so presented by the intellect that they appear as a. universal 
good. 
The absolute norm of 'the good', 
however, can be approached as 
interpreted by reason in various 
ways, prudently, or imprudently, 
in accordance with the more or 
less changeable and fallible 
human judgment, and the formation 
of the judgment itself is man's 
responsibility, depending, as it 
were, on his more or less adequate 
realization of the nature of 'the 
good' an~ 'the end' and on his more 
or less developed intellectual 
faculty of comparative evaluation. 
Thus, reason may 'substitute' 
pseudo values for the real Abso-
lute, and it may present to the 
will these surrogatel5as acceptable and desirable goods. 
14
"Bonum autem perfectum, quod es~ Deus, necessarium quidem 
connexionem habet cum beatitudine hominis, quia sine eo non 
p.otest homo esse beatus; verumtamen necessi ta.s hujus con-
nexionis non manifeste apparet homini in ha.c vita, quia Deum 
per essentiam non videt; et ideo etiam voluntas hominis in 
hac vita non ex necessitate Deo adhaeret; sed voluntas eorum 
qui Deum per essentiam videntes, manifeste cognoscunt ipsum 
esse essentiam bonita.tis et beatitudinem hominis, non poteet 
Deo non inhaerere, sicut nee voluntas nostra poteet nunc 
beatitudinem non velle.• ~., Tom. VIII, Quaestiones Dis-
15putatae De M!!!t III, a.3. 
K. F. Reinhardt. ! Realistic Philosophy. Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1944, P• 133. 
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In order that any object move the will, it is necessary that 
it first be apprehended by the intellect, for the will itself 
is a blind faculty. Because of man's imperfect intellectual 
nature, an object may be erroneously represented to the will. 
For man•·s intellect does not always perceive at once the good 
or evil in all. their possible relationships. "Now it is the 
result of the imperfection of man's intellectua1 nature that 
his intellect does not immediately possess all things capable 
of being understood, but only a few things, from which he' is 
moved in a measure to grasp other things.•16 For this reason 
man often errs in choosing means which are not directed toward 
his ultimate goal; or, on the other hand, the will may actuaicy 
avoid the greater good in its preference for the lesser good, 
because of the same circumstances. The intellect may even 
represent good where none actually exists, or may so present 
the lesser good as to make it apparently the greater good. 
In the same manner, evil is often made to be an apparent good. 
Thus the will, in this life, may not adhere to object·s which 
have a necessary connection with our ultimate end. 
16 
But there are some things which 
have a necessary connection with 
happiness, namely, those by means 
~Summa Theologica, I, lx, a. 2, c. 
of which man adheres to God, in 
~Vhom alone true happiness con-
sists. Nevertheless, until through 
the certitude produced by seeing 
God the necessity of such a con-
nection be shown, the will does 
not adhere to God of necessity, 
nor 1~ those things which are of 
God. 
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It is clear, then, that will tends necessarily only to 
what is presented as absolute good. The will desires, of 
necessity, happiness; and whatever else it desires,it does so 
freely. Now only God, the Absolute Good, is without imperfec-
tion, and therefore the only thing the will cannot not-will. 
Any other good, no matter how desirable it may actually be in 
itself, contains imperfection which is a non-good, and there-
fore not necessarily desirable by manta will. 
And since the lack of any good 
whatever is a non-good, conse-
quently, t.hat good alone which 
is perfect and lacking in nothing 
is such a good that the will can-
not not-will it; and this is hap-
piness. But any other particular 
goods, in so far as they are lacking 
in some good, can be regarded as 
non-goods; and, from this point 
of view, they can be set aside or 
approved by the will, which can 
tend to one and the same thin~ 
from various points of view.l 
i~!B!£., I, lxxxii, a. 2, c. lBi£., I-II, x, a. 2, c. 
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Kan is not free to choose his ultimate goal, for he was 
created for happiness and is necessarily destined by nature 
for this .end. But the means by which beatitude is finally 
attained is left to the free choice of man. If perfect hap-
piness is not reached on the day of reckoning, failure to 
reach the goal is inevitably the result of contrary means, 
freely chosen. -we are masters of our own actions by reason 
of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards, 
not the end, but ~means i! !h! ~, as the Philosopher says. 
Consequently, the desire of the ultimate end is not among those 
actions of which we are masters. •19 
Rational appetitive acts may also be distinguished either 
as elicited acts of the will or as commanded acts of will. 
This division clarifies the explanations for acts performed 
contrary to will, i.e. acts performed through coercion. 
Elicited acts of will are internal volitions, and proceed from 
within the appetitive faculty itself. Such acts are indepen-
dent of any force external to will, and may be performed 
regardless of contrary extrinsic manifestations. Commanded 
acts of the will are those acts which are executed by the will 
19Ib1·d ... I .,~-·i 1 ad oz 
.. , ...~..A.AAJ. , a • , • .JUin. 
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itself or some other power. Thus, the will might command an 
action of the body which remains unperformed because of an 
external obstacle. In such a case, will itself is not inter-
nally impeded, and remains unchanged; only the attempt to 
manifest itself externally in a particular w a.y is thwarted. 
In endeavoring to shift an ambiguous figure, the subject may 
fail to acquire the desired rate of oscillation, not because 
will is lacking, but because obstacles are present. On the 
other hand, a man may be forced to give up his personal pos-
ses&ons to a robber, not because he wills it, but because 
physical violence forces him to do so. •As regards the com-
manded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, 
.. 
in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from 
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper 
act, violence cannot be done to the wi11.•20 
The clarification between an immediate act of will and a 
voluntary action is also necessary before complete understand-
ing of will psychology can be attained. An act of will pro-
ceeds directly from the rational faculty itself, while the 
voluntary action results, in turn, from an act of will. A 
voluntary action proceeds from the will, indirectly, in so far 
20Ib. . 4 ~ , I-II, v1, a. , c. 
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as other means are necessary for its performance. For the 
execution of an act of will, rational appetite, preceded by 
intellectual apprehension alone suffices; for a voluntary 
action, there may be any number of other faculties or powers, 
either of mind or body, needed for the fulfillment of the 
will-act. Time may elapse between the act of will and the 
voluntary action commanded. "The act of the will is twofoldJ 
one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, 
1Q will; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and 
put into execution by means of some other power: e.g., i! 
walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be 
. 21 
executed by means of the power of locomotion." Many of the 
reaction-time experiments have centered around this precise 
difference, and have sought to investigate the time element 
between decision and actual performance. 
We must take care, in these explanations of will~tiv-
ities, not to imply any disunity either of the volitional 
faculty itself or of the human person. Whatever action is 
volitional in character, proceeds from and is a manifestation 
of the rational appetite. Likewise,. it is the whole man who 
wills and the whole man who performs voluntary actions. Though 
21 ~., I-II, vi, a.4, c. 
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at one time will dominates the pattern of human activity and 
at another time does not, there are no actions which can be 
attributed solely to one part of man. Distinct powers do not 
operate in complete independence of each other in man, for the 
one is influenced by the very existence of the other. All 
powers and actions in man manifest various aspects of the same 
hylomorphic unity. Man is essentially a unified whole; and 
consequently any one of his actions whatsoever proceeds from 
a unified self. Man wills and man performs voluntary actions. 
In the first case, will alone dominates the picture; in the 
second, will together with the powers needed for the requested 
operation dominates the pattern of activity. Whatever the 
action, it is the same unified self, the same personality who 
is agent. 
Scholastic philosophy has always emphasized the signifi-
cant distinction between human acta (actus humani) and acta crf 
man (actus hominis), because of the moral implications inYolved. 
An inadvertent act (often termed 
an act of man) is an act which, 
though per~ed by a human being, 
does not depend on his free will. 
Man has, or exercises, no dominion 
over such actions. For example, 
man has no control of the beating 
of the heart or of talking in his 
sleep. He does not exercise 
dominion over thoughts indulged 
in during a moment of distraction; 
nor over actions performed in 
walking, eating, etc., without 
reflection ••• 
A human act is an act that 
is deliberately performed by one 
possessed of the use of reason. 
Deliberately performed means 
that it is freely and knowingly 
placed. It is deliberately elicited 
by the will. Man has dominion 
over such actions as thinking with 
deliberation; eatin2~ drinking, 
etc., deliberately. 
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Acts of man, though indeliberate, are volitional in the sense 
that :man's nature is rational and free. In human acts the 
will exercises its freedom. The phrase, actus hominis, refers 
to the impulsive and indeliberate or even unconscious acts of 
man. They are voluntary only in a wider sense, in so far as 
they are preceded by an apprehension of an end, but are the 
outcorne·of an internal principle, i.e., they are indeliberate. 
11
.Tust as natural tendency springs from nature and is in accord 
with it, so does the tendency which corresponds to senstive 
23 
and intellectual nature follow from knowledge." At times, 
acts of man are simply spontaneous ones without any previous 
choosing or rejecting. Again, they may not be wholly instinc-
tive, but because the higher faculties of the soul play a 
2~dwin Hea1y, Moral Guidance. Chicago: Loyola University 
23P:ess, 1943, pp. 6-?. P~erre Rousselot. opus cit., P• 
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minor part, they cannot be considered as truly human acts. 
The term, actus humani, refers to actions in which there is 
both apprehension of the end sought and knowledge and consent 
to the desire or acquisition of the apprehended goal. Human 
acts are both free and deliberate. Hence, the will exercises 
its prerogative only when requisite conditions are fulfilled. 
First of all, will is free when it is at liberty to choose or 
not to choose; to act or not to act; furthermore, the will is 
free when it is capable of selecting one or the other means of 
24 
obtaining its goal. 
This point again brings us to the explanation of univer-
sal good as compared with a par-ticular good. The source of 
freedom lies in the nature of intellect. Because of natural 
imperfections, the intellect in our present life is unable 
24
•cum autem voluntas dicatur libera inquantum necessitatem 
non habet; libertae volunta.tis in tribua considerabitur; 
scilicet quantum ad actum, inquantum poteet velle vel non 
vel1e· et quantum ad objectum, inquantum poteet velle hoc 
v.el iilud, et ejue opp·oei tum; et quantum ad ordinem finis, 
in quantum poteet velle bonum vel malum. Sed quantum ad 
primum horum ineet libertas voluntati in quolibet statu 
naturae respectu cujuslibet objecti. Secundum vero horum 
est reepectu quorundam objectorum; scilicet respectu eorum 
quae sunt ad finem, et non ipsius finis, et etiam secundum 
quemlibet statum naturae. Tertium vero non est respectu 
omnium objectorum, sed quorundam eorum, scilicet quae sunt 
ad finem; nee respectu cujuslibet status naturae, sed illiue 
tantum in quo natura deficere poteet. Nam ubi non est 
defectus in apprehendendo et conferendo, non poteet esse 
voluntas mali in his quae aunt ad finem sicut patet in 
beatis. Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velie malum nee est 
libert:as nee pars libertatis, quamvie sit quoddam libertatis 
signum.• Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, XXII, a.6. 
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to apprehend Absolute Good, towards which will would be 
impelled. Intellect apprehends only limited good, or Absolute 
d . 1. . t d 25 Goo ~n a ~m~ e manner. For this reason, will may accept 
or reject an object, under proper conditions. 
Some scholastics have made further differentiations of 
voluntary actions. These distinctions are helpful especially 
when considering lower levels of responses. The latter are 
often confused with one or the other kinds of voluntary action. 
For example, habits are interpreted by some psychologists, 
merely as types of conditioned reflexes. 
Father Gruender tells us that an action may be actually 
voluntary when its performance is 'Willed directly; or it may 
be virtually voluntary \'lhen the action results from a volition 
made at some previous time; or it may be habitually voluntary, 
i.e., an action initiated by the will, but through repetition 
is now performed mechanically. 
A movement is actually voluntarl 
when the internal act of the vlill 
guiding it is'here and now pre-
sent. A movement is virtually 
voluntary v1hen it is a component 
part of a series of movements and 
the internal act to perfor.m this 
particular movement is implied in 
the intention to perform th~ whole 
25 See above pp. 24 ff • 
series of movements. A movement 
is habituall~ voluntary when it is 
so entirely given over to the neuro-
muscular system that it is performed 
without any attention of any kind 
and can be called voluntary only, 
because sometime in the past I have 
voluntarily ~5eated this physiolo-
gical habit. 
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So far we have confined our discussion to a description 
of voluntary actions. The bulk of psychological experimen-
tations already performed have been confined to reactions on 
other levels of.response. In many cases, experimenters have 
interpreted their results in such a way as to indicate their 
belief that mechanical or instinctive responses constitute the 
highest level of both human and aniL~l activity. The 
Behaviorists ha..ve vigorously contended that their experimental 
results prove the all importance of conditioned reflexes in 
human as \,ell as in animal behavior. All the complexities of 
the human or animal organism are explained in terms of re~es. 
Followers of the Freudian and Hormic Schools have refuted the 
conditioned reflex theories,and claim that instincts are the 
driving forces of all life. As a contrast to the subsequent 
investigation of will experiments and to the previous discus-
sion of volitio~ it will be beneficial to review briefly some 
26Hubert Gruender, Problems£! Psychology. Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Company, 193?, pp. 6?-68. 
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of the outstanding experiments on reflex and instinctive 
behavior, and also to study the nature of these non-volitional 
responses. 
Non-Volitional Responses 
The experiments of Pavlov, Bechterev, Thorndike,and 
Watson, gave much impetus to the study of reflexes. Through 
the influence of Watson and Thorndike in America, the stimulus-
response bond v;as upheld by many as the inevitable answer to 
the intricacies of human behavior. Man was, accordingly, 
reduced to a mass of physical connections, and the human 
personality, to the sum total of biological genes. Volition, 
as wel1 as thought, sensation, and all mental processes, was 
explained in t erma of reflexes. Will, as an immaterial faculty, 
was discarded as an imaginary power, a remnant of medieval 
metaphysics. Terms referring specifically to any of the 
rational processes were rated as unnecessary appendages in 
scientific studies. The extremists even considered instincts 
but another name for a series of conditioned reflexes. Deter-
minism was riding on the crest of the wave. The mechanists 
claimed that all the complexities of human behavior were 
ultimately reducible to reflexes. 
38 
The animal experiments of Pavlov constituted one of the 
first great studies of the conditioned reflex. The universal 
popularity of these experiments, along with those of Watson, 
gave birth to modern behaviorism, and the conditioned reflex 
formed the very core of behavioristic mechanism. By means of 
the conditioned reflex technique, attempts were made to inves-
tigate the whole of human behavior, and also to determine its 
very nature and character. 
The much quoted experiment,and the standard example given 
by behavioriste, is that of Pavlov's conditioning of dogs. A 
conditioned reflex refers to a response aroused by a stimulus 
other than the original one. Thus the original~imulus for a 
salivary response in dogs is the presence of food on the 
tongue. Pavlov rang a bell every time food was presented to 
the dogs, and this procedure was continued for a number o·f 
times. Afterwards, the bell alone, without the presence of 
27 the food, was found to cause the flow of saliva in the dogs. 
The materialists were quick to generalize on such a prin-
ciple, and applied their generalizations to human as well as 
animal behavior. The behaviorists soon established the 
stimulus-response bond as the unit of activity; complex activ-
27 Ivan P. Pavlov. Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes, Vol. II, 
trans. by w. Horsley Gantt:-New York: International Publish-
ers, 1941, Chapter LVII. 
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ities were but combinations and integrations of S-R units. By 
means of conditioning, it was mow thought that the whole proc-
ess of behavior could be studied. One could build up or tear 
down any phase of human activity. Conditiening provided a 
method that was completely objective. As Watson states, the 
aim o.f all psychology is to predict and control behavior, and 
by studying the responses .occasioned by stimuli it is pos-
sible to achieve this goal with great accuracy.28 The inef-
ficiency of introspection, the accepted method of the 
Structuralists, could at last be eliminated and replaced by a 
thoroughly scientific and objective technique• 
John Watson, after the example of Pavlov, attempted to 
discover further facts about conditioned reflexes. He did not 
restrict his experiments to animals, but endeavored to eubstan-
tiate the application of the reflex theory to human behavior 
by perfor.ming experiments on children. He began this study a.n 
the premise that there was nothing of a subjective nature in 
the child itself which contributed to its own development. 
The outcome of the individual, his position in life, his 
personality, his character--all were the result of condition-
ing and environment. Watson's most famous experiments were 
28John B. Watson. Psychology F.!:!!! 1!!!, Standpoint Slf ~ 
Behaviorist. Philadelphia and Londonr J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1929, Chapter I. 
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those which dealt with the emotions of children. Through a 
series of tests, Watson presented a rabbit to the young child 
under prescribed conditions. On his first experience with the 
furry animal the infant showed no fear whatsoever, but when 
the animal was repeatedly pre~ented at the same time a loud 
noise was sounded,the child was soon •conditioned" to fear the 
rabbit. Like experiments were performed to test the child's 
responses to fire, large dogs, snakes, white rats,etc. From 
the results obtained, Watson concluded that all types of 
learning and all behavior patterns proceed in the same way by 
f d . t. . 29 means o con ~ 1on~ng. His famous proclamation sums up the 
extreme view of behaviorism. 
Give me a dozen healthy infante, 
well formed, and my own specified 
world to bring them up in and I'll 
guarantee to take any one at random 
and train him to become any type of 
specialist I might select--a doctor, 
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and 
yes, even into begga.r-man and thief, 
regardless of his talents, penchants, 
tendencies, abilit~es, vocations, and 
raoe of ancestors. 0 
29Ibid., Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company 
Inc., 1925, Cha~ters VII and VIII. 30carl. Murchison ted.). Psychologies of 1925. Worcester: 
Clark Univer~ity Press, 1928, p. 10. 
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Conditioning, reconditioning, unconditioning--all are 
methods dependent upon environment. In his many experiments 
on new born infants, Watson found few unlearned responses. 
Consequently, he concluded that all patterned responses 
develop after birth through the influence of environment only. 
Pre-natal environment as well was thought to be an important 
factor in later development of responses. Besides these con-
ditions there was little else, if anything, to account for 
man's behavior. 
Such extreme mechanism reduces man to a state of "proto-
plasmic plasticity". What is really an integral part of the 
individual himself is interpreted as some phase of environment. 
The individuality of the human person, the contributions of 
self, the influence of innate tendencies, and above all, man's 
prerogative to exercise free will, are all entirely disregarded 
in the behavioristic explanations of human activities. Expla-
nations of human actions in terms of reflexes reduce these 
actions to an unconscious level. 
Reflexes are localized bodily reactions:;; a.nq thus are 
not even reactions of the organism as a whole. A reflex 
stimulus need not be a conscious one, though it may be. 
Reflexes are specifically confined to the biological level and 
can, therefore, be stimulated independently of will. In 
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reducing human behavior to this level of response, materialism 
reached its nadir. Man was deprived not only of free will 
but also of consciousness. "The conditioned reflex instead ef 
banishing introspection and explaining consciousness in 
voluntary action, itself demands an explanatien.•31 The 
attemp.t to explain all human behavior, even the higher proc-
esses of thought and volition, in terms of reflex responses 
only increased the confusion existing in psychological circles. 
Repercussions to the reflex theory occurred in the subse-
quent over-emphasis on sensory dynamics. Mechanism had 
deviated too far from a common sense psychology of behavior. 
Rejection of consciousness and the failure to account for 
dynamic tendencies in both human and animal life were the two 
most obnoxious features of behaviorism. Reactionary theories, 
accordingly, sought to emphasize the importance of instincts, 
impulses, drives, and urges. Consciousness was restored, but 
not to its rightful place. Freudians designated the uncon-
scious level as the harbor of all man's urges and drives, and as 
the source of all human dynamism. Other theories concentrated 
on instincts striving toward purposive goals. 
31Thomas v. Moore. Dynamic Psychology. Philadelphia and 
London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1924, p. ?2. 
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Instinctive responses are common both to man and to 
animal; these tendencies are unlearned dispositions which 
activate the organism to respond in a particular way in a 
given situation. In contrast to the reflex, an instinctive 
response is not a localized one, but rather an activity in 
which the organism as an individual whole is involved. The 
modern concept of instincts includes three aspects: cognitive, 
appetitive, and motor. Thus, sensory perception of an object 
or activity, as desirable or undesirable, precedes the impulse 
towards or away from it, and is subsequently followed by a 
corresponding motor· activity. st. Thomas speaks only of the 
vis aestimativa which corresponds to the cognitive element in 
the modern notion of instinct, though he refers to natural 
inclinations common to both man and animal. "• •• there is 
in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more 
specially, according to that nature which he has in common 
with other animals; and in virture of this inclination, those 
things are said to belong to the natural law which nature ~ 
taught 1£ all animals, such as sexual intercourse, the educa-
tion of offspring and so forth." 32 st. Thomas, however, dis-
tinguishes between the estimative power in man and that of 
animal prudence. 
32 ~Summa Theologica. I-II, lxciv, a. 3, c. 
For the apprehension of intentions 
which are not received through the 
senses, the estimative power is ap-
pointed • • • 
Now, we must observe that as 
to sensible forme there is no dif-
ference between man and animals; 
for they are similarly immuted by 
external sensibles. But there is 
a difference as to the above in-
tentions: for other animals per-
ceive these intentions only by some 
sort of natural instinct, while man 
perceives them also by means of a 
certain comparison. Therefore the 
power which in other animals is 
called the natural estimative in 
man is called the cogitative, which 
by some sort of cg!parison discoYers 
these intentions. 
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The response level of instinct lies midway between reflex 
and rational appetition. ImpulsiYe reactions are higher than 
reflex activities since they require consciousness and 
sensory perception of a goal, but lower than volitional 
activities since they are primarily of a material and sensory 
nature. Instinct in man is essentially the same in itself 
as instinct in animals, but human instinctiye activities dif-
fer from those of the animal because of the ever-present 
influence of man's rational powers. The animal lives and 
moves solely by instinct, while in man instincts and impulses 
are always capable of being made subservient to volition. 
33Ibl"d., I,, __ ... 4 ~111, a. , c. 
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Modern theories have sometimes over-emphasized the role 
of instincts in psychological phenomena. While instincts 
became all important in comparative psychology, they consti-
tute only a part of man's sensory nature. 'Vhat is true for 
the animal in regard to instincts is not equally applicable 
to man. The animal is a creature of instincts; man is endowed 
with an intellect and will which redirect and modify these 
impulsive tendencies. 
Prominent among psychological theories which uphold 
instincts as the source of human dynamics is the Hormic theory. 
William McDougall studied the habitat and development of the 
solitary wasps and also of various types of birds. He care-
fully observed their periods of maturation and the instinctive 
tendencies manifested in all phases of their life-cycle. 34 
Fro.m his experiments on insects and animals, McDougall formu-
lated a theory of instincts which he applied equally to man. 
Greater variabilities in behavior patterns of the latter were 
said to be due to the more complicated organism of human 
beings. The influence of :McDougall's Hormic theory is still 
prevalent in modern psychology, and appears in various 
34
outline of Psycholo~y. New York and Chicago: Charles 
Scribner's sons, 19 3, Chapters II-VII. 
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modified forms. Instinct adequately explains, for the 
materialist, the problems of human dynamics. Volition is 
defined as a higher type of instinct, or as a distinct power 
which is subservient to instincts and drives. As McDougall 
says, 
The instinctive impulses determine 
the ends of all activities and 
supply the driving power by .which 
all mental activities are sustained; 
and all the camplex intellectua~ 
apparatus of the most highly 
developed mind is but a means 
towards these ends, is but the 
instrument by which these im-
pulses seek their satisfactions.35 
In theories of will and in experiments on volitional 
processes, the erroneous concept of' instinct or of other lower 
types of response have vitiated otherwise valuable results. 
For the most part reflex activities are no longer considered 
the predominant factor in human behavior, and because of their 
mechanical nature, psychologists usually refer to them as · 
physiological responses only. But modern dynamism is almost 
entirely centered upon the sensory level of appetition. Will 
in its capacity of a rational dominating faculty is disre-
~drded. Or if will is referred to as a rational power, ra-
tional is understood in the sense of requiring greater 
35 An Introduction to Social Psychology. Boston: John w. Luce 
and Company, 1928, P• 45. 
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complexity of response. No essential distinction between 
sensory and rational appetition is made by the modern non-
scholastic psychologist, and instinct and volition are dif-
ferentiated only on the basis of grea.ter or less variability 
in response patterns. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORIES OF WILL 
The preceding chapter on the nature of volition has pre-
sented the theory of will generally upheld by the Scholastics. 
Differentiations of opinion concerning secondary points have 
resulted in interpretations other than that of St. Thomas. 
However, whatever the variations may be, all Scholastics main-
tain the same fundamental principles concerning will, i.e., 
that will is the rational., appetitive faculty in man and is 
rooted in the very essence of his being. 
The voluntarism of Dune Scotus is strongly opposed to the 
intellectualism of st. Thomas, but the opposition seems to re-
sult from emphasis on one or other faculty and the kind of dis-
tinction that is to be found between them. For st. Thomas the 
volitional process includes both reason and appetite, while in 
Duns Scotus' doctrine we find a definite line of demarcation 
drawn between will as nature and will as the source of free or 
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elective acts. 1 Reason is never the total cause of a free act, 
for liber arbitrium is not predetermined by the judgments of 
reason in any way. Whatever criticisms are presented by reason 
previous to the fiat, will itself remains entirely free to do 
this or that. Thus for Scotus,opposition existed between will 
as a natural tendency and the elicited act of will. St. Thomas, 
as we have already seen, maintains that reason and knowledge 
form an intimate part of the vo-litional process, and that will 
is ultimately derived from intellect. However, both Duns Sc~ 
and st. Thomas were careful to preserve at all timw the imma.te-
rial and rational nature of will. 
The early Greeks, long befo,re the med ievaJL philosophers, 
oftentimes had been vigorously engaged in polemical discussions 
on problems of the will. Controversies aro:se among them in 
their attempt to study and develop a system of ethics. The 
ancient philosophers, as well as the early Christian Fathers, 
1
"Loquendi de appetitu naturali, voluntas quidquid appetit, ap-
petit pr·opter beatitudinem; quia secundum appetitum naturalem 
appetit secundum quod est perfectio ejus: sed quaecumque per-
fectio appetitus naturalis est ejus perfectio in ordine ad ul-
timum ejus perfectionem ••• Si quaestio· aut em quaerat de a.ppetitu 
voluntatis, prout est actus elicitus, sic dico quod non cportet 
quod voluntas appetat quicquid appetit propter finem ultimum." 
Q.uaestiones Q,uatuor Voluminum Scripti Oxoniensis Super Senten-
~' & Suodlibeta. Tom. IV ?ist. 49, ~. IX, no. 18. 
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and the medievalists who followed them, emphasized the intel-
lectual nature of will. The lower passions and faculties were 
described as subservient powers. The ancient philosophers were 
chiefly concerned with the will as the inseparable associate of 
morality. Among the medievalists, problems of will centered 
around the aspect of freedom as opposed to a deterministic 
theory of will. In modern times great impetus has been given 
to the study of will from a psychological standpoint as well as 
from the philosophical aspect. 
Each theory of will is characteristic of some one system 
of philosophy. In other words, a theory of will is an essential. 
constituent of any philosophy of man. The nature of man, his 
course of action, his purpose of existence, the means by which 
he attains his ultimate goal--all are problems intimately re-
lated to will. The various modern schoals of thought have been 
formed upon some basic explanation of man, and in each of these 
schools is found a corresponding interpretation or theory of 
Wille 
Modern schools of psychology have been greatly influenced 
by the philosoj)hy of Locke and Hume. The empirical and induc-
tive methods used by these philosophers gave rise to the present 
day "psychology of behavior" and a new concept of will. 
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.Tohn Locke 
According to Locke, "disquietude" or "uneasiness" consti-
tutes the primary feature of will. Will and freedom, though 
not identical, co-exist in pa~dllel fashion, and both refer to 
••a power to begin or forbear action, continue or end several 
actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies barely by a 
thought or preference of the mind."2 Will is distinguished 
from freedom in so far as it is a power of preference,~hile 
freedom is the power of acting once the preference has been 
made. Thus, there can be will without freedom, but no freedom 
without will. While man is free to act he is not free to will. 
It is this "uneasiness" which determines manta will or prefer-
ence. ttThe motive for continuing in the same state or action 
is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is 
always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon the change of 
state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness.tt3 And again 
Locke says, that the most urgent uneasiness we at any time feel 
is ttthat which ordinarily determines the will successively, in 
2
"An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Philoso.Phical 
Works, Vol. 1, London: George Bell and Sons, 18?5, Book II, 
3Chapter xxi, section 5, 8, 71. Ibid., section 29. 
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that train of voluntary actions which make up our lives ••• but 
that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, 
to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed 
on some absent good: either negative, as indolence to one in 
4 pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure." Will runs 
counter to desire only when that desire is weaker than some 
other. Action thus is always determined by the strongest desire 
or motive. Locke describes the strongest motive as the most 
urgent uneasiness. His idealistic system of philosophy forbade 
him to adnit that an object could be the source of a thou~ht. 
For Locke, mind has no other object except its own ideas; and 
ideas, he claims, ~riginate only from sensations and reflection. 
Therefore, neither can motives of will proceed from reason. 
Such would be the only consistent corollary to his fundamental 
idealism. The only possible object of reason is the simple 
idea which proceeds from sensation and is inevitably accompanied 
by the feeling states. ~elight or uneasiness, one or other of 
them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation 
and reflection; and there is scarce any affection of our senses 
from without, any retired thought ~f our mind within, which is 
4~., section 40, 33. 
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not able to produce in us pleasure or pain."5 In the strict 
sense of Locke's doctrine, the only proper motives~ action or 
will are appetite and desire, as produced by the imagination. 
Only happiness is capable of moving desire,and happiness 
consists in the acquisition of pleasure and avoidance of pain. 
Good and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain, and happiness 
6 in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of. 
Thus man does not err in his pursuit of happiness,for he never 
fails to realize that which is pleasurable. Every one "knows 
7 
what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers." Locke, 
however, avoids pure Hedonism by resorting to the future good 
as a r:J.otive of will. Though will without exception is deter-
mined by the strongest desire,and the&rongest desire is none 
other than the strife for the greatest pleasure, man has the 
power to suspend his desires and stop them from determining his 
will to any action until, "he has examined whether it be really 
of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or 
8 
no." In ather words, man can suspend actions in preference 
for a future pleasure which he deems greater than the present 
5 . 6~., Chapter vii, aection 2. 
7Ibid., Chapter XXI, section 42, Chapter x:x:viii, section 5. Ibid., Chapter xxi, section 58. 
8Ibid., section 56. 
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one. In these comparisons, judgment may err and in doing so 
man becomes responsible for his own actions and preferences. 
'Even in his admission of a possible greater pleasure ob-
tainable in the future,as compared to a present pleasurable 
good, Locke's doctrine reveals an inherent weakness. Since all 
action is determined by impulse to remove the "'uneasiness" 
created by the desire for the greatest pleasure, which is in 
turn derived from the senses, how may we account for the actual 
desires and objects of will which in reality cannot be found in 
the sensible world? Above all, Locke's doctrine of will, though 
it proposes to offer.a basis for morality, is inconsistent with 
true morality when it attempts to explain good and evil in 
terms of pleasure and pain. 
David Hume 
Hume follows closely the theory held by Locke,and defines 
will as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of 
when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or 
9 
new perception of our mind."' Volition is enumerated in the 
9A Treatise 
Religion. 
1898, Vol. 
~ Human Nature and Dialogues Concerning Natural 
London and New York; Longmans, Green and Company, 
II, P• 181. 
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category of passions along with desire and aversion, grief and 
jay, hope and fear. The passions·a.r·ise fro:in good and evil;a..nd 
the internal. impression we feel when we consciously give rise 
to motion is w.ill• Feeling, therefore, becomes an integral 
part of every volition. In Htllllle's philosophy, will is reduced 
to the sensory level and is deprived of its dignity as a · 
rational power. Along with the "other passions" it is fo,unded 
upon pleasure and pain, and may even arise from impulse or 
_instinct. There is no question of will as an intellectual 
faculty to which passions and impulses must be subservient. 
Hume's notion of will is based on his particular concept of 
intellect and reason. "Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them.•1° Following the tenets of ide-
. 
alism, Hume spoke of ideas in terms of unrealities, and reason, 
merely as a concept of mind. InHume's theory, reason could 
neither constitute objects·nor provide motives because he main-
tains that all motives arise from the desire for pleasure. 
Acco,rding to Hume, the only. check to any passion is a mo1tive 
of greater pleasure or a countermotive; therefore there is no 
10Ibid., P• 195. 
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such thing as conflict between reason and passion. Far, •A 
passion mus.t be &ccompanied with same f&lse judgment, in order 
to its being unreasonable; and even then is not the passion, 
properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.•11 
InHume's doctrine, the good as proper object of will refers 
only to pleasure; thus the influencing motives o·f will are al-
ways contained in some form of pleasure. Even as regards moi&l 
good, pleasure remains the dominating factor; for the moral 
good itself is considered a mode of pleasure, and only as.such 
does it ever become· a. motiTe to the will. 
The eensism and hedonism of Locke and Hume are among the 
principle sources of modern materialistic psycho~o.gy. Asse:eia-
tiamism in the realm o.f ideas and an emo.tienal er senseey 
concept of will formed the chief tenets of many schools o! 
thought which succeeded these philosophers. Locke's empiri-
cism with its denial of the immaterial and spiritual has been 
the primary source of modern scientism. 
Jahann Friedrich Herbart 
On the continent Herbart may well be considered an out-
standing forerunner of modern psychologism. The mind in 
11Ibid., P• 196. 
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Herbartian philosophy constitutes an aggregate of faculties; 
more definitively, mind is the sum of sense-perceptions, and 
among these is will. Mind is not a unit but an aggregation of 
many units. The concept of mind is derived from the fundamental 
tenet that all knowledge is based on experience guided by meta-
physical and mathematical principles. Thus psychology is de-
rived from a threefold source; metaphysics, mathematics, and 
experience. 
Ideas themselves are dynamic entities and struggle with 
one another for self-preservation, i.e., for existence in con-
sciousness. Ideas, considered per~· are merely passive states 
of mind, but in their relations with one another and in their 
consequent attempts to reach consciousness they become dynamic 
forces. Oftentimes two ideas fuse and form a continuity of 
thought, while at other times they remain antagonistic and repel 
one another·. 
The distinction between ideas and will, or between cogni-
tion and appetition is not well-defined •••• "all concepts with-
out exception may be expressed as desires and feelings.•12 
Herbart's concept of will is merely the struggle of ideas to 
12 ! Textbook _!a Psychology. Trans. from the German by :Margaret 
K. Smith. New Yorks D. Appleton and Company, 1896 1 p. 140. 
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attain consciousness or to strive for self-preservation. The 
interaction, fusion, and reproduction which constantly take 
place in the world of idea.e form the basis of will activity. 
The response of the mind to outward physical stimuli is pri-
marily a volitional process. The idea which is of greatest 
worth becomes the motive value of will, since it is this ide& 
which reaches consciousness by means of its overpowering 
dynamic strength. In brief, the first activity of mind i~ its 
response to external sense stimuli is a will activity, and the 
worth of each idea determined by its predominance oTer others in 
consciousness is said to be the motive T&lue. 
Will is desire accompanied with 
the presupposition of the attain-
ment of that which is desired. 3 
Actual self-control and the pos-
sibility that a man may carry .ut 
that which he demands and should 
demand of himself depends upon 
the cooperation of several con-
cept-masses. In this, that 
general will is manifested, if 
such has already been formed, 
and in that ease it is alw~ys 
located in some kind of c«ncept-
maes, a great power which may be 
recognized in elery activity that 
has a purpose.l The more cum-
plicated such an activity is, the 
~:Ibid., P• 1?5. 
Ibid., P• 181. 
more manifest is the power of 
that dominating concept-mass in 
which the will of the chief de-
sign has its seat over all the 
others which are subordii~ted to 
it in different degrees. 
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Thus the will, whether it be considered •will in general," 
or "voluntary acts which deal with details,• has its origin in 
these •concept-masses.• The latter are the ideas which have 
succeeded in their attempts at self preservation and have at-
tained existence in consciousness. These concepts, assembled 
together, constitute the sum-total of consciousness. 
Herbart's associationism greatly emphasized the uncon-
scious also. For the most important dynamic activities were 
those in which ideas struggled with one another· for dominance, 
and this process of fusing, blending, repelling, reproducing 
takes place in the realm of the unconscious. 
Franz Brentano 
Between the idealism of Locke and Hume and the objective 
experimentalism of the Leipzig school lies the significant and 
influential group of •act psychologists• under the leadership 
of Franz Brentano. The important aspect in regard to the 
15 
.D.!!·, p. 182. 
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development of ::Brentano's theory was its extreme contrast to 
the prevailing theory of the day. ::Brentano was of Wundt's 
generation. The traditional theory, the psychology with which 
other views and systems were compared and contrasted, was the 
content psychology of the Leip~ig School. Act psychology dared 
to introduce and to emp,b.asize the place of dynamic concepts, & 
measure contrary to all the precepts of the established 
Wundtian orthodoxy. 
::Brentano's empiricism afforded a unique interpretation of 
appetition in general. Within the thr·eefold classification o·f 
mental acts (ideating, judging, feeling) feelings were thought 
to be analogous to judgments and in this way: in judgment 
there is either the decision that a thing is true or that it is 
false; likewise, feeling is either pleasant or unpleasant. In 
the division of the mental processes called feelings, functi~ 
the phenomena of love and hate. Will itself is nothing more 
than the complete functioning of the love-hate activity. The 
third class of mental phenomena contains all the various forms 
of appetition that are listed ordinarily under the names of 
feelings, emotions, instinct, desires, and will. Within this 
third category, all of these appetitive activities form more or 
less of a concatenation according to the degrees of noticeable 
differentiation; so that one may pass from one member of the 
series to the next quite easily and perhaps almost imperceptibly. 
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Herein lies the difference between feeling and will. At one 
. 16 
end of the series stands feeling and at the other end, w111. 
Brentano, like many of the evolutionists and other materi-
alists, considers the higher faculties of man, s·uch as willing 
and understanding, different from sensory knowledge and appeti-
tion only in degree. No matter how pronounced the differentia-
tion may be between a feeling of sadness and an act of will, 
the two functions are separable only in degree of intensity and 
not by any intrinsic distinction of kind. 
In Brentano' s system of values, the phenomenological con-
cept of will is developed more fully. Values in act psychology 
are not external entities existing in the objective world, but 
are derived from the mental activities· of the third class of 
psychic phenomena, namely, feelings. An analogous relationship 
exists between judgment and the love-hate process. Ideating 
consists only in the presentation of objects or contents; but 
in judging and feeling, a movement takes place under the form 
l6"Betra.chten wir als Beispiel die folgende Reihe: Traurig-
keit--Sehnsucht nach dem vermissten Gute--Hoffnung, dass es 
uns zuteil werde--Verlangen, es uns zu verscbaffen--Mut, den 
Versuch zu unternehmen--Willensentschluss zur Tat. Das eine 
Extrem ist ein GefUhl, das andere ein Willen; und sie 
scheinen weit voneinander abzustehen: Wenn man aber auf die 
Zwischenglieder achtet und immer nur die nachetstehenden 
miteinander vergleicht, zeigt sich da nicht uberall der 
innigste Anschluss und ein fast unmer.kl.icher Ubergang?• 
Psycholo~ie .!Q!! Empirischen Standpunkt, Zwei ter· Band, 
Leipzig: Verlag Von Felix Keiner, 1925, P• 84-85. 
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of selection. It is the third class of love-hate which pro-
duces values; the second class, judgment, produces only in-
tended truth or falsehood. The fundamental norms of vallue, 
nameiy, the true, the good, and the beautiful, instead of be-
coming basic themselves, are rather superimposed upon the al-
ready established categories of ideas, judgments, and feelings• 
Thus, the beautiful is the norm of the subject-object relation-
ship which exists in the realm of ideas; it is the result of 
the highest functioning of the ideating process. The true re-
sults from the highest functioning of judgment, while the good 
results from that of feelings or the love-hate faculty. 
Will and sense appetites are grouped together as forms of 
judgment. Neither is judgment restricted to a rational proc-
ess, nor are instinctive impulses confined to the sensory 
realm. Both are but members of a mental series in which the 
various forms progress from the lower to the higher degrees of 
intensity in an unnoticeable transition. 
Brentano reveals his hedonistic tendencies especially in 
his theory of values and in his explanation of the good. One 
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of the essentials of good is its pleasing nature or quality; 
17 if there is no pleasing quality, there is no good. 
Brentano's notion of good is clearly steeped in hedonism 
and is ultimately baaed upon the pleasure principle. Because 
he makes no essential distinction between rational and sensory 
appetition, it logically follows that, for him, a good, in ord~ 
to be so, would conform to both forma of processes. Since 
there is no subjection of one to the other·, both would be 
capable of determining good. When an essential difference is 
recognized between the will and sense appetite, a good in order 
to be a true good must be conformable to man's rational nature. 
An apparent good, such as bodily pleasure,may be an evil because 
of its effect on man's rational nature; and a senso~ displea-
sure may be a true good because it is advantageous for man's 
rational nature. 
17 ~amit ein Akt der Gemntstatigkeit in sich selbst rein gut zu 
nennen sei, dazu gehortr 1. dass er richtig sei, 2. dass 
er ein Akt des Gef&llens, nicht ein Akt des Kissf&llens sei. 
Fehlt ibm das eine oder andere, so ist er bereits in gewisser 
Beziehung in sich selbst schlecht; die Schadenfreude ist 
schlecht aus dem ersten, der Schmerz beim Anblick der 
Ungerechtigkeit aus dem zweiten Grunde. Fehlt ibm beides, so 
ist er noch schlechter, entsprechend dem Prinzip der 
Summierung ••• ~ Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis, Nebst 
Kleineren Abhandlungen ~ Ethischen Erkenntnistheorie ~ 
Lebensweisheit~Herausgegeben ~ Eingeleitet ~ Osk&r Kraus. 
leipzig: Verlag Von Felix Keiner, 1921, P• 60, n. 37. 
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In the explanations of the good and of values,Brentano is 
not entirely consistent. Pleasure is not considered as the 
only actual good. However, he maintains,at the same time,that 
18 feeling is the criterion for degrees of goodness. Here again 
the essential distinction is missing. Intellect and sense do 
not apprehend good in the same manner,and therefore feeling 
cannot be- the criterion for a universal notion of good. To 
establish the criterion for good in man's sensitive nature 
would be to subject the higher power to the lower. "Now, the 
sensitive appetite is not related to the common notion of good, 
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal---But the 
will is related to the good according to the common notion of 
od ltl9 go • • • But if feeling increases or decreases the goodness 
of a thing in itself, as Brentano says, feeling would be the 
criterion of goodness and thus surpass the higher powers which 
would then be dependent upon the lower. Brentano does not 
actually distinguish between real and apparent good; a thing is 
good only if it contains his requisites for good. Actually, 
18
-nemselben Princip entsprechend wichst in dem Falle, wo die 
GemUtstatigkeit gut 1st, die Giite des Aktes mit seiner 
Steigerung, wihrend in analoger Weise in den Fallen, in 
welchen der Akt rein schleeht ist oder wenigstens in 
irgendweleher Beziehung an dem Sehleehten teil hat, die 
Sehleehtigkeit des Aktes mit seiner Intensitit zunimmt.• 
Ibid., p. 60. 
l9st. Thomas Aquinas. !!!! Summa Theologiea. (ed. Pegis) I, 
lxxxii, a. 5, c. 
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the goodness of a thing is independent of feeling because the 
goodness of a thing ~ ~ can be ascertained only by the 
intellect. Feelings are oftentimes moved toward an object 
which the intellect knows to be bad; on the other hand, they 
often repel objects which the intellect knows are good. It is 
precisely this antagonism between the will and lower powers 
j 
which constitutes man's perpetual strife with himself. Cer-
tainly, his feelings alone are no criterion for the goodness or 
badness of a thing. 
Brentano's ~nfluence in the field of dynamics was far 
reaching as well as immediate. In the interpretation of will 
and the appetitive processes in general, the effects of act 
psychology appeared in the theories of Ward, Stout, the 
Wurzburg School, the Gestaltists, Spearman, and others, as well 
as in the Austrian School which adopted act psychology almost 
in its entirety. 
Wilhelm Wundt 
Though a close adherent to Herbartian associationism in 
many respects, Wundt did not adopt Herbart's concept of will 
without modification. He rejected the notion that will is 
merely a simple unconscious quality, a definition upheld by 
some of his predecessors, nor did he agree entirely with 
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Herbart that will was the reaction of ideas to external 
stimuli. Will as defined by Wundt is more closely allied to 
that postulated by Hums--feelings and will are essentially 
interrelated. Will and feelings are not identical, but all 
volitions necessarily include a feeling content; will is a 
composite of feeling and "Affekt•. Characteristic of content 
psychology, will is described •ore as an end product than as 
a process. While feelings are the initial elements, will is 
the final result of the same process. Feeling and will are but 
two aspects of the same process. •In a. concrete voluntary 
action the two are not different processes, but part-phenomena. 
of one and the same process, which begins with an affective 
excitation, and passes over into an a.et of will.•20 Both feel-
ing and will are intimately connected with ideas and appercep-
tion. In fact, the separation between ideas and will is a.n 
a.bstra.ctio.n only. lttfhe separation between these processes is 
one that exists only in psychological abstraction, and has no 
basis in reality.•21 In the same way impulse and will are not 
two different processes, but the same process under differing 
condi tiona: • ••• impulse is not a. process which can be 
20 Lectures .2!! Human !!!2_ Animal Psychology, Trans. from 2A 
Ge~ edition by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener. 
21London: Swan Sonnenschein and Company Lt.d., 1896, P• 224. Ibid., P• 210. 
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distinguished from will, still less opposed to it.•22 
Actually, idea and feeling are a unity; they become separated 
into objective and subjective phenomenon only by abstraction. 
In the same way, will and feeling are considered as two forms 
of experience and actually for.m a. •psychical compound." Fee1-
ings constitute the internal accompaniment of concrete willing. 
According to the Wundtian theory, will is the original 
energy of consciousness; in its primordial form it is a simple 
impulse derived from a previous sensation accompanied by some 
specific feeling tone. Every sensation whether simple or com- . 
plex is characterized by a. corresponding content of feeling 
which is followed by increased intensity and consequent move-
ment. This series of actions or sequence of elemental states 
is an act of will. From a. series of sensation-feeling-action 
contents results the unity of will activity. Volition :for.ms 
the sum total product of these elemental states. 
In contrast to the associationiste,WUndt reduces will to 
a sequence of feeling states or emotional processes. Herbaxt, 
as we recall, had conceived of volition as a particular series 
or arrangement of cognitive phenomena. Consciousness of an end 
22Ibid., P• 225. 
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or goal wa.s not essential to volition in Vlundt's psychol.ogy of 
will. Many voluntary activities occur without previous cogni-
.aance of an end. 
AllL those attributes of sensation 
which endow it with a vivid affective 
tone serve also to make the impres-
sion effective as a motive to will. 
In this case it generally happens 
that the impression, with its strong 
affective tone, is the only motiTe 
present in consciousness: the volun-
tary action is a simple, or, as it is 
or-dinarily expressed, an impulsive 
action. All sense impulses are 
simply tendencies to will connected 
with definite sensations, i.e., they 
are feelings which have a strong 
tendency to pass over into actual 
volition. 
But in course of time mind ac-
quires various disposi tiona towards 
the renewal of previous ideas which 
are themselves connected with defi-
nite voluntary tendencies. An ax-
terna.J. stimulus w,ill not any longer 
simply call out the impulse corres-
ponding to it; but this impulse will 
increasingly tend to influence and 
be influenced by the dispositions 
already existing in the mind. These, 
again, may be transformed into con-
scious motives to will either· by 
the external imp~gssion or by secon-
dary influences.' 
The process of Tolition consists in the fusion of the es-
sential constituents, and these are further divided into the 
23Ibid., P• 232 • 
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three complementary pairs of elementary feelings. Pleasantness 
and unpleasantness, excitement and depression, tension and 
relaxation are the elemental contents which fuse in any number 
of different ways in order to form, ultimately, a will activity. 
Without this particular concomitant fusion of feelings, no 
volition can result. These feeling compounds, according to 
Wundt. are essential to any and every act of will. 
A voluntary action without feeling, 
one that follows from purely intel-
lectual moti~es, as many philosophers 
presuppose, does not exist at all. 
On the other hand, the volitional 
pr·ocesses are marked out from the 
ordinary emotions by characteristics 
which give volition its peculiar · 
character ••• the end stage consists 
of characteristic feelings,- which 
always occur in essentially the same 
manner in all volitional processes ••• 
They are very probably compounded 
of :feelings of excitation, of strain 
and of relaxation, as a closer sub-jective analysis and the concomitant 
objective expression-symptoms, es-
pecially the movements of breathing, 
sh0111. Excitation and strain precede 
the conclusive act, relaxation and 
excitation accompany the act, and 
continue for a short time after-
ward.s. It is obvious that the 
numbers and the reciprocal action 
of the motives are of decisive mo-
ment for the constitution of the 
voli tiona.l process.24 
24An Introduction !2 Psychology, ~rans. from the 2d German 
edition by Rudo1f Pintner, New Yorkr ~be Macmillan Company, 
1912, PP• 64-65. 
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Wundt maintained that voluntary acts differ from impulsive 
ones by reason of their degrees of complexity. An impulsive 
act is simple and consists of only one objective content to-
gether with its concomitant feeling; voluntary acts always 
contain several of these objectiv.e contents or ~motives~ with 
perhaps one predominating in the focus of consciousness. Choice 
is always a voluntary act because of the complexity of motives 
which necessarily precede it. A conflict arises from the con-
currence of several antagonistic contents which appear with 
clearness in consciousness. A process of selection follows, 
and this is the act of choice. 
Wundt seriously endeavors to maintain some semblance of 
unity amid the evolutional series of elements, the formation of 
compounded feeling sta.tes, and the essential association of all 
these with app.eJrCeptian. All are said to be, first, intercon-
nected among themselves; and finall~ fuse with the ego to form a 
unitary state of self-consciousness. The unification of con-
tents which constitute the volitional p~ocess is the self: 
FUrther.more, this unity of volition 
enables us to explain directly another 
fact to which we have already referred--
the fact that the feelings of each 
mament unite in a single total feel-
ing, whatever oppositions may exist 
between them. This total feeling 25 is the :tresultant volitional tendency. 
25Lectures ..2!! Human ~ Animal Psychology, p. 2M. 
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Wundt's theory of will reveals original and characteristic 
adaptations of principles established by associationism. He 
has built his system of content psychology up.on a foundation 
which is thoroughly materialistic,and consequently will is de-
fined solely in terms of sensory elements. Will as the ter.mi-
nation of an emotional evolution became the orthodox definition 
of the Leipzig School, and was likewise accepted by the great 
majority of experimentalists who succeeded these pioneer inves-
tigators. 
Oswald Kulpe 
Oswald Kiilpe stresses the subjective nature of will and 
distinguishes between the external and internal activities in-
volved. Internal activities pertain to volitions which aim to 
affect the inner processes of ideation; will in its external 
capa~ity is concerned with bodily movements. 
It is usual to describe .the 
activity of will as external or 
internal, according as its aim 
or result is a bodily movement 
or a change in the course of 
ideation. Will, i.e., is re-
garded as a subjective power or 
capacity to exercise a deter-
mining influence upon conscious 
proce~ges or movements of the 
body. 
Though consciousness is usually involved in the process of 
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will, it need not be, necessarily. The end product of will is 
conscious to the self, but the process of willing may or may not 
be conscious. The only difference between reflex movement and 
voluntary action is the consciousness of the end result. How-
ever, whether the movements be reflex or voluntary, conscious-
ness is not a constituent of the process itself. •It is plain 
that a capacity of this kind need not be consciouso At the 
same time we do not ordinarily speak of 'will' except when we 
may assume th&t there is consciousness at least of the result 
of its activity.•27 
Unlike his theory of ideas and imageless thought, Kulpe's 
explanation of will does not contain any irreducible element. 
Kulpe and hie Wurzburg School, in their comprehensive studies 
and experiments on the thought processes, had concluded that 
ideas contained an element which was irreducible to feelings or 
images. Knipe's description of •imageless thought• had estab-
lished a precedent among the Ger.man psychologists. Contr&ry to 
26
outlines of Psychology. Trans. from 
W. B. Pillsbury and E. B. Titchener. 
27and Unwin Ltd., 192?, P• 445. Ibid., PP• 445-46. 
the German (1895) by 
London: George Allen 
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the long-standing orthodox doctrine of Wundt, Kulpe and the 
Wurzburg School c~aimed that introspections offered conclusive 
proof that ideas contained an element which differed essentially 
from images and feelings. Ideas could not be reduced to these 
sensory elements, for the process of ideation contained an 
intangible quality not found in any of the elementary image and 
feeling states • 
••• the discussion of the will is 
rendered still more complicated 
by the question of whether the 
process of internal or external 
voluntary action anywhere contains 
a third qualitatively irreducible 
element, a specific voluntary act 
in addition to the familiar con-
tents of sensation and feeling, 
the elementary nature of ·which is 
universally admit ted. This last 
question may be ruled out of our 
p:esent2~nquiry without hesita-tJ.on ••• 
In his previous considerations of will, Kiilpe had pointed 
out that such an elementary activity, even if it were found in 
volition, could not possibly be a distinguishing cha.ra.cterietic. 
Kulpe thus reveals his confusion concerning will as an appeti-
ti ve po-wer and will as a rational power. He considers the 
dynamic nature of will to be its distinguishing qua.lity;and 
whether or not the dynamic nature contains an irreducible ra-
28Ibid., P• 446. 
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tional element does not seem to be of great importance. Effort, 
spontaneity, and dynamism are the outstanding features;and 
these, in turn, can be reduced to sensations and feelings • 
••• the relative intensity of effort 
rune parallel to the relative inten-
sity of the organic sensations; and 
wherever we find effort we find 
motor innervations; actual or ideal.. 
Moreover, effort can be voluntarily 
aroused by the thought of a pleasant 
ehange of locality. The pleasant-
ness in this instance simply acts 
as an effective stimulus to the 
origination of ideas of movement, 
and the sensations occasioned by 
the imagined movement of the limbs. 
The elementary will quality, there-
fore would seem to reduce2§o defi-nite sensation qualities. 
Like Wundt, Kulpe describes will as a derivative factor of 
apperception. Wundt had made apperception the source of all 
mental life; this was true of the higher thought processes as 
well as of primary images and feelings. While Kulpe perceived 
a more universal and immaterial quality in ideas, he did not 
perceive the same rational attribute in will. He followed the 
traditional theory of Wundt and the Leipzig School who defined 
volition as a particular form of the feeling states and of 
apperception. 
29Ibid., P• 267. 
Hence we shall prefer to 
adopt Wundt's view, which considers 
apperception and will as ultimately 
one and the same function. For the 
characteristic energy which we attri-
bute to will, theenergy which makes 
it the supreme power in our conscious 
life, would seem to flow from one 
single source, in ~pperception. All 
the peculiar attriputes of perc.eption 
are also pred.icable of will; so that 
will we ~Y ;ee, is only a special 
mode of ma.nif'estation of appercep·-
tion, The phenamena of will are 
thus seen to be referable partly to 
the laws of reprgguction, and partly 
to apperception. 
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, In general, there is little difference between Kulpa's 
theory of will and that of Wundt. However, others of the 
Wurzburg School through experimental procedures arrived at 
conclusions which revealed a more thorough study of the voli-
tional processes. As we shall see later, ~h found that will 
contains a factor which cannot be explained entire1y either in 
terms of feelings or of sensations. 
Theodule A. Ribot 
Ribot's physiological theory of will may well represent 
the extreme position of materialistic determinism. The source 
of volitional activities is found either in the physiological 
30 Ibid., P• 450. 
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networks of the human organism or in the instincts, appetites, 
and passions. Operations of will are the responses of the 
physiological mechanisms to outer st.imuli. Like the Behavior-
ists, Ribot actually identified -will with the· sum total of 
responses evoked from the human organism by its environment. 
Every voluntary act consists of two separate elements: 
(1) the consciousness of self as a willing self; (2) a psycho-
physiological mechanism which is the source and seat of all 
volitional power. Vo1untary acts are the natural outcome of 
will acts which are either impulsive or inhibitive. Thus, the 
state of consciousness represented by the •1 will• always tends 
to express itself in a physiological mechanism or by means of a 
physiological act. 31 These responses may be either conscious 
or unconscious. Volitional responses follow the fundamental 
law of physiology, which states that reflex action is the source 
of &11 human activity. 
Ribot divides appetition into higher and lower states. 
Both elementary and higher forms of affective movements are 
physiologically the sam~~ they differ only in regard to the 
31
• ••• dans toute a.cte voluntaire, il y a deux ~lemente bien 
dietincte: l'eta.t de conscience, le •Je veux•, qui constate 
une situation, maie qui nra par lui-m€me aucune efficacit'; 
et un m'canisme psychophyeiologique tree complexe, en qui, 
seul r'side le pouvoir d'&gir au d 'emp~cher.• Lee Maladies 
de la Volont' Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer:Bailli~re et Cle~l893. P• 3. 
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state of consciousness involved in each. Desire is an affec-
tive state which is physiologically a degree higher than that 
of a reflex state because of a more intelligent degree of con-
sciouenesa which a.ccompa.niee it. Ideomotor activities are still 
higher in the series of v~litiona.l movements and indicate a 
more marked degree of individuality in the organism. These 
activities are movements which result from ideas or t-houghts. 
Ribot characteristically explains all from a. physiological 
standpoint. Thoughts are referred to as mental states which 
are comprised of both motor and sensorial elements. Some ele-
mente, especially those involving sight and touch, are inevi-
tably accompanied by physical movements. This is true to some 
extent for all mental phenomena, so that movement is always an 
32 integral part of images and ideas. Ribot believes that some 
physiological movement is always necessary in order t.o perceive 
an object in reality. The same process occurs when -we see an 
object ideally. • 
Ribot does not restrict the mot or a.cti vi ty solely to the 
performances or movements which follow perception and thought. 
32 
••• que nos perceptions, en part iculier lee importantee, celles 
de la. we et du toucher, impliquent a titre d'elements 
int~grants des mouvements de l'oeil ou des membres; et que 
si, lorsque noue voyons ~ellement un objet le mouvement est 
un ~l~ment eesentiel il doit jouer le mame r&le, quand nous 
voyons l'objet id~a.l~ment. Lea images et lea idees, m~me 
a.bstra.i tee, eupp.osent un substratum anatomique dane lequel 
l~eAmouvem~nte sont representee en une mesure quelconque. ~., P• 7. 
Perceptions and ideas contain within them a motor element 
distinct from that which is involved in the fulfillment of 
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volition as such. In order to have an idea of an object, mus-
cular activities are required. These activities form the 
intrinsic motor element which, in turn, is a constituent of 
every state of consciousness. Movements which result from p·er-
ceptions or ideas are called the extrinsic motor elements, and 
the purpose of these elements is to express outwardly the exist-
ing state of consciousness. 
Though affective movements proceed from an idea, it is 
really not the idea which produces the movement; it is rather 
the physiological accompaniment which is responsible for every 
volitional activity. The physiological state is "transformed 
into an act.• Volitional acts can be defined only as movements 
which occur in some sta.ge of the progressive evolution of phy-
siologie~l activities. The series originates in the most prim-
itive movements, pure reflexes, and extends to abstract thought 
when the "tendency to action is at the minimum." It may at 
times be impossible to know which is volitional activity and 
which is purely physiological response, for the evolutional 
progression is oftentimes almost imperceptible. 33 
33
• ••• 1• act'ivite voluntaire nous apparait comme un moment dans 
cette ~volution ascendante qui va du reflexe simple, dont 1& 
tendence a.u mouvement est irresistible, a l'idee abstraite, 
ou la tendence a l'&cte est 4 son minimum. On n'en peut 
fixer regoureusement ni le commencement ni la fin, la 
transition d'une forme a l'autre etant presque insensible.• 
Ibid., PP• 12-13. 
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Ribot's theory of will is little else than a discriptive 
interpretation of the physiological movements which he asso-
ciates with perception and thought. The ultimate source of 
will is a reflex mechanism; and therefore, will, like all other 
mental phenomena,is essentially physiological in nature. 34 
Even the materialistic psychologists did not accept the 
extreme views proffered by Ribot. The psychological aspect of 
will were minimized to such an extent as to reveal a lack of 
consideration for psychic factors and an exaggerated emphasis 
on the physiological groundwork of mental life. Over and above 
the anatomical basis of cerebral physiology, introspection and 
experience give evidence of immaterial mental phenomena both in 
the cognitive and appetitive orders. :Furthermore, the gener-
alizations of Ribot's theory are for the mo.st part unauthenti-
cated. Volition is purely a rational process, and there is no 
definite evidence that physiological correlations exist. 
Alexander Bain 
The hedonistic theory of will is best represented by 
Bain's interpretation based on the pleasure-pain principle 
which is the core of his entire philosophy of man. 
34
•Les reflexes c'rebraux, surtout lee plus ~lev~s, consistent 
en une reaction adaptee a des conditions tr~s c~plexes, tree 
variables, tr~s instables, different d'un individu a l'autre, 
et d'un instant a l'autre dans le meme individu. Ce sont les 
reactions ideo~otrices, lee volitions.• Ibid., P• 25. 
-
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Bain begins his explanation of will by describing its twa 
components: •nese are, first, the existence of a spontaneous 
tendency to execute movements independent of the stimulus of 
sensations or feelings; and, secondly, the link between a pre-
sent action and a. present :feeling, whereby the one comes under 
the control of the other. •35 Bain gives great stress t c the 
influence and impo:rtance of the dynamic element which exists in· 
every form of mental life. All sensations contain an active 
component which makes them independent of external stimuli. 
The basis for this assumption is neurological, •such as the 
physiological fact of a central discharge of nervous energy 
where no stimulus from without is present as a cause.•36 
T'he remotest beginnings of voluntary actions are found 
among these many and diverse spontaneous movements: the loco-
motive apparatus including &11 the various movements of muscles 
and limbs; the voice, tcmgue, and mouth which involve many 
minute communications with brain and nerve centers. In &11 
these interrelated but isolated movements are found the 
origins of voluntary actions. The prime source of volition, 
then, is spontaneous movement. Circwnstances peculiar te each 
35 The Emot.ione and the Will. London: Longmane, Green, and 
36CGmPany, 1888::P.~3. lli!•, P• 304. 
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individual increase or diminish the discharge of the inherent 
spontaneity. For examp.le, natural vigor of constitution, 
stimulants, such as excitement, pleasure, a.nd pain, are all 
contributory factors to the amount of spontaneous action dis-
charged by the organism. From these sources is derived the 
mode of operation peculiar to volition. 
Bain maintains that, besides the element of spontaneity 
which characterizes the volitional process itself, there is 
another integral component, namely the purpose or aim towards 
which the will strives. It is this consideration which reveals 
the intimate relationship between feeling and action. Pleasure 
• 
and pain in general, whether deriYed from organic sensations, 
the five senses, or any of the emotions, are the motive powers 
of all volitional activities. These motives in any of their 
various forms determine us by their existence whether the 
latter be actual, real, present, or whether their existence be 
only ideal. An ideal motive of pleasure or pain is explained 
in terms of •pro~ision.• Precaution against causes of illness, 
attacks upon our person or possessions, may well exemplify the 
•ideal" actions of these motives. Retentiveness and repetition 
strengthen whichever motive exists. 
It may oftentimes happen that a conflict arises amid a 
concurrence or complication of motives, and in such a. case, the 
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form af voluntary action called deliberation results. Closely 
linked to deliberation is the consciousness of effort mani-
fested only in maturity. Bain, however, attaches great impor-
tance to the feeling of effort. 
We know from experience that 
movement of some kind is the 
bringer of pleasure and the dis-
peller of pain; we are therefore 
urged to begin moving, although 
quite at randam: if the movement 
succeeds, it is kept up without 
conscious effort, although it may 
also be aided by conscious effort. 
If it fails or makes bad worse, 
there is the same double influ-
ence to stop it; the primordial 
feeling, and the conscious exer-
tion. .. 
This conscious effort is no 
doubt the prominent fact of the 
will in mature life ••• We are 
said to make a.. great effo·rt to 
exert ourselves, to show great 
resolution, determination, or 
strength of will, all of which 
means that the motA;e is matched 
by its opposition. 
Conscious effort, however, is not the cause of voluntary 
motion; it is rather the phenomena of pleasure and of pain 
which are the sources of volitional power. Pleasure and pain 
are the motive forces of all voluntary action and are derived 
from the nervous and muscular systems of the organism. 
371lli.. ' p.. 320. 
A voluntary act (as well as 
some acts not voluntary) is ac-
companied with a consciousness or 
feeling of which there may be 
several so·rts. The original motive 
is some pleasure or pain, experi-
enced or conceived. The active 
exertion is accompanied with the 
muscular consciousness, agreeable 
in states of vigor, painful under 
exhaustion or fatigue, and often 
as regards p~~asure or pain, 
indifferent. 
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All the various aspects of volition which Bain discusses 
in his lengthy dissertation on will are essentially related to 
tlle feeling states. Deliberation, resolution, consciousness of 
effort, desire are all ultimately rooted in the pleasure-pain 
principle. Whatever the form of volition in question, either 
pleasure or pain constitutes its mental antecedent and its pri-
mary source of power. 
The pleasure or pain, th&t 
is, the mental antecedent of a 
voluntary act, is embodied in the 
nervous and other organs, and rises 
or fails with their physical condi-
tion. When a feeling of either 
sort pr~pts the voluntary execu-
tive, a. new kind of consciousness 
arises, that amounting to the ex-
penditure of motive power; but in 
a way, if possible still more 
decided, does this consciousness 
38 1.1212.. , p. 421 • 
rep.ose upon material processes. 
The nervous centers are drained 
of their energy, the muscles part 
with theirs, and in a very short 
time the whole system is run down 
like a steam engine with its fire 
burnt out.39 
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An interesting feature of Baints theory is tke distinction 
made between reflex and voluntary actions. Here again we note 
the great predominance and significance of the feeling states 
in all motor activities. It is the intervention of feeling 
which gives to an action its volitional character. Feelings 
are not indispensable to reflex movements,for they are purely 
mechanical and devoid of conscious effort. "VoluntaryLactions 
are distinguished from reflex and spontaneous activity by a 
directive intervention of a feeling in their production.40 
llodern psychologists have been greatly influenced by the 
pleasure-pain principle of Bain. This is the case especially 
in the study of will. Activities, both executive and inhibi-
tory, are on many occasions prompted by pleasure and pain, re-
spectively. At times, such actions are spontaneous, or at 
other times ·Pleasure and pain may be concomitants; but volition 
itself is a power over and above all physica~ and material fac-
tors. Modern psychologists, inspired by predecessors such as 
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Bain and others, identi~y the spontaneous physical movements o~ 
the body with the immaterial dynamism of will. The error is a 
common one and the basis o~ much antagonistic controversy bet-
ween materialists and scholastics. 
William J'ames 
The psychology of William .Tames is oftentimes summed up in 
the single descriptive phrase, a stream of consciousness. Op-
posed to the elementarism of Wundt, .Tames emphasized the proc-
ess, the flux, the stream of consciousness which he established 
as the underlying substrata o~ mental life. Wundt's theory had 
divided and subdivided the whole of consciousness until all 
mental activities had come to be static elements, interrelated 
but never entirely amalgamated by a common bond into a substan-
tial unity. Wundt stressed the unity of self, but against the 
oneness of the ego, each mental element stood as a separate 
entity in bold-faced relie~. Elementarism bad been character-
ized by sterility. .Tames, on the other hand, maintained that 
any attempt to split consciousness into series o~ mental ele-
ments was bound to distort the realities o~ mental life. 
Therefore, he emphasized the activism of mind, and in his treat-
ment of will, the opposition to elementarism is particularly 
noticeable. 
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Jam~s classical theory of volition is characterized by 
two outstanding factors; •the feeling of effort,• and "ideo-
motor action.• Many of the leading authorities, such as Wundt 
and Bain, had upheld the •principle of innervation•, namely 
that effort was effected by the movement of different sensa-
tiona. Besides the necessity for imagery, the innervation 
theory held that voluntary acts only required an outgoing cur-
rent of energy from the brain to the muscles for the perfor.m-
ance of these acts. Each outgoing current was charged by a 
specific feeling. James rejected this principle of innervation 
because he found that all feelings were sensory and therefore 
afferent. 
But in spite of the authority 
which such writers deservedly 
wield, I cannot help thinking 
that they are in this ins'tance 
wrong,--tha.t the discharge into 
the motor nerves is insentient, 
and that all our ideas of move-
ment, incl'Uding those oft~ 
effOrt which it requires, as well 
as those of its direction, its 
extent, its strength, and its 
velocity, .!!:!. images of ;eeri-
pheral sensations, either "remote,• 
~resident ~ the movins parts, 
or in other parts which sympa-
thetically act with them in con41 sequence of the diffusive wave. 
4lrhe Principles of Psychology, 2 Vole. New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1931, Vol. II, PP• 493-494. 
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According to James, primary functions of the organism 
include reflexes, instincts, and emotions; volitional activi-
ties are secondary ones. Before volition can take place, other 
requisites must be fulfilled. A movement of will follows only 
when kinaesthetic images, i.e., revived memory images of acts 
already experienced, have preceded. • ••• Whether or not there 
be anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously 
will a certain act, a mental conception made up of memory-
image.s of these sensations, defining which special act it is, 
42 
must be there.• James refuted the principle of innervation 
and substituted his own •:reeling of effort•; as a result of his 
personal introspective studies. Introspection, as far as he 
was concerned, revealed no basis for the innervation of energy, 
but definitely gave evidence that kinaesthetic images always 
precede voluntary movements. 
!E- anticipating ims.ge, then, of 
~ sensorial consequences ~ ~ 
movement , ;plus ..2a certain ocea..si ons 
the fiat that these consequences 
Siii11"'"bec""Oiiieactual, ..U .!h! only 
psychic state which introspection 
lets .!:!§ discern A§ .t.h§ forerunner 
.9.i. ..Q!!!: voluntary !&.U·, There is 
no introspective evidence ever o~ 
any still later or concomitant 
feeling att!ched to the efferent 
discharge. 
4
4;Ibid • , p. 492. 
ll!9_., P• 501. 
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Fundamentally, .Tames 'e •feeling of effort • corresponds to 
the views of these associationists. Though disagreements arose 
as to the direction pursued by the current of energy, the 
origin of stimuli (whether they be central or peripheral), and 
other matters of detail, both the theory of innervation,as up-
held by Wundt, Bain, and others, and the theory proposed by 
.Tames affirm that voluntary action results from involunta'ry 
movements. All that is actually required for voluntary act!ons 
are mental conceptions composed of various sensorial images. 
Unless ra.tiana.l thought p,lays a part in the establishment of 
the images of movement,the intellectual source of volitional 
activities is completely wanting in both the "principle O'f 
innervation" and .Tames's "feeling of effort. • 
According to .Tames, ideo-motor action is the real response 
which follows, ttunhesi tatingly and immediately", the precon-
ceived kinaesthetic image. In such voluntary actions there is 
no preceding confl.:tct of notions. Thus, an a..ct is brought 
about by an idea of the •ct. To imagine a particular action is 
to arouse a strong tendency to perform the same action. As 
attention to the action increases eo does the idea tend 
increasingly to express itself outwardly. ~e effort of 
attention is thus the essential phenomenon of wi11.•44 If 
44 rug_.' p. 562. 
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action is to follow the idea, the idea must be held steadily 
within the focus of attention. Thoughts, images, mental con-
tents of varying kinds are constantly flowing through con-
sciousness. It is the function of attention to sustain the 
idea, to hold it :firmly within the field of co:nsciousness, so 
that it may be realized through the medium of motor activities. 
And with his consciousness, his 
action changes, for the new ob-
ject, once stably in possession 
of the field of his thoughts, 
infallibly produces its own motor 
effects. The difficulty lies in 
the gaining possession of that 
field. Though the spontaneous 
drift of thought is all the other 
way, the attention must be kept 
strained on that one object until 
at last it grows, so as to main-
tain itself before the mind with 
ease. This strain of the atten-
tion 1M the fundamental act of 
will. 
Ideo-motor activities are mostly spontaneous, and for this 
reason are not dependent upon any underlying pleasure-pain 
principle,a.s Bain ha.d insisted. James found sources other, than 
pleasure or pain which gave rise to voluntary actions • 
45 
•• ~I am far from denying the 
exceeding prominence and impor-
tance of the part which pleasures 
and pains, both felt and repre-
sented, play in the motivation of 
Ibid., P• 564. 
our conduct. But I must insist 
that it is no inclusive part, and 
that co-ordinately with these 
mental objects innumerable others 
have an exactly similar impulsive 
and inhibitive power.46 
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Nor does James identify volitional effort with muscular cona-
tion, as many others ha~e done. It is the purpose of voli-
tional effort to represent to the mind whatever muscular 
activities take.place, but volitional effort is clearly distin-
guished from visceral and muscular movements. "This volitional 
effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the 
muscular effort with which it is usually confounded.•41 
Previous to acts of decision, various kinds of voluntary 
processes occur. James designated five distinct types of deci-
sion which correspond to the several kinds of prel.iminary men-
tal activities. (l) The reasonable type, where the process is 
mostly a ma.tter of rational balancing, resulting in favor of 
one alternative. (2} The decision is one of acquiescence to 
pressure of circumstances. (3) The individuai, overc~e by 
internal conflict, commits himself to one or the other. 
(4} Conscience enters in to regulate our decisions. (5} Deci-
sion is deliberately made with the •reeling of effort•. Upon 
4~Ibid., P• 558. 
4 Ibid., P• 562. 
this division of voluntary decisions, ~ames developed his 
temperament types. 
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In general, the theory of will proposed by ~ames is char-
acterized by two predominating notionss (l) that voluntary 
movements are aroused only by kinaesthetic images; (2) the idea 
of movement inevitably tends to be realized by motor activities. 
The universality of these principles is doubtful. The emphasis 
on kinaesthetic imagery, whatever may have been their source, 
as the primary and necessary basis for voluntary movements is 
indicative of ~ames'sattitude concerning the higher intellectual 
processes. He was convinced that psychology had overly empha-
sized the importance of man's intellectual nature; and, accord-
ingly, emphasized volitional activities, although these, in turn, 
seem basically determin·ed by physiological processes. Conse-
quently, will as a rational, immaterial faculty, intrinsically 
independent of sense imagery and feeling, found no place in the 
psychology of ~ames. 
G. F. Stout 
Stout's theory of will holds a central position and in 
some respects is related to many of the prevailing schools of 
thought. His explanation of will is not characterized by any 
unique interpretation nor is it derived from hypotheses 
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specifically his own; it is notable rather for its eclecticism. 
stout • s theory includes a number of viewpoints already expressed. 
He has combined and incorporated into his own system of 
thought, various principles adopted from his predecessors and 
contemporaries--those principleswhich he judged to be best and 
sui table for a c.ommon sense psychology. 
Stout's psychological theory is established upon a philo-
sophical groundwork--Kant's categorical imperatives. The three 
aspects of mind, namely cognition, affection, and conation, 
formed the basic structure of Stout's concept of mind. He was 
the first to popularize the use and modern meaning of conation, 
a notable precedent in the history of contemporary psychology. 
Volition is defined as "the intention or determination to 
act, not the mere production of movement; otherwise all reflex 
action would be volition and we might regard the muscles them-
selves as the seats of the will. 1148 Stout emphasize!:? this 
distinction throughout his discussion of voluntary movement, 
but he describes intention and volition as inseparable. There 
can be no volition without a previous intention to act. 
Conation is used as a general term including all forms of 
appetition. Stout speaks of higher and lower forms of conation, 
48A Manual of fsychology. New York: Hinds, Noble, and 
Eldridge, 1915, p. ?7. 
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and the distinction between them is based upon .the level o-f 
cognition which precedes them. Conation following sensory per-
ception is impulsive movement, while ideas induce "generalized 
conative tendencies.• 
••• we may distinguish different 
leve~s of conative process as 
connected with different levels 
of general mental development. 
On the p.lane o.f perception we 
have the perceptual impulse; 
this includes instinctive im-
pulses. Its general charac-
teristic is that the activity 
involved in it finds immediate 
expression in bodily movement 
guided by external impressions ••• 
But we reach a distinctly higher 
plane when ideas become suffi-
ciently selfsustaining to form 
trains l~t are not wholly 
shaped. 
Stout is also careful to point out the significant differences 
between conation and the feeling states. Pleasure and pain are 
dependent upon the success or failure of efforts exerted by 
conative energy. Feelings are either concomitants or resul-
tants of conation and cognition, but are not the determinants 
of either. 
The essential point in Stout's doctrine is the unitary 
nature of conation and cognition. Both are but aspects of one 
49Ibid., PP• 704-705. 
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and the same process. There is no question of conation being 
secondary to cognition. Such an assumption might imply two· 
separate processes,which is contrary to the whole of Stout's 
doctrine. -cognition gives the process its deter.minate charac-
ter: without conation there would be no process at all to have 
a char&cter.•50 Though it is true that the interrelationship 
between cognition and appetition is such that both are mutually. 
interdependent. in regard to the operation of each, there is 
sufficient evidence th&t the two are distinct processes. st. 
Tha.mas is explicit on this point. 
What is apprehended and what is 
desired are the ~e in reality, 
but differ in aspect; for a thing 
is apprehended as something 
sensible or intelligible, whereas 
it is desired a.s witable or good. 
Now, it is di verei ty of aspect in 
the objects, and not material 
diversity, 5yhich demands a diversity of powers. 
In voluntary dicisione, Stout stresses the significance of 
self-consciousness. Deliberation intervenes in all voluntary 
decisions, and deliberation involves referral to the self of 
all po:ssible courses of action. In voluntary decisions, it is 
necessary that the action be realized by the self as the agent's 
~~bid., P• 704. 
-~Summa 'l'heologic& (ed. Pegis) I, lxxx, a.l, ad 2um. 
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own action. That the self become cognizant of the action a.t 
hand as· an integral and per.manent part of its own unity, is 
essential to every voluntary decision. 
What is distinctive of voluntary 
decision is the intervention of 
self-consciousness as a cooperat-
ing factor ••• If a conation is 
realized, the completed action 
becomes part of the life history 
of the agent. If in contemplat-
ing it beforehand the agent takes 
this into account, if he asks 
himself whether he really wants 
this action and so to become 
included in his own conception 
of himself, he is on his way to 
the forming of a voluntary 
decis1on. 0 2 
Throughout the process of deliberation various mo.tives are 
weighed a.nd balanced; the value of each as well as the plausi-
bility of incorporation with the self is carefully considered. 
So far, these are merely the extrinsic motives for deciding. 
Once the decision has been made the motive becomes an integral 
part of self and now becomes a motive for action. •The recog-
nized reasons for a decision can never constitute the entire 
cause of_a decision. Behind them there always lies the self as 
---
52 The Groundwork .£!_ Psychology. New York: Hinds, Noble, and 
Eldridge, Publishers, 1903, P• 232. 
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~ whole and what this involves can never be completely analyzed 
th f 4'- d fi . t . 1 t . tt53 or stated in e orm OJ. e n1 e reasons or epec~a mo ~v.es. 
Stout, for the most part, has avoided many of the pitfalls 
found in the doctrines of extremists. He has endeavored ta 
maintain a common sense viewpoint in hie explanation of will. 
The most serious criticisms which we must offer against this 
doctrine is the failure: (1) to distinguish conation from cog-
nition; (2) to make an essential distinction between the "higher 
and lower levels of conation.• Though the influence of Stout 
on contempora..ry psychologists is not as prevalent as that of 
James, it is notable a:mong particular schools, especially the 
Hormic School of thought under JlcDougall's leadership. The 
principle of self-consciousness as an essential will factor, 
together with the basic identity of cognition and conation, was 
adopted by JlcDougall in his psychology of instinct. 
James R. Angell 
The functionalism of Angell had for its particular task 
the study of mental processes as contrasted to the study of 
mental elements pursued by the structuralists. The function-
a1iets made special attempts to discover the mode of operation, 
53A.nalytic Psychology 2 Vol.s • Vol. II, London: Swan 
Sonne De che in and Company, 1896 , p. 132. 
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the ends achieved, and the attending circumstances of all our 
mental processes. Volition, as well as emotion and instinct, 
because of its dynamic nature, was among the chief concerns of 
the functionalists. Wundt and Titchener had described mental 
life in terms of contents, states, and apperceptions. The 
spontaneity and forceful energy of the appetitive faculties had 
created many difficulties for the structuralists who could only· 
offer inadequate explanations in terms of static elements. Con-
sequently, emotions, instincts, and will had been relegated to 
the background, and apperception had been established as the 
source and primary content of all mental phenomena. But the 
functionalists were interested in menta~ processes and in men-
tal activities as a part of a vital living organism. 
Angell does not refer to will as a specific faculty but 
rather to the volitional process£!~· Will is the mind!! 
~~ acting in the capacity o·f a directive force. As a reac-
tionary measure to structuralism, every attempt is made to 
avoid a.ny notion of mind which implies a. division of powers or 
a. separation of mental contents. Hence, perception is mind 
experiencing a. sensory synthesis; ideation is mind in the proc-
ess of cognizing; volition is mind directing the mental forces 
to some preconceived goal. Mind is a whole, operating now in 
one capacity, now in another, and is ne-v:er to be considered as 
a. conglomeration of individualized elements. 
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Scholastic psychology has likewise persistently endeavored 
to preserve the unity of mind in all its ope rat ions. But 
instead of saying that mind is a whole, they say that the 
person possessing a mind is and acts as a whole. While the 
whole man is involved in every vital act, there is ample evi-
dence in our experiences to show that at times one or another 
process predominates, and that mental processes dominate and 
give direction to the whole person. It is true that the whole 
mind is involved in every mental operation, yet not all menta~ 
acts are of the same kind. The mind can act and be known to 
act on various levels and in various capacities. While the 
Schcilastics refer to the faculties or powers of a unified 
pe.rsan, Angell. ,Prefers to speak always of mind as will, or mind 
as thought. When he speaks of volition he is speaking of mind 
in its totality, as engaged in the process of willing. Will 
refers to th~ whole mind exercising one type of activity and 
does not designate a specific faculty or operation of mind. 
Wil~ is mind and mind is will. It is necessary that we make 
this clarification in Angell's theory, for this particular con-
cept of will and of mind is the fundamental tenet of function-
alism, and it stands in opposition to the principle that an act 
is distinct from the agent. 
99 
For Angell, will.ing is the mind engaged in the process of 
organizing and assembling its forces for some set purpose. In 
order to direct itself towards a goal it is necessary for mind 
"to attend•. Willing is, in reality, attending to a. specific 
object or goal. "Choice, decision, will, in the fullest sense 
of the word seems to arise out of such circumstances, and those 
impulses and ideas which succeed in gaining our persistent 
attention are forthwith translated into action. Willing is 
therefore in the last analysis a psychological process of 
attending.•54 
Volition and attention are closely allied, but to identify 
them as Angell. does is to increase the confusion already exist-
ing in dynamic psychology. Attention is often invo.luntary; for 
example, a sudden noise often attracts us without any directed 
effort of attention on our part. Will, therefore, is a power 
over and above attention. It is true that a complementary 
relationship exists between attention and will, since attention 
contains a cognitional element also. In order to will we must 
cognize; in order to cognize we must attend. 
Angell's analysis of volition includes three elements; 
namely, foresight, consent, and muscular movements (for 
54 An Introduction 1.2. Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1.908, P• 23?. 
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purposes o;f obtaining the desired end). It is obvious that in 
many voluntary acts bodily movements are required. But Angell. 
extends the necessity of muscular movements to will-acts as 
well as to voluntary acts, and claims that thought itself 
requires a •motor attitude.• 
Inaamuch as certain decisions 
seem primarily to concern our 
trains of thought, rather than 
our muscular activities, as when 
we resolve to continue a course 
of reflection, our for.mulation 
may appear to emphasize unduly 
the motor features of volition. 
But it must be remembered that 
voluntarily carrying on a proc-
ess of thinking required the 
securing of definite motor 
attitudes, and further.more that 
all such thinking has as its 
purpose some future action, how-
ever long deferred 5~e may expect this action to be. 
Whatever muscular movements take place in the performance of 
voluntary actions, we must consider such movements only as con-
comi tants of volition, certainly not as a.n integral part of will 
itself. 
The functionalist theory of will pl.&ces specific emphasis 
on the relationship between sensory ideational elements and 
55 Psychology: &! Introductory Study .!lf ~ Structure !!!2_ 
FUnction of Human Consciousness. New York: Henry Holt and 
Coapaey, I9oa, P• 39'2. 
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voJ.itions. Some sort of knowledge must be had before vo-lition 
occurs. •we may safely start, then, from the assumption that 
every voluntary act involves the presence in the mind of 
sensory or ideational material in some way anticipatory of the 
act.•56 This assumption definitely establishes a. differentia-
tion between will and reflex, since the latter requires neither 
consciousness nor cognizance of any kind. But does this asst.m'.!P-
tion provide any well defined delineation between will an4 
instinct? Instincts, as commonly accepted by Scholastics, 
involve consciousness of a. goal, but not abstract intellectual 
knowledge of goals and motives, whereas reflexes do not even 
require consciousness. Will is essentially of an intellectua~ 
nature, and sensory knowledge, alone, is inadequate to evoke 
the volitional process. It is necessary that &ll activities of 
will be preceded by intellectual perception. Angell's analysis 
is vague on this point; he merely states that sensory-ideational 
elements must precede voluntary movements. Whether these ele-
mente be rational ideas or sensory images only does not neces-
sarily have a bearing on the vol.itions which result. n •• • in 
certain cases the idea which apparently controlled the voluntary 
act was an idea of the movement itself ••• in certain instances 
kinaesthetic sensations .!:!!9,. ima.ges furnish us the material by 
56 Ibid., P• 398. 
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means of which we practical1y anticipate, and so control, the 
movement we wish to make.•51 
In keep.ing with the evolutional fundaments of function-
alism, Angell speaks of controlled voluntary movements a.s an 
outcome of gradual growth. The spontaneous movements of the 
infant, through maturation, develop into the controlled move-
mente of the adult. It is not a. case of the predominance of 
rational powers over the sensory which brings about vo,luntacy 
control, but, rather, a case of physiological transition and 
increased muscular coordination which accounts for volitional 
power. The impulsive, random movements of childhood constitute 
the elementary stage of volition; voluntarily controlled move-
mente, those of mature life. 
51 
We may lay down two general pro-
positions ••• {!) that all voluntary 
control is built upon a foundation 
of movements which are already 
going on in an uncontrolled impul-
sive a.y; and (2) that the develop-
ment of control, although from the 
beginning it extends in a measure, 
perhaps, to all the voluntary 
muscles, proceeds more rapidly, 
now in one group and now in 
another ••• Volition must not, then, 
be thought of as a process in which 
consciousness somehow brings into 
life movements which previously did 
not exist. The problem of the 
Ibid., P• 401. 
evolution of control is primarily 
the problem connected with the 
coordinating,in reference to cer-
tain ends,of movements already 58 
occurring in an uncoordinated way. 
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Volition is important to the functionalist because it is 
characterized by movements--it is a process, a. function. The 
singular importance of will as a psychological power is derived 
from its dynamic nature, not from its immateriality. All con-
sciousness is conative; all imagery tends to produce motor 
changes; but, according to Angell, volitional processes, like 
instincts and desires, are of special significance because of 
the directive forces they possess, not because of their 
supremacy. 
Charles H. Judd 
Functionalism represents the American expression of opposi-
tion to the domination of the Wundtian Schoo 1 and its off-
spring, structuralism. However, among the functionalists are 
those who have manifested individualistic tendencies and theo-
retical developments in their writings on many of the various 
problemmat ical issues of psychology. They have sought to; 
develop a functional view of mental life in general, but have, 
58Ibid • , p. 405·. 
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at times,clung to other trends and influences. Consequently, 
their wo.rks reveal interesting personal interpretations super-
imposed upon the fundamentals of functional psychology. Among 
such followers of the functionalist school is c. H. Judd. 
Though he had received the greater part of his training at 
Leipzig under Wundt, Judd wholeheartedly adopted the spirit of 
f'unctiona.I.iem. His psychological works were written from the 
functionalist standpoint, but the influences of Wundt 1 s teach-
ings as we 11 as tho:se of William James are everywhere evident. 
According to Judd, the volitional processes like all other 
mental phenomena are an outgrowth of a genetic process. Thus, 
in order to understand volition which is the highest and most 
complex form of human dynamics, we must first know something 
about impulse and reflex which represent appetition in its most 
primitive stage. Reflex activity is the simplest and most 
direct form of behavior. It is not accompanied by a high 
degree of consciousness, and is devoid of any previous delibexa-
tian whatsoever. From the pure reflex just described, all the 
way up the scale to volunt&ry choice, are innumerable degrees 
and grades of impulsive activity. Sensation-reflexes, percep-
tual-responses, volitional processes--all conta~n within their 
own group an ascending order of complex movements, and these 
groups themselves form an ascending series of categories among 
all appetitive responses. 
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In ~udd's theory, an impulse proper differs from a reflex 
in so far as it is a response, not to one sensation, but to 
complexes of sensations or percepts. The impulsive response 
* 
may be the same kind of muscul&r moTement as the reflex, but 
its determining factor lies in the percept or sensations which 
precede it. The complexity of reflex, impulse, or volition is 
dependent upon the nature of the perception which is the effec-
tive cause of ever.y movement. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, ~udd makes special 
efforts to clarify the relationship between attention and vo,li-
tion. Attention has oftentimes been identified with conation, 
or defined as a form of vo,li tion. ~udd pointe out that atten-
tion, of itself, ha.e no power to determine action, but ra.ther 
is dependent upon a. higher directive organization. Common 
examples of life around us afford ample proof that this prin-
ciple is true. While food and enemies engross all of an · 
animal's attention, there is an endless variety of objects 'Which 
attract man's attention. The reason for this differentiation 
is found in the organization of experience which is an integral 
part of the self. The animal is limited by his nature to a 
narrower scope of experience; therefore the objects of his 
attention will be so confined within limits as to conform with 
the or~anization which precedes his attention. 
Neither attention nor bodily move-
ment can be used to explain the 
other factor of the situation, 
because ••• attention is always 
related to the organization of 
behavior, and beha~ior is, as we 
find in many cases, related in 
some way to attention. The two 
must be accounted for by some 
more ultimate fact of organization, 
which precedes both. If this more 
u~timate explanation is neglected, 
the who:le process may ta.~e on the 
appearance of an event 5~ithout antecedent conditions. 
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According to JUdd, in man, deliberation frequently pre-
cedes attention, for we find ourselves attending to: an object 
which we h.a.'Ve already decided upon as an object of our choice. 
Attention is in"lolved in both deliberate and impulsive activi-
ties, and we see from these observaticms that some force other 
than attention is responsible for dynamic movements. JUdd, 
however, in all these explanations, is emphasizing the impor-
tance of previous individual development from a genetic ang~e 
and not for the purpose of ele-vating volition because of its 
rational nature. The directive force, referred to by Judd a.s a. 
prerequisite for attention,is the total organization of experi-
ences, and is an outcome of the progressive evolutional de-velop-
ments. In man, therefore, the organization of behavior ·includes 
59Psychology: General Introduction. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1901, P• 324. 
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the more complex form of perception and responses, and has 
provided him with a more extensiTe field of experiences; but 
the animal, whose life is restricted to the sphere of instinct, 
possesses a far more limited and circumscribed background. In 
both man and animal the organization of background experiences 
is rooted in the physiological systems; thus beh&Tior, whether 
it be primitive or complex, is ul tima.tely determined, fo·r the 
most part, by the nervous and muscular systems. • ••• in the 
simplest impulsive activities and in the. highest forms of 
voluntary choice, there are elements which can be explained 
1 i t f . t• .60 on y n er.ms o nervous organ1za 1on. 
Volition is intimately concerned with the sum total of 
relationships existing between the self and the external world. 
When conflicting tendencies arise, ..-clition is the means of 
expressi~n used by the self in its endeavor to preserve the 
internal unity which constitutes the essence of self. Whatever 
the object or event may be, the self, by comparison, judgments, 
and reasonings, forms a relationship between itself and the 
object concerned; and thus maintains an equilibrium and stabil-
ity within its own organization. Re&ctions, modes of behavior. 
simple or complex responses are all controlled by the inte-
grated system of ideas which constitute the self. Conflicts 
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which arise or impulses which have been suspended are also 
results of the self, acting in behalf of its own unity. In 
these latter cases the relationship has proven to be negative; 
the impulse is withheld because it does not compare favorably 
with the hierarchy of ruling interests a.nd ideas of .. the self. 
Conflicts arise for the same reasons. Impulses or tendencies 
strive for fulfillment, but are counteracted by stronger 
impulses or movements which are favorable to the individual 
organism. 
~e truth is that the explanation 
of volition as a part of self-
consciousness can be given only 
by a recognition of those proc-
esses of organization which have 
entered into the elaborate con-
struction of the concept of the 
self. When one says that he has 
decided not to perform a certain 
act, he has, to be sure, given the 
highest possible expression of his 
own self-control, but self-control 
in this instance cannot be explained 
without some reference to the origin 
and development of the se1f.6l 
Conforming closely to the functionalist school, Judd 
exp,lains volition as the total self reacting to an object or 
situation. Will as a single faculty or power is only an 
abstraction, not a reality. Whatever activity is concerned, be 
61Ibid., P• 329 • 
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it reflex, impulse, or volition, in actuality it is the whole 
organization of previous experiences, together with the entire 
system of ideas, which is operating. Since any activity affects 
the behavior of the whole organism, the physiological system is 
likewise intimately involved. Reflex, impulse, voluntary move-
ment, and choice are developmenta.l forma of movement, and repre-
sent the various stages of maturation from the moat primitive 
response to the more highly evolved and comp~ex reactions. 
The tendency, therefore, as 
development goes forward, is to 
adjust thought processes to the 
possibilities of behavior and to 
the canons of criticism described 
in the discussion of conceptual 
thought with ever increa.sing 
recognition of certain fixed modes 
of procedure. Here again, we have 
cle&r evidence that the processes 
of development and the processes 
of conscious choice are intima.tel.y 
related, and we see again the 
impossibility of explaining thought 
and conduct, even at this highest 
level, without direct reference to 
the total deyelopment of the 
individual.62 
Judd's theory is particularly emphatic on the genetic 
origin of will activities. While Angell stresses the functional 
importance of will, Judd is more concerned with its evolutional 
history. '!'hough Judd i a a devoted disc ip.le of functionalism, 
62 Ibid., P• 332. 
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his works reveal influences resulting from the principles of 
sensism instilled in him during his ear1y training. 
Charles Spearman 
One of the most scientific app·roaches to the problems of 
psychology has been made by the :Factor School of Charles 
Spearman. According to the theory proposed by this school, 
intelligence contains a general factor of ability besides a 
large number of specific abilities. The •g• factor, or general 
intelligence, is opera.ti ve in all the powers O·f an indiVidual, 
while the "s 11 factar, o.r specific ability, varies from one 
pQ!wer to the other. bthema.tical formulas are used to deter-
mine the relationship between the various kinds of cognitive 
performances. These relationships are indicated by correlation 
coefficients. Whe.n two: compared abilities coincide, the coef-
ficients become a unity; when the relationship is a negative 
one, the coefficients are zero. By means of his statistical 
analyses, Spearman concluded that the two factors, "g" and "s", 
are the fundamental elements of intelligence. Both factors 
ultimately are based on physiological brain substrata. ~e 
nature of the "g" factor corresponds to a general cerebral 
power or energy, but the nature of "s 8 is characterized by its 
special motor power operating in a more restricted and chan-
neled area.. 
The factor was taken, pending 
further information, to consist 
in something of the nature of an 
'energy' or 'power' which serves 
in common the whole cortex (or 
passibly, even, the whole nervous 
system.) 
But if, thus, the totality 
of cognitive op.erations is served 
by some general factor in common, 
then each different operation 
must be further served by some 
specific factor peculiar to it. 
For this factor also, a physio-
logical substrata has been sug-
gested, namely, the particular 
group of neurons sp.ecially serving 
the particular kind of operation. 
These neural groups would thus 
function as alternative 'engines' 
into which the common supply of 
'energy' cout% be a.lternati.vely 
distributed.· 
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Spearman's description of •distributed energy" based on physio-
logical processes is similar t a JlcDougall 's •drainage theory." 
However, Spearman constantly endeavors to establish the higher 
cognitive processes on a level of their own. In a..ll these sin-
cere attempts he never quite relinquishes the physiologica1 
substrata, even in describing the nature of intellect and will. 
Besides these fundamental factors, •g• a.nd "s", there are 
others which play an important role in our life. Among these 
is the ""'" factor, or will. The will factor is primarily 
63The Nature ~ Intelligence ~~Principles of Cosnition. 
Lend on: Jlacmillan and C·ompany , Limited , '1927 , pp. 5-6 • 
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concerned with character development and morality. Individuals 
who possess a large percentage of "w" are motivated by reason-
able principles, while those who possess •w• to a lesser degree 
act more on impulse, and are motivated by the lower feeling 
states. As the basis for all these factors, Spearman sets 
forth several laws, which, because of their generality and 
ultimacy, are considered "irreducible minimums.• Among the 
five quantitative laws is the law of control in which voli-
tional factors are concerned. 
Though Spea.r.mants explanations of the faculties are on the 
whole very conformable with Scho1astic teachings, one criticism 
which must be mentioned in regard to his concept of volition is 
his variable use of terms. Conation, attention, volition, and 
orexis are sometimes used interchangeably;·it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to know precisely what is meant by e&ch. At ten-
tion is referred to as conation: "• •• the term attention could 
be replaced by, or defined in terms of, others which had auf-
fered less from ill usage. In particular, it has been found to 
indicate a mental constituent which could be described as a 
64 
seemingly forceful trying or striving, or 'conation'•" Dis-
cussions of will and volition are included in the explanat-ion 
64 Psychol.ogy 12.2!!1 ~ ~· 2 Vola. :tondont Macmillan and 
Company, Limited, 1937, Vo·lL· II, P• 71. 
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of the 1aw of control. The latter is said to consist of three 
phases: •A person makes up his mind to listen {resolution); at 
the chosen moment he accordingly tries to hear (conation); and 
65 in consequence he actually :ms.y hear. • From this description 
it would seem that conation is a pa.rticular stage in the voli-
tianal process. Actually, conation, considered from the stand~ 
point of physical effort, striving, or set, is merely a 
concomitant of volition and is frequently entirely absent from 
will acts. In this particular explanation of the •Iaw of 
.control,• Spearman refers to conation in its restricted mean-
ing, that of physical effort. In general, however, Spearman 
defines conation as a term which •includes all impulses, 
desires, or acts of will, and no less all consent, satisfaction, 
or dissatisfaction.•66 When conation is used as a. general term 
for all forms of appetition, it is evident that it cannot be 
identified with volition. Nor can the terms be used inter-
6'1 
changeably, as we have already seen in Chapter I. The pre-
servation of careful distinctions between general and specific 
terminalogy, and between rational and sensory levele of 
65 Ibid., P• 72• 66The l!Tature ~ 'Intelligence' and the Principles of Cogni-
tion, P• 53. 6
'see above P• 14 • 
appetition is of vital importance to the psychology of 
will. 68 
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In spite of these criticisms there is much to be said in 
favor of Spearman's exposition of volition. In his evaluation 
of volition as conceived by the associationists, it is clear 
that Spearman rejects will as a purely sensory phenamenon. 
Will is not merely a muscular tension as the physiologist, 
Ribot. claims, nor is it a motion which follows an idea and is 
motivated by the feeling of pleasure, as Hume and Hartley claim 
it to be. According to Spearman, the behaviorists, in their 
attempts to destroy all motives, purpose, and goals,ha.ve 
resarted to the most extreme form of radicalism in will psycho-
logy. While the associationists reduced will tb impulse, there 
was at least impulse 1e~t; the behaviorists, in eliminating 
goals and purpose,have eradicated all appetition from the can-
tent of psychology, sensory as well as rational. 
The fate of p.sychology, if it 
were really to be pursued on 
this principle, baffles the 
imagination. No account is 
to be taken of whether any 
movement is made intentionally 
or not. B'o consideration is to 
be taken of any motives. All 
68 . Spearman, at times, apparently uses conation and 
interchangeably. See Psychology J2.2!!! ~ Ages. 
P• 109, Vo~. I, P• 317. 
volition 
Vol. II, 
allusions to desire are to be 
expurgated ••• What does this 
leave behind? Bare c ogni t i o.n 
(if such a thing is conceiv~ble) 
and the motion of a muscle. 9 
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Spearman, contrary to these extremists, earnestly strives 
to maintain a middle course and to explain volition in terms of 
' 
rea.lity,and with due respect for the dignity of the human 
person. Though he does not offer a clear-cut distinction bet-
ween rational and sensory appetition, he does not identify the 
one with the other. Spearman recognizes a gulf of separation 
between an act of decision and the movement of impulse. Both 
contain an orectic element; yet in one there is the power of 
control, in the other, only a natural response to a precon-
ceived end. Spearman sums up his noti~n of volition in the 
following: "Within the sphere of volition there can actually 
. 
be observed the two alleged events differing in kind, not only 
from cognition and feeling, but even to some extent from 
impulse. One is the act of resolving. The other is the carry-
ing of the resolution into a.ction.•70 Spearman here acknowl-
edges the difference of "kind• existing between volition and 
impuise, though he is apparently unable to c~arify further the 
•extent• of the separation. He is aiso careful to distinguish 
~~Psychology~ !a! Ages, Vol. I., P• 310. 
Ibid., P• 312. 
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between a will-act and a voluntary movement which indicates a 
grasp of the true nature of will seldom attained by the modern 
psychologists. In general, throughout the various discussions 
on volition, law of control, orexis, and conation, Spearman, 
more than most of his contemporaries, has attempted to avoid the 
extreme positions maintained by the associationists and 
sensists. In his ca.mments and criticisms of materialistic 
theories, as well as in the exposition of his own doctrine, he 
has given frequent manifestations of adherence to scholastic 
principles and acceptance of the Thomistic concept of man. 
Spearman is significant 
especially for his recognition 
of the need of building up a 
science of mind on a. basis of 
sound philo~ophic principles ••• 
The f'a.ctori2illist, whether he 
admits it or not, is really a 
faculty ·psychologist. This is 
true of every investigator in 
the field of psychometrics. He 
is working in the best Aristotelian 
and Thomistic tradition, since the 
ground he covers is concerned with 
the acts and powers, or the per-
fo-rmances and abilities, of man. 71 
Edward ToJma.n 
The purposive behaviorism of Edward Tolman presents a ~ 
pourri of theories, systems, and influences amalgamated into a 
71Robert E. Brennan. Thomistic Psychology. New Yorkt The 
ll'a.cmilla.n Company, 1942, PP• 344-345. 
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doctrine which may be readily recognized as the author's own 
unique interpretation. Fundamentally, Tolman's works are 
behavioristic; they are based on the assumption that man is a 
biological entity only and that human behavior is the sum total 
of the organism's responses to environment. Tolman, however, 
has attempted to adop:t and fit into the behavioristic pattern 
viewpoints gleaned from several other sources. He has intro-
duced an objective and mechanical type of purposiveness; has 
explained learning in terms of gesta].t formations; and has at 
times emphasized the functional character of the stimulus-
response reflex. 
Properly speaking, Tol.ma.n' s works deserve no place in the 
discussion of volitional theories. His approach to' psychologi-
cal problems is not only thoroughly materialistic, but even 
devoid of any attempt to distinguish, actually, between human 
and animal behavior. ~ere is no reference to will or volition 
as such; psychic elements which are subjective in nature are 
either entirely disregarded or interpreted in terms of pure 
objectivism. However, since To:lman's theory represents a 
dynamic form of behaviorism, because of the purposive element 
he introduces, it may be well to investigate briefly his 
descriptio·ns of human activities. 
Tolman's acceptance of "purpo,se" and "goals• is based on 
his experimental observations of animals. Princfp.les deduced 
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from these animal experiments are readily applied to human 
behavior, for both man and animal are intrinsically dependent 
upon their biological structures. Even among animals it is 
evident that some objects are sought for, while others are not; 
the same objects may at one time be the aim of possession and 
at another time may be the cause of repulsion. The reasans for 
such variable resp.onses are based on purposive object i vis:m.; the 
causes are themselves rooted in environment and the physiolo&-
ical atatus of the organism. 
The first initiating causes of 
behavior are environmental s ti-
muli and initiating physiological 
states. These operate on or 
through the behavior-determinants. 
The behavior-determinants are, it 
appears further, subdivisible into 
three classes1 (a) immediately 
'in-lying' objectively defined 
purposes and cognitions--i.e., 
the 'immanent determinants'; 
(b) the purposive and cognitive 
'capacities' of the given indi-
vidual or sp~cies, which mediate 
the specific immanent determinants 
as a result of the given stimuli, 
and the given initiating states; 
(c) 'behavior-adjustments', which, 
under certain special conditions, 
are produced by the immanent deter-
minants in place of actual overt 
behavior and which serve to act 
back upon such immanent deter-
minants, to remould and 'correct' 
the latter and thus finally t~ 
produce a new and different overt 
behavior from that which7~ould otherwise have occurred. 
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Much attention is also given to appetites and aversions, 
instinct and drives. These psychological fact ore are s·igni-
ficant in purposive behavior, for they are the underlying 
motivations of all actions. Tolman repeatedly reminds us that 
his theory is not a form of hormic psychology. McDougall's 
doctrine is also purposive and built upon the assumption that 
all human as well as aDimal activities ultimately are guided 
and directed by instincts. McDougall's instinct theory, though 
it attributes much import to the physiological basis and devel-
opment of behavior, endeavors to explain purposiveness in ter.ms 
of ment~l and psychic phenomena. According to McDougall's 
theo;ry, instinct is not merely a form of objective behavior; it 
is a bodily reaction stimulated by a purpose preconceived by 
mind. Hor.mic psychology describes instinct as comprising two 
equally important elements; the response of the bodily organism 
and the mental perception of a goal. Contrary to these prin-
ciples, Tolman's interpretation eliminates the mental aspect 
and strictly adheres to a purely objective consideration of 
purpose. Nature is essentially monistic, and purposiveness in 
7 ~rRosive Behavior.!!! Animals and Men. New York and Londont 
The Century Company, 1932, P• 21.-
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behavior arises ~rom the same kind of source as does the 
physiological response. '.rhere is no twofold division of body 
and mind; therefore the source of manta activities cannot be 
partly "mental* and partly physiological. For Tolman, goals 
and purposiveness are a. part of the response situation, not a 
mentalistic conception •. 
••• for us, these same facts of 
purpose and cognition are but 
an expression of certain very 
complex,~ctivities in organic 
bodies. • •• In a word, the fact 
of purpose, as we conceive it, 
is an objective ~act. It is·the 
fa.ct that behavior is docile 
relative to objectively deter-
mined ends. Our psychology is 
purposivism; but it is an objec-
tive, behavioristic pu?iosivis:m, 
not a mentalistic one. 
Appetites and aversions are the two general classes o~ 
motivations. An appetite is an innate demand to attain phy-
siological "quiescence,• while averl3ion is an innate demand to 
escape physiological disturbances. All behavior is activated 
by these two kinds o~ innate drives. It is interesting to note 
Tolman's ingenious ability to intersperse, here and there in 
his own doctrine, psychological morsels obtained from other 
schools of thought. Hie explanations of appetites and drives 
'73 
'1 4Ibid., P• 422. Ibid., P• 423. 
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include a revised feature of Gestaltism. Besides the innate 
demand to possess or repel, contained in appetite and aversion 
respectively, there is another element comparable to the cona-
tive effort as accepted by most psychologists. Tolman refers 
to conation in terms, whose meaning can be conveyed adequately, 
only by a direct quotation. Describing appetites and aversions 
in man, the author states the following: 
FUrthermore he is provided 
innately with certain more or 
less vague sign-gestalt-readiness 
as to how to get thus to or from. 
In the ease of an appetite, he is 
provided innately with some vague 
final sign-gestalt-readiness as 
to the type of consummatory object 
and consummatory response which 
will lead to the given quiescenee--
a.nd also, it would seem, with some 
vague subordinate sign-gestalt-
readinesses as t~ how to explore 
in order to get such consummatory 
objects.'15 
At other times, Tolman stresses the functional qualities 
of beha~ior. The activities of man, and of animals as well, 
form a continual goal-seeking process. Behavior, in other 
words, is an entity which is defined functionally as well &s 
objectively; behavior is the sum total of all our activities 
and is the biological organism functioning as a whole. When he 
'15Ibid., P• 287. 
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speaks r:L behavior, he is speaking of an organism functioning 
in its capacity of getting to or from goal-objects, and of 
selecting certain "means-objects-routes" towards the acquisi-
tion of these same goal-objects. 
The basic princip~es o'f Tolman's dynamic behav-iorism are 
c~osely allied to those of Watson. While the purposive feature 
of Tolman's th.eory may apparently seem to be a serious devi-
ation from the Watsonian tradition, actually it is not. Object-
goals and purposiveness add no rational or even mental quality 
to overt behavior. They are merely objective variables 
inserted for the purpose of explaining the diverse patterns of 
responses occurring in the individual organism. Volitions and 
will do not exist in Tolman's theory; voluntary movements are 
simply included in the category of mechanistic responses, and 
are prompted by an innate demand towards certain goal-objects. 
Though Tolman proposes to offer a behaviorism with the intent 
to explain its purposive nature, he does little else than admit 
that variabilities in responses occur and deserve explanation. 
Behavior reactions are not stereotyped. However, his theoret-
ica1 contribution is but a remodeled edition of the old 
behavioristic doctrine. 
In recent years, the pure reflex-behavior· theory, popu-
larized by Watson, has receded to the background; and the trend 
is definitely in favor of a modified form of mechanism, one 
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which describes behavior in terms ·of motivation, purpose, and 
goals. Psychologists soon found the stereotyped reflex 
responses inadequate to account for the variability of human 
reactions. Something more dynamic, more vital was needed to 
explain the innumerable complexities arising in every day 
living. Yet the modern materialists were anything but willing 
to forsake their monistic principles; and with camplete non-
chalance attempted to describe motivation, purpose, and even 
will, as physiological properties of a biological organism. 
Paul T. Young 
The above resum€ of Tolman's theory indicates the author's 
tenacious adherence to the fundamentals of behaviorism. At the 
st.me time, he tries to incorporate into his own syetem prevail-
ing notions concerning purposiveness in psychology. Others 
\ 
have relinquished the emphasis on stimulus-response bonds as 
unite of behavior, and have concentrated on motivation as the 
unitary force in the psychology of man. A strong advocate of 
motivational psychology is Paul T. Young. 
The author is almost apologetic in his few paragraphs on 
volition and refers to it as the •so-called 'will' factor.• He 
defines it in terms of sensory conations; "will is a postural 
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adjustment or set of the subject towards his ta.sk."76 From the 
outset it is evident that will is looked upon as a •motivating 
factor" rather than as a directive power itself. Young de-
scribes experiments on learning and on specific determination 
in great detail, and with many elaborations on the conscious 
purpose of the subjects; yet at no time makes any attemp;t to 
explain what is motivated. The organism as a whole reacts in a. 
great variety of modes to a certain stimulus at different 
times, and under changed conditions;~ or the organism reacts to 
one stimulus and not to another--these are the generalizations 
resulting from Young's investigations. The causes for these 
inconsistencies are found in the physio1ogical background or 
perhaps in external objective circumstances. Young is con-
cerned with the biol.ogical organism as a. whol.e and is not in-
terested, particularly, in the numerous individual powers with 
which people are endow.ed. The focus o1' Young's s.tudy is the 
objective motive, whatever it may be, which brings about a re-
action in the organism. Needs, desires, wants, wishes, appe-
tities, aversions, and all forms of dynamic activities are 
classed as motivation factors. They become objects rather than 
p.racesses. For example, the "'will to learn" is a power-ful 
76Kotiva.tion of Behavior. New York: ~ohn Wiley and sons, Inc., 
1936, P• 21.3. 
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motive in the learning process; the subject learns because he 
has a specific determination motivating him. 
The problem of will enters into tasks involving voluntary 
attention. Again, Young refers to •valuntary• a.s a type a:f 
physical set. "The essential. factor in voluntary attention is 
postural set or adjustment ••• When an activity in which we 
are interested goes al.ong by i teelf' without this sense of 
effort we do not ordinarily speak of voluntary attention in 
connection with it.•'7 Even free will is explained as a cona-
tive set. ·~o!!!! an action is to assume a determining set 
which motivates behavior. The problem of free will centers 
around the conditions which bring a determining set into 
. t ·'8 eJOe ence. 
Among the very inclusive list o:f motivee,ranging from the 
•will-factor• to drives and desires, the feeling states are not 
to be found. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are described as 
conscious processes in the realm of' experience. Young rejecte 
the theory oi' peychol.ogical hedonism as it is usually under-
stood and has adopted what he calls, "factual. hedonism.• Hie 
distinction is made upon empirical facts. Everyday experi-
ences, he says, reveal that pleasantness and unpleasantness do 
'1'1 Ibid., P• 214. 
'18Ibid., p. 216. 
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not always determine our conduct; they are only associated with 
the pur~uit and attainment of a goal and the avoidance of an 
undesirable object, respectively. •Pleasantness and unpleas-
antness are thus the manifestations within conscious experience 
of dynamic interpl.ay of motivating factors. They are subjec-
tive signs of conflict, release, over--stimulation, and other 
conditions existing within the physical mind.•~9 
Young's interpretation of mind, and of all the factors 
concerned in mental processes, such as motives, goals, drives, 
and will, is substantially physiological. First of all, his 
basic hypothesis is the identity of mind and brain. 
We hold to the theory that the 
mind and the brain are one and 
the same reality. All the facts 
about motivation ••• fit this 
identity hypothesis~ •• Whether 
the structure which regulates 
behavior and conscious experience 
be called a mind or a brain 
matters little:Provided we are 
clear about viewpoints. The main 
difference between the. conceptions 
af mind and brain is that the former 
is assumed from an individual point 
of view, and the latter fram an 
objective.BO ••• The assumption 
of a single motivating structure 
as the basis of a.l.l activity re-
moves the difficulties latent in 
the dualistic opposition of a real 
mind and a real brain.Bl 
'19Ibid., p. 384 • 
80Ibid., P• 532. 81Ibid., P• 3'1. 
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Following this first assumption, Young proceeds to explain 
motivation as a physiol.ogica.l process which stimulates behavior 
in the organism as a whole. Motivation by means of neural 
mechanisms releases energy and initiates bodily movements. All 
motivating factors, therefore, may be defined as conditions 
which bring about the release of physica1 energy. Motives may 
originate within the organism or may be occasioned by environ-
mental causes; the latter kind are called •incentives." 
In his attempts to describe the dynamic energies of man, 
Young has reduced the human individual to a physical, biological 
structure. Consequently, motivation designates any facto,r 
which causes a release of bodily energy. Consistent with the 
basic pattern of the human person as a biological entity, the 
"will-factor• refers only to muscular set or a specific deter-
mination made effective through the neura.1 organization of the 
body. Though the doctrine rejects mechanism in fa.vor of moti-
vational dynamism, ultimately both motivation and human dynam-
ics are expounded as forb of physical determinism. Young's 
summary of moti va.tional psychology provides a worthy testimony 
of these facts. 
Motiva.tional psychology may be 
defined as the study of all con-
ditions Which arouse and regulate 
the behavior of organisms. The 
arouaa1 of beha~ior necessarily 
implies a release of physical 
energy from the tissues. The 
regulation of behavior includes 
the control of activity through 
determinations as well as the 
restriction of act~~ity by 
organic structure. 
Kurt Lewin and Geeta1tiam 
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As an offspring of the Gestaltqualitat of the Austrian 
School and the phenomenology of Husserl, was born the very 
influential contemporary school of thought, Gestaltism. The 
principles and laws of Gestalt psychology are many, and the 
adherents to this theory are subdivided into groups according 
to their own particular interpretations and special researches. 
However, the fundaments of Gestalt psychology are generally 
upheld by all these groups within the school. Like function-
alism and hormic psychology, Gest&1tism was a reactionary move-
ment against structuralism, and from the outset h&a stead:faetl.y 
defended the unity of mind and dynamic nature o~ all human and 
animal activities. The immediate beginnings of this echool can 
be traced to, Wertheimer's experiment on the perception of move-
ment. As a result of his investigations, Wertheimer, together 
with Kohler and Koffka, concluded that psychological phenomena 
82Ibid. 
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existed in our experiences which were inexplicable according to 
the classical principles of Wundt. The famous •phi phenomena•, 
discovered by Wertheimer and his subjects, convinced these men 
that life is more than a mere callection of elements. 
The first principle established by the Gestaltists--that 
the whole is more than the mere sum of its pa.rts--was a direct 
attack on elementariam. Adding up bits of associated elements 
never produces a perception in its true nature. lie first per-
ceive objects as wholes, not as a bundle of parts; therefore 
the perception of the whole is prier to the perception of its 
parts • .Following this first principle, Gestalt psychology 
rejects any form of connectionism, bonds of association, or 
elemental unite ~f behavior. Such appendages are superficial, 
unreal, and contrary to the oneness or gestalt quality of all 
perceptions. We can neyer determine the rea.l nature of our 
mental experience by means of analysis because analysis itself 
destroys the reality of our experiences. Analysis breaks up 
the existing unity, and in doing so changes the very essence of 
the object under study. Our own common everyday experiences 
confirm these facts. We p:ereeive objects as wholes,. not as a 
mosaic of parts or a.s clusters of elemental sensations and 
feelings. 
A rejection of assimilated sensations as the basis of 
experience included an abandonment of the constancy hypothesis, 
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which maintained that a. direct one-to-one co,rrespondence 
existed between isolated or local stimulations and immed.ia.te 
behavior. Sensations, aroused by their respective points of 
stimulation, were supposed to become united by bonds of asso-
ciation or fused together to form the perceptions we experi-
ence. Gestalt psychology vigorously contested all these 
assumptions of elementa.rism and associationism, and built up a 
psychology which describes all our experiences in terms of 
"patterns,. and •tetalities•. Its specific intention was ta. 
cleanse psychology of all artificiality, and to replace the 
inadequate and sterile doctrine of structuralism by a. theory 
which interprets experiences as they really exist, not as they 
seem to be under analytic eissectien. 
All we intend to do is te replace 
l.&ws. of local correspondence, 
laws of machine effects, by laws 
of a much more comprehensive cor-
respondence between the total 
perceptual field and the t o,ta.l 
stimulation, and we shall, in the 
search for these laws, find at 
least indications of some more 
specific constancies, though 
never one of the type expressed 
by the constancy hypothesis.83 
This brief description of Gestalt psycholegy is only a 
schema of a very complicated and intricate system of thought. 
8~. Koffka. •rinciples J! Gestalt Psychology. New York: 
Harcourt, Bra.ee and Compa.ny, 1935, p. 97. 
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In our diecussion,we are primarily interested in the theory of 
will as proposed by Gestaltists. As a preface to this parti-
cular investigation, it will be wel1 to understand something 
about the general nature of dynamics acco:rding to Gestaltists. 
These theorists are severely critical of mechanisms of the 
behavioristic kind. Behaviorism stresses the stimulus-response 
bond as the unit of activity; reflexes are the ultimate source 
of all action. But the reflex theory, in describing behavior, 
emphasizes the importance of isolated movements elicited by 
isolated stimUli, a direct contradiction to the Gestaltqu&iitlt 
c 
of behavior in reality. Iech&nism of this kind is promptly 
rejected; in order to preserve the "to:tality" of action as well 
as the "wholeness • o:f perception, the Gestalt ists established 
an analagoue relationship between the laws of behavior and the 
laws of physics. However, the Gestaltists do not identify 
psychical and physical forces, but emphasize the close analogy • 
••• the treatment ·of causal dynamic 
prnblems campels· psychology to 
employ the fundamental concepts 
of dynamics, not, as frequently 
in the past, promiscuously, but 
in the development of a differ-
entiated cancept-:f'ormation in 
dyna.:adc fields. Physical analogies 
may often be drawn without damage 
to clarification. On the other 
hand, it is always necessary care-
fully to avoid certain very ea.sy 
errors, for example, in the ade-
quate comprehension of the 
psychical field forces; and it 
must always be kept in mind that 
we have to do with forces in a 
psychical field and ng1 in the 
physical environment. 
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Mental. laws were prescribed to provide an explanation fo:r 
the simultaneous and orderly reactions of the organism as a 
whole to the many a.nd various kinds of stimuli. Many patterns 
of stimulations occur in rapid and often haphaZard sequence, 
but beha,vior itself is purposive, o:,rderly, and· meaningful.. 
Because the organism reacts to these stimuli as a whole and not 
in isolated sections, the order· and meaning of actions are pre- , 
served. What is it that maintains this order and directs our 
performances toward goa.ls and purposes? The Gestaltists say 
that just as the solar system and the various other systems in 
nature are controlled and piloted by the interactions of phys-
ical forces, so are the activities of the human organism 
governed by psychical forces. Psychical forces are dynamic and 
are the source of all human power; by means of their own mutual 
interrelationships they direct, organize, and contro;l all the 
activities we perform. 
Dynamica1 interaction, undisturbed 
by accidental impacts from without, 
leads to orderly distribution, 
8
"Kurt Lewin. A Dynamic Theory of Personalit)': Selected 
Papers. Trans. by Dcm.&l.d K • .Adams and Karl E. Z.ener. New 
York and London: llcGra."W-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935, p. 46. 
though there are no special pre-
established arrangements. 
And what is the explanation 
of this general tendency in undis-
turbed dynamics? It is simple 
enough. In all these systems we 
have one resulting force at each 
point at each instant of time. 
All the resul.tant forces together 
form one texture af stresses. 
From the principles of physics one 
can deduce, therefore, that, .!2£ 
!!!!t s_y stem ~ !!. whole, the imme-
diate effect of a]l those forces 85 
will have one definite direction. 
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In the field of dynamics, then, the prima.ry assumption of 
Gestalt psycholLogy is1 that psychical forces are the point of" 
origin for all activities of the organism. Human precesses &re 
directed and distributed by the dynamic interactions of these 
natural executive forces. 
The GestalLtists h&v.e not t~t&lly discarded the ter.m will, 
and have made some attempts to distinguish between voluntary 
and non-voluntary actions. Koffka, Kohler, and others have 
based their discussions of will on the earlier investigations 
of Kurt Lewin. Introducing the problem of will in his chapter 
I 
on Action, Koffka says, •The discussion which is to follow will 
again be based very largely on the work of Lewin, whose lucid 
and acute analysis of the problem has probably been the strongest 
85Wolfgang KShler. GestalLt PsycholLogy. New Yorks Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, 1945, P• 139. 
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force in re-establishing problems of volition as primary prob-
lems of psychology.•86 
Strictly speaking, the Gestaltists make no clear-cut 
segregation of actions into voluntary and non-voluntary types. 
Actions are complex and may contain both positive and negative 
valences, as well as external and internal influences. An 
intense resol.ve to perform an action may include a.n actual dis-
like ar unwillingness to fulfill the deter.mination. ~lenees 
often control the situation, so that it is difficult to say 
whether the action is voluntary or not. 
An already existing state of 
tension, which may go back to a 
purpose, a need, or a half-
finished activity, is interested 
in a certain object or event, 
which is experienced as an 
attraction (or repulsion), in 
such a. way that this particular 
tense system no:w obtains control 
of the mot o·rium. We shall say 
of such objects that they possess 
a. 'valence ' • 
Valences of this sort operate 
at the same time (as do certain 
other experiences) as field forces 
in the sense that they steer the 
i~~~~f::a~rocesses, above all the 
Lewin offers a classification of activities consistent 
with the determinism of Gestaltism. Instead of voluntary and 
86 t"\n • t 416 87~· £!_., P• • 
K. Lewin • .QR.• ill•, p. 5l.. 
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involuntary activities, he refers to "field-actionstt and 
ttcantrolled actions". Field actions refer to those actions 
directed by external forces situated somewhere outside the 
subjective ego. Controlled actions refer to actions ruled by 
ego-forces. This division does not imply complete mutual. 
exclusion of either kind of forces; for we may say that 
environmental forces predominate in field actions, and ego-
forces, in controlled actions. In the final analysis, the 
distinction is due, not eo much to the type of fo,rces concerned, 
but, rather, to the difference in organization of the forces 
involved, whichever ones they may be.. •A continuous control of 
the process by the forces of the outer psychologicalL en-viron-
ment occurs when the activities are not (or are in only slight 
degree) autochthonous, or when the forces inherent in the 
course of the process as such are small relative to the field 
f .. as orces. 
Lewin does not describe will as a single power or even as 
an individual "force•·, but regards volition as a type of deter-
minis tic organization of many fo:rces. The human organism con-
tributes little in the way of direction to the total process; 
the individual himself is atsteered" either one way or the 
8811?.!!·' p. 49. 
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other, depending on many circumstances. The forces,both of the 
inner and outer environment, the process itself, the intention, 
the positive and negative valences existing in the field of 
forces,--all these, depending upon the particular pattern of 
their organization, determine whether an action be controlled, 
or whether it be impulsive. The steering process is governed 
immediately by the pereeptua1 field, but remotely by the total 
organization of all forces and processes concerned • 
••• the action process ••• proceeds 
typically in successive action 
steps which themselves for.m 
largely autochthonous wholes ••• 
Whether the control of. the proc-
ess by the field of force occurs 
in this latter manner or in the 
sense of a continuous steering 
depends, on the one hand, upon 
the integral firmness and the 
forces of the action process 
itself and, on the other hand, 
upon the strength of the forces 
in the field. Hence changes in 
either of these circumstances 
lead to essential changes in the 
course of the process. At all 
events, the steering processes·· 
are of fundamental significance 
for the whole field of im~ulsive 
and controlled behavior.s 
I.ewin'.s theory of will, which is practically that of 
Gestal.t psychology, is essentiall.y deterministic and 
89 Ibid., P• 49. 
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mechanistic. Whether behavior is controlled by stimulus-
response connections or by psychical forces, in either case, it 
is determined and not free. Gestalt psychology has not reJected 
mechanism but has substituted one kind for another. Will is 
not a supreme, directive power, but simply one of the many 
dynamic ego-forces of which the total organism is composed. 
Man is completely without a substantiality of his own, for 
every act changes the whole individual and every act is con-
trolled by psychic energies. Not only is he at the mercy of 
cosmic forces, but he is even wholly subjected to the psychical 
forces within his own organism.. In brief, actions, volitional 
or impulsive, are the physical or cortical patterns of dynamic 
energy arising from a biological whole which is man. 
Johannes Lindworsky 
Among the modern scholastic psychologists, Lindworsky is 
the most eminent authority on will. He has made an intensive 
study of volitional processes, and ha·s been a strong opponent to 
those who define will as muscular tension or conative set. His 
investigations and written works reaffirm all the essential. 
fundamentals set forth in scholastic philosophy. His findings 
are but further substantiations of the true rational. character 
of will. He has made invaluable contributions to the study of 
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will in his detailed psychological developments of principles 
already established by metaphysics and the philosophy of man. 
Lindworsky points out that volition, unlike cognition, is 
not a primary conscious power. Perceptions and sensations are 
a part of the cognitive process and nothing else precedes them 
in our conscious life. In the case of will, there must always 
be knowledge befo:rehand. The most important of all the cogni-
tive contents which precede will are motives. For Lindworsky, 
motives :form an integral. part of the volitional process a.nd are 
defined as fo,llaws: tt!B& motive of ~volitional .!£!..!!. 
everything which~ represented to ~mind~~ val.ue realiz-
able through ill_ va.lunta;:y act. We understand by value any-
thing that is advantageous for the individual eoncerned.•90 
Motives may be classified as higher and lower, and inner and 
outer. Lower motives find their only value in the pleasurabie 
feelings which they excite. Higher motives refer to values 
derived through cognizance of relations. Inner· motives are 
concerned with the goal in question and its personal value, 
while outer motives pertain to a more extensive realm of values. 
Obviously, the most essential requisite for all motives is 
appearance in consciousness. '~ile other-organic processes 
9~xperimental Psychal.agy. Trans. from the Ger.man (1930) by 
Harry R. De Sil.va... New Yo:rk: The l&:a.emillan Company, 1931., 
P• 304. 
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progress effectively without the presence of consciousness, 
motives and values must be cognized by the mind in order to 
exist. They are subjective contents, not objective ones. 
Because of their subjective nature, the efficacy of motives may 
vary from time to tiDe. Imagination may enhance certain 
motives beyond their actual value, o.r at times we may be mor-e 
cognizant of hidden val.ues than at other times. In training 
the will, greatest emphasis should be given to motives. The 
older notions of strong will-power were founded on the belief 
that continual. exercise increases strength--as if will were a 
muscular power. Lindworsky's thesis maintains that strength of 
will is achieved by habituating it 12 !£!~proper motives. 
The author's experiments on the 
resolutian of the disagreeable. 
speak decisively against the 
existence and significance of 
intensive acts of will. Our 
will appears to be comparable 
not to a fo·rceful stroke of a 
hammer, but, rather, to; a switch-
ing, or a closing of a contact, 
for which no particular force is 
necessary. The t o.tal strength of 
will might depend on the placing 
in readiness of valuable goals, 
and in a skilled diiversion of the 
attention. In this way, many 
facts may be e.:x:.P~ained satisfac-
torily; for example, the circum-
stances that the strength of will 
is not reserved for any age err 
sex alone and that men who in one 
domain have great strength of 
will :may lack it completely in 
ethers. It is not the existence, 
or the lack of strength of will, 
but· the readiness or lack of' 
motives, that furnishes the key 
to the understanding of'9iueh · contradictory behavior. 
The concept of value is, in turn, dependent upon the 
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entire hierarchy of values and the compete philosophy of life 
which an individual pessesses. Motives and values are relative 
objectives. However, in will training, it is of utmost impor-
tance that· eur motives be specific. Just as images are neces-
sary to bodily action, so are specific motives necessary to 
right will-action. Abeve all, we must distinguish between 
subjectively experienced values and merely speculative ones aa 
effective motives. Ideals are simply cqncrete, complex motive-
values. A sound permanent set of values embodied in concrete 
ideals is the only guarantee for stability and security in one•s 
psychological development. 
The internal act of will., though prompted by motives, is 
per~ a rational, appetitive movement, distinct from pereep-
tion, thought, or feeling. Acts of will form a distinct ca.te-
gory of their own in the intel.lectual life of man. But the 
voli tiona.l process is a cap lex pheno-menon and includes a 
diversity of other elements besides actual willing. There are 
three stages in every complete process of volition: •first, 
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the acquisition of motives preceding the resolution--we might 
call it the accumulation of will power; second, the resolution 
or rather the choice; and third, the execution of resolution.n92 
From experimentations on will, Ach had concluded that a 
sort of psychic force, acting subconsciously, existed in the 
volitional process. A "determining tendency" leads to the 
fulfil].ment of resaltuion. Lindwor·sky refuted Ach's law of 
special determination, and pointed out that voluntary attention 
explained the performances of tasks unadverted to after the 
original resolution. To will or resolve something specifically, 
we must first intellectually perceive the task before us, and 
in doing so we attend to the object of our will. The image of 
the task is strengthened by the attention thus given to it, and 
even in the absence of the initial resolution the task may be 
performed effectively. Lindworsky says that the resulting 
performance is not the outcome of a specific determining force, 
but of voluntary attention, acting under the influence of 
previous habit. 
Lindworsky carefully distinguishes voluntary actions from 
will acts and also from reflex and instinctive movements. All 
these movements, however, are at times associated with the 
92 !h! Training of the Will. 
Fitzpatrick. lifiwau'iCe'ei 
P• 112. 
Trans. by A. Steiner and E. A. 
The Bruce Publishing Company, 1929, 
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volitional processes. Inward wil1ing requires various bodily 
activities for its objective fulfillment. In this discussion 
arises the problem of images. Some authors, as we have seen, 
designate kinaesthetic images as a prerequisite for voluntary 
movements. Lindwo:rsky states that experimental self-observation 
reveals the scarcity of these images. However, at some time or 
other, previous to the movement, there must have been an image 
of the movement. The image is a necessary step to the final 
production of an action. •It has been shown in every case that 
no direct path leads from the im&ge of the goal to its realiza-
tia.n. Otherwise, each no~l person should be able to move 
either of hie eare.•93 FUrthermore, in customary voluntary 
movements, a visual image of the goal pursued is more signifi-
cant than kinaesthetic images, which might even prove to be 
disturbing :factors in the actual performance. Lindwo,rsky 
affirms the advantages of kinaesthetic images previous to 
voluntary actions, though he apparently does not assert that 
they are immediate prerequisites; it is possible that they are 
frequently present only in the remote background. Neither 
visual nor kinaesthetic images should be regarded as super-
fluous appendages, but, rather, as :factors contributing to the 
total process of willing an act and executing it. •According 
93-Experimental Psychology, po 320. 
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to our view, the kinaesthetic images assist in making the finer 
corrections of the occasionally occurring movements, while the 
94 
visual images assist in making the coarser corrections.• 
We may now briefly summarize some of the outstanding 
features of I.indworskyt-s theory of will. {l) While other 
authors hav.e emphasized exercise by repeated performances as 
the important factor in will training, Lindworsky stresses 
motives and value as the main source of will power. However, 
Lindworsky does not overlook the value of repetition, and 
recommends its use whenever it is found to be efficacious. 
Education of will should train it to act on proper motives. 
He makes careful distinctions between subjecti"fely experienced 
values and those which are merely speculative ones. FUrther-
more, the more specific motives are the more effective ones. 
(2) Objective experimentations cannot prove the existence of 
will or freedom of the will, th~ugh it follows indirectly from 
them, or at least negatively. (3) While the will-act is per~ 
a rational appetitive act, the volitional process in human 
beings is complete only when will reveals itself in outward 
behavior; • ••• valid observations indicate that there is no 
isolated willing, that there is no pure act of will, and 
94Ibid., P• 321.. 
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that just as the mind needs the body, so the vo1itional act 
needs a mode of behavior in which it can reveal itself.•95 
We have attempted to review some of the most influential 
theories of will and to present a cross section exemplifying 
the many diversities and individualistic tendencies apparent in 
so many of the outstanding ones. However, the picture is still 
ineo.mplete, for experimental.ists have also contributed theories 
based on objective data and introspective reports. It is out-
side the scope of experiments to determine anything about the 
nature of will directl.y, but by these indirect methods it is 
po·s~ible to know more about effects of volition. In the next 
chapter we will give a resume of the classic experiments on 
Will. 
95 lli.Q.. 
CHAP!'ER IV 
EXPERIMENTS ON WILL 
In recent years experimentations haTe flourished in psy-
chological fields. Our· knowledge of perception, imagery,. 
memory, and thought has made great adTances, and much of this 
progress is the result of the many ingenious experiments 
carried through by careful inTestigatere. Will experiments are 
few in number and the results inconclusiTe. However, both the 
methods used and the achieTements attained are well worth our 
consideration. 
lla.rziss Ach 
Preeminent among the early experimenters on will is 
llarziss Ach. There is scarcely a chapter on volition among our 
modern psychology books which does not include a discussion or 
at least references to Ach's remarkable work. Ach's new mode 
of procedure, rather than the conclusions he drew, established 
a.. precedent in experimental psychology of the higher thought 
processes. 
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Ach rea1ized that the will-act and the external reactions 
ar-e two separable phenomena. In order to gain introspections 
on the act of willing as well as on the ensuing reaction, he 
fractionated the obserTations into three periods; a fore 
period, the main period, and the after period. In the fore 
period, the subject reported his experiences between the pre-
liminary instructions and the presentation; in the main period 
he described his actual reactions to the stimulus; in the after 
period he introspected for the time subsequent to the reac-
tionary period. Ach tried to create a situation which would be 
certain to include an observation of the will act, for volition 
occurs when the subject accepts the task and not only when he 
performs it. 
In Ach'a experiments, the subjects were required to mem-
orize a group of paired nonsense syll&bli.es, so that when one 
member of the pair was presented, they would readily respond 
with the other member. After they had completed this task, 
conflicting conditions were established. Instead of responding 
with the other syllable of the pair memorized, they were now 
required to giTe a syllable that rhymed with the proposed one. 
In order to fulfill the Ia.st requirements, the subjects had to 
oTercome a preeatablishe~ habit; and to accomplish this feat 
will-acts were necessary. Through introspective reports from 
the eubj ect s a.bou t their experience during the pro,ce ss, Ach 
14? 
obtained descriptions of Tolitional action under controlled 
conditions. The presence of conflicting tendencies eToked in 
the subject a strong resolution to overcome the established 
•determining tendency". Ach contended he could measure the 
strength of will manifested in these subjects by measuring the 
force of the determining tendency; the measure was termed the 
ttassociati Te equi Talent". In ather words, the stronger the 
conflicting tendency, the greater the strength of will. If the 
determining tendency proved to be stronger than the reproduc-
tiTe tendency, the subject was able to overcome the association 
already established.1 
Ach's analyses of the introspect! ve reports of the sub-
jects led him to some Tery significant conclusions. These 
1
•Der Erfolg und mit ibm der Wirkungsgrad des Wol1ens ist 
nlm1ich abhangig von yershiedenen Faktoren. · 
Vor a.llem ist er bedingt durch die starke der 
Determination, welche durch den Willensakt gesetzt wird. Je 
eindring~icher, da.s aktuelle :Moment im Entschluss hevortritt, 
desto starker ist im aU.Semeinen a.uch die determinierende 
Tendenz, welche beim Erleben der konkreten BezugsTorstellung, 
des :Mittels zur Erreichung des Zweckes, den Ablaut des 
psychischen Geschehens bestimmt. In der Starke dieser durch 
den Willensakt gesetzten Determination, die, wie in w. u. D. 
nachgewiesen ist, aach im Unbewussten weiterwirkt, zeigt sieh 
die Intensitat der Willenskraft des IndiTiduums, der 
llachtbereich seines Wollens. D&bei ist diese Intensitat 
bedingt einerseits durch eine persanliehe Konstante, 
andererseits durch die Eindringlichkeit, mit der d§s aktuelle 
:Moment des konkreten Willensaktes erlebt wurde.• Uber den 
Willensa.kt l!!!! 9.!!. ~emperament. Leipzigt Verlag Ton Q.uelle 
und Meyer, 1910, P• 250. 
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reports made it clear to Ach that the determining tendency 
included four distinct e1ementsr first, a sensory element 
manifested by physical feelings of tension and effort; 
seeondly, an intellectual element, ideas and thoughts cancern-
ing the purpase in Tiew; thirdly, the consciousness of effort 
exerted to·wa.rds acquisition of the goal; a.nd :fina.Jily,. the 
actual or essential element which is an awareness o·f the "I 
w111•. The last mentioned element constituted the most 
distinguishing attribute of the will-act. i'he subjects were 
aware that the action in which they were engaged proceeded 
fram the self. They were experiencing, here and naw, the self 
in action, a phenomenon unrealizable in any other kind of 
dynamic actiTity. 2 
As Kulpe, llarbe, Orth, a.nd others of the Wiirzburgers had 
arrived at the presence of irreducible elements in ideas and 
~ur so viel ist klar, da.ss hier die "Ichseite• des psychischen 
Geschehens in ganz anderer Weise hervortritt als bei sonstigen 
'Erlebnissen, sowie dass ferner in dem J(omente, wo der Willen-
sa.kt in seiner energischen Form gegenwartig ist, eine 
eindeutig bestimmte Anderung des Verhaltens des 8 Ich" erlebt 
wird. Es ist mir vorerst versagt, noch naher auf eine 
Char&kteristik dieses Teiles des Erlebnisses einzugehen. Bine 
Klarung ist insbesondere dann moglich, wenn die innerste Seite 
des seelischen Geschehens, welche wir eben a.ls das "Ich" 
bezeichnens der Untersuchung nlher zug&nglich sein wird. Und 
das ist dann der Falls wenn der Willensakt im H~blick auf die 
Art und Weise seines Zustandekommens betra.chtet wird • Ibid., 
P• 241. ----
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judgments, so Ach believed that non-sensory contents existed in 
volitions. The lrdrzburgers had made the first serious break 
with traditional sensism; the strength of their opposition was 
increased by their unanimity of opinion reached through various 
kinds of experiments. During the expertments,Ach observed that 
the subjects exerted great effort,and often their attempts were 
accompanied by tense bodily posture or characteristic gestures. 
These physical concomitants were definitely classed as externa1 
signs a·f the internal act of will. Ach did not consider these 
conative movements as part of the will-act itsel~but only as 
outward manifestations of the internal resoJLve. 
Only a few af the subjects were successful in overca-ming 
the strong reproductive tendency developed in the first part of 
the experiment. 
At this point it is well to reconsider Ach' s. •associate 
equivalent•. There is no real evidence that the "deter.mining 
tendency• is the will-act only. In his attempts to measure 
will by the experimental procedure described, Ach was actually 
only comparing the strength of two reproductive tendencies; and 
he did not discuss the further problem of freedom of choice 
involved in the acceptance o.·f the ta.sk. For, the tendency to 
comply with the directions, whate?er the subjects moti "Ye for 
acceptance may h&"Ye been, by giving a rhyme instead of the 
learned syllable is also, in a sense, a reproductive tendency •. 
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Personai experiences of the subject may have greatly influenced 
their ability to reproduce rhyming syllables. Ach determined 
his ~asure• by first finding out how many repetitions of 
nonsense syllables were needed for the learning process, with-
out at the same time hampering the efficacy of the resolutions. 
He found that 120 repetitians formed so· strong an association 
that it overcame the subject's resolution to respond according 
to the directions. Strength of will, then, was measured by the 
~ 
number of repetitions needed to form an effective •associative 
equivalent •. To attempt the measurement of will power on a 
numerical basis is a precarious procedure to say the least. 
This method would never permit of generalizations in other types 
of will act ion. 
In his work on the will, A.ch,. like others, recognized the 
existence of mental states which were unpicturable, incapable 
of being represented by any sensible images. 3 Ach's analysis 
of will-acts m&rks a great contrast to the interpretation of 
the sensists. Sin.ce the time of Locke and Hume, will popularly 
3
-oabei war dieses Wiesen unanschaulich gegeben d. h. es waren 
keine phlnomenologischen Bestandteile wie visuelle, akustische, 
kinlsthetische Empfindungen oder Erinnerungsbilder von so.lchen 
Empfindungen nachzuweisen, we1che den als Wiesen gegebenen 
Inhalt seiner ~u&litlt nach bestimmten.• Uber· die Willen-
statie;keit !!!!9.!!!!, Denken. Gottingent Vanderh"''e'Ck a.nd 
Ruprecht, 1905, p. 210. 
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had been described as a complex process characterized chiefly 
by the feeling states or by emotional elements. Contrary to 
these views. Ach claimed that the will-act was something over 
and above the physical feeling of effort. His experiments gave 
ample evidence that the acceptance of the task and actual. "I 
will" was an intellectual process- and like thought itself 
contained neither kinaesthetic images nor physical tension.4 
While it is no,t possible to experiment on the will 
directly, Ach's works show that experimentations have .contrib-
uted invaluable descriptive data on volitional activities. 
Hie experiments offered objective proofs for the fact that 
the internal act o~will, at least as a tendency, cannot be 
identified with cognitive processes, whether sensory or 
4~in derartiges Gegebensein von kinasthetischen oder akustisch-
kinlsthetischen Vorstellungsbildern mag wohl die Ursache fur 
die weit verbreitete Annahme sein, dass sich unser Denken 
stets in innerem Sprechen oder in a.daequa.ten visuellen, 
akustisohen u. dergl. Erinnerungsbildern vollzieht. 
DemgegenUber muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass es sehr 
4omple:x:e Inhalte.gibt, bei denen, wie sohon erw~hnt, die 
Teilinhalte in mannigf&chen gegenseitigen Beziehungen bewusst 
vorliegen, ohne da.ss hierbei diese einzelnen Inhalte durch 
ihre adaequa.ten sprachlichen Bezeichnungen u. dergl. 
reprt'i.sentiert sind beziehw. Uberha.upt reprasentiert sein 
k~nnen.• Ibid., P• 215. 
-
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intellectual, nor with any of the feeling or emotional states. 
Willing is a dynamic process distinct from all other mental 
a.ctivities.5 
Kichotte and PrWa 
Kichotte and PrUm of the Lcuvain School undertook to 
investigate another type of will-act, namely choice. Methods 
were planned so that records of the process of choice could be 
secured under experimental conditions. ~he subjec- were asked 
to choose between two mathematical operations at each trial. 
~wo numbers were presented by means of a tachistoscope: if the 
card contained a four-digit number, the subject had to choose 
between addition and subtraction; if the number presented was 
smaller, he was to choose between multiplication and division. 
As soon as the decision was made, the subject pressed a key. 
~he subjects were asked to report their introspections during 
5
•Aus unseren AuafUhrungen ergibt sich, dass der Willensakt als 
solcher in seinem unmdttelbaren Gegebensein wohl 
cbarakterisiert ist und als ein spezifisches psychisches 
Erlebnis angesprochen werden muss. Info·lgedessen sind alle 
jene Ansichten zurttckzuweisen, welche entweder nur in einem 
der angegebenen Elemente ein charakteristisches Kennzeichen 
des Wollens sehen, oder welche nur in einem besonderen 
Zusammensein einzelner phitnomenologischer Inhalte z. B. der 
Spannungsempfindungen und der Bewusstseinlage der Anstrengung 
ein spezifisches Merkmal der Willensbetatigung annehmen." 
•• ~ ~ Willensakt ~ das Te!Per&ment, p. 247. 
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the time preceding actual choice, as well as their experience 
of the final selection itself. The directions requested that 
the choices be made for a serious reason and that they be made 
as quickly as possible. From the data obtained, Michotte and 
Prum made a complete and careful study of the factors in voli-
tional. consciousness. 
Upon the presentation of the EStimulus card, it was 
observed that the subjects immediately began to evaluate the 
twa: alternatives according to the motives which they had in 
mind. During this time one object was found to be more worth-
while than the other. This period was characterized by con-
sciousness of motives and values. After the period of 
motivation, an •intermediary" period ensued wherein the sub-
jects realized a consciousness of doubt and hesitation; and they 
found themselves engaged in reasoning, comparing, evaluating, 
etc. Sensory contents at this point were completely lacking. 
During this time, preliminary to actual selection, the subjects 
often experienced muscular tension, especially in the finger 
which was preparing to press the reaction key. The whole tenor 
of this transition period was one of suspension, and for this 
reason it is natural that physical accompaniments would be 
6 present. 
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In the final state which included choice, an interesting 
differentiation was noticed by the experimenters. Two factors 
were present, decision and consent; and these were found to be 
distinguished by definite structural differences. Decision 
followed immediately after the adoption of motives, or after 
the two alternatives were clearly within consciousness. In 
this case, the subject designated the chosen operation in one 
of two ways; either in a •live]y• fashion or in a "cold" 
fashion. Decision was "lively" if it followed after consid-
era.ble muscular tension; it was •cold tt if no muscular tens ion 
6
•Le stade intermediaire comprend tout d'abord un etat 
subjectif assez caracteristique du aujet. Cet etat contient 
camme facteurs conatitutifs: 
1. Une conscience de doute, d'heaitation, d•oacillation. 
2. Une conscience d'attente, de auspena. 
3. Une tension muaculaire gen~rale, localisee plus 
specialement dans le doigt qui doit reagir et dans la 
poitrine. La respiration eat superficielle acceleree, 
et preaente des arr~ts.• , 
''Etude Experimenta.le sur le Choi:x: Volontaire", Archives ~ 
Psychologie, Tome X {1910), P• 180. 
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preceded it. Consent followed only when the desired alter-
native was present alone in the focus of consciousness. While 
decision requires two alternatives,. consent which follows 
decision is characterized by acceptance; therefore it needs 
only consciousness of the desired alternative. Consent is also 
closely related to motivation.8 One more important distinction 
was observed, namely the dif"ference between voluntary and •non-
voluntary" choice. Some subjects did not possess any 
7 ~r.mi lee actee volontaires, la distinction la plus 
caract~r.istique est celle qui separe la dicision du consente-
~ , ' ment, ou de l'adheeion. Ces phenomenes peuvent, de plus, 
presenter divers aspects. La. decision peut ~tre 'froide', 
'vive', ou 'active', qui diff~rences qui paraissent tree 
accus,es chez lee sujects non-exerc,s, mais qui, avec un peu 
d'habitude de !'introspection, semblent de peu d'importance 
ou point de vue du ca.ra.ct~re volontaire ••• La. decision est, en 
g€neral, 'vive' dans le sene que voue venons de decrire, quand 
elle est precedee par un etat de forte tension, et elle 
s•a.ccompagne alors normalement de contractions dane diverses 
parties du corps ••• la tension ne s'6tant pas rel€ch€e 
immediatement, 1a decision est froide." Ibid., PP• 181-184. 8
•Les deux formes d•a.pparition du choix vo"i''iitaire, d~cision et 
consentement, r~Qondent ~ des conditions bien definiee. Le 
choix est considere toujours comme veritable d~cision, quand 
il appa.raft iDDD6diatement apres lee motifs, ou immediatement 
apres la pause pendant la.quelle se developpent l'attente et le 
doute, ou encore quand lea mots d'signant lea deux operations 
sont prononces interieurement par le sujet immediatement avant 
le choix. ~uand, par contre, seule !'alternative qui va €tre 
choisie se presente a la conscience, sous forme interrogative, 
ou bien accompagnee de la notion'c'est ceci Ji.U'il faut 
choisir, '· ou enfin quand cette notion appara1 t seule, le sujet 
consid~re toujours le choix comme ayant la forme du consente-
ment. Il r'sulte de la, que le choix revet cette derniere 
forme quand au moment ~ui le ~r'c~de imm~diatement, !'alter-
native la PllfS favorieee a. ete specialement consciente,. ou que 
- I' , ...... 
sa valeur a ete nettement presente. Le caract ere du choix 
semble done en rapport intime avec la motivation.• Ibid., 
PP• 190-191. ----
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consciousness of action, and consequently their actions or 
choices were automatic and not voluntary. Iichotte and PrUm 
established •consciousness of a.ctionft as a fundamental requisite 
for volitiona1 activities.9 
Michotte and PrUm found that volitional activity was char-
acterized by an irreducible element--consciousness of self 
cannot be analyzed into sensations, feelings, or images. This 
awareness of the self in action is a phenomenon, distinct in 
itself and independent of sensory exp-eriences. While other 
factors of volition may vary from time to time, the conscious-
~~ action constitutes the essential nucleus of will. Con-
sciousness of activity is often accompanied by muscular tension 
and physiological processes, but it is in no way identifiable 
with these concomitants. 1-he presence or absence of physio-
logical accompaniments does not affect the essential nature of 
voli tion.10 The experiments repeatedly attempt to substantiate 
9
"D'autre part t il e:x:iete des processus qui paraissent etre tout 
a. fait semblables a nos d~cisions volontaires et qui cependa.nt 
ne sont pas consideres comme tela par le sujet; ce sont lea 
decisions automatiquee. Le seul facteur qui dans ces cas, est 
u;oujoura absent, est la conscience de l 1 action." Ibid., P• 195. 
Ce facteur que nous nammerons afin d'~viter toute~ivoque, 
'con.science de 1' action', n' est pas un contenu distinct, plac' 
a cot~ des autres; absolument different du sentiment 'd' / 
activit~ mueculaire', il se ma.nifeste comme une simple modalite 
qui affecte certains phenomenes, comme un caractere qui ne 
eubsiste pas en .lui-.meme comme contenu de conscience, mais qui 
n~cessite un eubstrat qu'il qualifie. Ce qu'il y a de 
caract~ristique dans !'intervention de ce facteur, crest qu'il 
porte directement le caract~re de l' action, et ne peut sr exprim-
er que pa.r ltinfinitif; crest la conscience de 'faire•, 
'd'agir', de 'designer•, de •se tourner vera•, de 'dire•, de 
'laisser a.ller•, etc.• Ibid., PP• 19~-194. 
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this principle by reference to automatic actions which are so 
obviously devoid of consciousness. What may be said of con-
scious, dynamic sensory processes? Michotte and PrUm do not 
consider these activities to any great extent. 
Though consciousness of goals and purpose is necessary 
even for instinctive activities, something more is required for 
rationally directed activities, namely awareness of the self-in-
action. Animals are aware of the objects they pursue, but give 
no evidence o.f self-consciousness in the process. Jlichotte and 
Prum are not too clear on this point. They say their experi-
ments confirm the fact that choice contains immaterial attri-
butes, but they claim that "consciousness of self• is also 
present in activities other than rational volitions. Their 
emphasis on physiological accompaniments as being distinct from 
volition is admirable; but they stress the sensory and dynamic 
comp:onent of will-acts, and apparently see in these a kind o'f 
awareness of self. The distinctive feature of volition, namely 
awareness of self-in-action, is not brought out clearly enough 
in the interpretations of their experiment; although they 
sametimes seem to imply a distinctive feature. 11 
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The analyses made by JHehotte and Prlim are in close agree-
ment with those of Ach. Eoth experiments, investigating two 
different aspects of will activity, have arrived ultimately at 
the same general conclusions. The most imp.ortant among these 
is the recognition of an irreducible eleme·nt or rational 
quality in the mental processes of volition. The works of 
Michotte and PrHm, like those of Ach, have demontrated in an 
11
•quant ~ la conscience de l'action elle-m~me il ne semble pas 
qu 'elle soit un attribut exclusif de ce que nous appelone 
vulgairement ph~nom~nes volontaires, en ce sene que sa 
pr~sence conditionnerait toujours le caract~re volont&ire des 
ph~nam~nes qu' elle affecte. Si, en effet, cette conscience 
de l'action se d€finit ad~qua.tement au point de vue 
descriptif, en.disant que lee ph,noraenes qui la portent ne 
peuvent s exprimer que par l•infinitif, il est ~vident que 
certains faits de la vie psychique ont ce caractere, sans 
toutefois Btre ~ proprement parler des ph~nom~nes 
'volontaires'; telles la conscience de 'tendre', de 'desirer', 
'd 'avoir envie de'. Cee divers ph~nomenes portent sans 
aucun doute possible, le m$me caractere d'action que nos 
'decisions' et nos 'consentemente'; de mame que ceux-la, ils 
ne peuvent s'exprimer que par l'infinitif, et menent 
directement a l'affirmation de l'intervention au 'moi'. La 
m~me conscience d 'action peut done affecter divers 'noyaux', 
divers contenus de conscience, toutes lee combinaisons de la 
conscience de l'action ne constituent pas des phenom~nes 
auxquels on donne spontan~ment le nom de volontaires, mais, 
au point de vue descriptif, elles font toutes partie d'une 
m~me classe de ph~nominee, que neue o.pp,osons, comme '~tats 
dynamiquee de conscience' aux '~tats statiques', c'est-a-dire 
a c'eet ~tats de conscience qui ne comprennent pas la 
caract,restique de l'&ction, soit sous forme active, soit sous 
forme passive, tela par exemple lee sentiments du groupe 
plaisir-depla.isir." l.la!9..•, PP• 195-196. 
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objective, scientific manner, the immateriality of volitional 
processes. Cammon to both experiments is the strong evidence 
of self-awareness, of the "Bgo-in-action•. In all the intro-
sp.ections, the experimenters noted that the predominant char-
acteristic was the conscious intervention of self, operating in 
12 the capacity of its dynamic, appetitive nature. 
Boyd Barrett 
Boyd Barrett, another experimentalist of the Louvain 
School, made investigations very similar to those of Michotte 
and Pram. His prime purpose was to study motives and motiva-
tion. In order to do so it was necessary to set up laboratory 
conditions through which records of numerous choices could be 
obtained. The experimenter was then able to make an intensive· 
study of the motives, circumstances, and phenomena of the 
choice a made. 
Five psychologists were used as subjects; the experimenter 
proposed twenty-eight different choices. The choices were pre-
sen ted in a precise o·rder and under identical condi tiona. For 
12
•11. y a coincidence, tout d 'abord, au au jet de la pr~sence de 
la 'conscience de l'action' et de son importance au point de 
vue du ca.ract~re volontaire. Le 'facteur actue1' de Ach est 
/ 
en effet, sans aucun daute, ce que naus avons appele 
'conscience de l'action'; c'est une activit~ vecue. Ibid., 
P• 310-311. 
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each choice, the subjects were required to report their intro-
spections. The time duration of each choice was recorded by 
the experimenter. The. materials consisted of eight different 
iiquids which were carefully selected so as to present a series 
of tastes, graduated according to their degree of agreeable-
ness. Some were highly .obnoxious, some were indifferent, and 
some were very pleasant. All the liquids were colorless and 
could be differentiated only by their tastes. Nonsense syl-
lables were used to designate each liquid. The experiment 
included three divisions. In the first part, the subjects 
learned the associations between the tastes and their respec-
tive names. Secondly, the strength of the associations was 
measured by testing the subjects' ability to recognize the 
liquid by the stimulus card. Thirdly, the subjects were asked 
to make choices from the objects ptesented. After the subjects· 
had thoroughly learned the associations between the nonsense 
syllables and the liquids, the following directions were given 
to them: "Two words will appear corresponding to the substance 
in the two glasses. You are to choose between these substances 
and to drink at once the liquid which you have choaen.•13 ~e 
act of choice which followed these instructions contained two 
13Motive--Fo.r'Ce and Motivation--Tracks. London and New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, P• 51. 
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periods: (1) the time bet.ween the app.ea.ra.nce of the stimulus 
card and the reaction; {2) the time between the reactions and 
the actual fulfillment of the choice. Th~ first period was 
measured by the Hipp chranoscope, and the second, by the 
Vernier chronoecope. 
Acco·rding to Barrett, the most important factor in the 
whole experiment was motivation. Evaluation of motives 
engrossed the attention of the subjects more than any other 
activity. The whole process of selection centered around the 
balancing of values. Various types of motives induced the 
subjects to choose one card rather than another. Sometimes the 
motives were subjective, and the subject b•sed his choice on 
some whim or feeling rather than the quality of the differences. 
Most of the motives, however, were objective ones of an 
intrinsic kind. These were based on the it}}edonic .. quality o-r 
the substance indicated. Sometimes the subjects resorted to 
less serious mptives and simply chose the nearest glass or the 
most familiar one. 
Intraspections revealed that motives themselves were 
influenced by circumstances, and fluctuated even during the act 
of choice. Conflicts arose and caused hesitations until one 
motive succeeded in predominating over the other. Barrett 
calls this· success of domination ·~e Critical Point of 
Motives.• 
It is not sufficient that one 
motive should predominate over 
another, in order that the choice 
may be made ~n its favor. It 
must predominate by a certain 
surplusage. It do,es not suffice 
that it should be stronger than 
the other, in order that it may 
win. It must, itself, first 
reach a certain degree of strength 
or force--it must reach what we 
shall ca11 its Critical Point. 
By the Critical Point &f 
:Mo·ti ves we mean that point or 
degree of strength, which, being 
reached by the motive, the choice 
results automatica.lry.l4 
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)Ia.ny different conditions increased the strength of a motive 
until the Critical Point was finally reached. A motive was 
strengthened merely by being in the focus of attention for a 
long time. Or perhaps a. weak motive became effective because 
there was no other to oppose it. According to Barrett, 
~otive-strengthening is indeliberate, and even an unconscious 
15 process. It is none the less real.." Choices of the same 
kind tend to follow the same course, and after many of them have 
been made,a sort of ttmental furrow"' is established. Barrett 
called these vo,li tional tendencies "moti vation-:-tracts .• 
14 
15Ibid •, P• 83. Ibid., P• 86. 
Choices. when of the same kind, 
normally run along fixed lines, 
The general structure of the 
choice act, and the psychical 
contents remain the same, save 
for the inevitable evolution and 
shortening in point of time and 
content. The motives which recur 
are usually the same, though in 
a gradually modified for.m--they 
evo;lve. These motives and the 
Whole choice act, so to speak, 
pass along beaten tracks. We 
speak figuratively, to m&ke the 
matter clearer, not to tinge it 
with a materialism or a deter-
miner for whf~h we see no shred 
of evidence. 
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One of the chief purposes o·f Barrett's experiments was to 
find out the influence of hedonism on motivation. There was 
ample evidence that the influence was significant, and examp1es 
of hedonic attractions and repulsions were abundant. WWe found 
that a correlation existed between the quickness o:f reaction 
and the hednnic value, or motive-force of the alt~rnative 
1'1 
chosen.• It is interesting to note that.pleasantness made 
for rapid choices, while the slowest choices were those whose 
objects were unpleasant substances. But over and above choices 
influenced by "hedonism•, there were always present non-hedonic 
motives. Even in an experiment which involved no ethical 
principles, it was evident that the pleasure-pain principle was 
not always the determiner of choice. 
~~Ibid., PP• 119-120. 
Ibid • , p. 95. 
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Barrett's general conc1ueions correspond closely to those 
of Lindworeky's. Both psychologists empha..size the tremendous 
influence of motives. "The whole capital of the will lies in 
the motives. But these are thought complexes by which we com-
1.8 prebend values.• Barrett, how·ever, claims that motive-
strengthening is indeliberate and unconscious. Lindworeky, on 
the other hand, stresses the. fact that the first inculcation of 
motives becomes the more effective precisely a..s these motives 
come into the focus of attention; though, of course, later on 
certain choices may become more or lees habitual processes. 
For Lindworsky, the building up pro:cese is not an unconscious 
procedure, but rather an intelligent, directed course of a.ction. 
While Barrett believes that motive-strengthening is acquired by 
repetitions which, in turn, form a 11bea.ten path"', Lindworsky 
ascertains that all the strength of mo-tives lies in the value 
attached to, them. 
No matter how well furrowed the course of choices may be, 
once the object-value is changed, minimized, or lost, will-
action is in some manner or other changed or redirected. Per-
ma.nency does not result from repetition, but, rather, from 
goals which are. intellectually grounded. Life experiences seem 
to bear witness to the fact that •motivation-tracts" are not 
18The Training of !.h!t !!,!!, P• 159. 
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the result of routine repetitions. They are dependent upon the 
permanency of the goals toward which they lea.d. 
Robert s. Woodworth 
Though the investigations of Woodwo.rth cannot be consid-
ered as outstanding experiments in will psychology, they have 
earned wide acclaim because of the evidence which they proTide 
against the widely accepted theory o~f ideomotor will action. 
First of all, Woodworth was concerned chiefly with dynamics as 
a. whole, and not specifically with volitional activities. T.he 
imp.orta.n.ce of his works on voluntary movements is deriTed not so 
much from the nature and results of the experiments themselves, 
but more from the fact that they a.re the works of Woodwo:·rth. 
In the field ·of contemporary psychology, Woodworth is found 
among the top. ranks of experimentalists. The accuracy and 
precision of his methods together with the extensive range of 
his researches has made him an outstanding authority in experi-
mental psychology. In perusing a resum' such as ours, Wherein· 
attempts have been made to recount the works of notable 
psychologists, the natural tendency for a critical reader would 
be to wonder what Woodworthts opinions on this particular issue 
might be. The renown achieved by Woodworth is due not only to 
his intenei~e researches, but is also the result of hie 
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endeavors to follow a. middle course, avoiding at all times the 
position of an extremist. Accordingly, Woodworth is cautious 
in hie acceptance of new interpretations, and ha.e tried to. 
establ.ish his own system of psychology on a sound factual 
basis. 
So if you ask me which school ta 
choose for your own, I should be 
inclined to advise you to stay 
in the middle of the road. We 
must remember tha.t the middle-of-
the-road group are no:t simply the 
left-overs or those who cannot 
make up their minds. Sometimes, 
with a slight change in the figure 
of ep.eech, we middle-of-the-roaders 
are said to be sitting on the fence, 
and to have in bad individual cases, 
a.n inveterate tendency to sit on the 
fence. Wel1, in support of this 
position it may be said that it is 
cooler up here and one has a better 
view of all that is go-ing on. But 
I like the middle-of-the-road figure 
better, because it brings1sut the continuity of this group. 
For Woodworth, the whole problem of dynamics lies in the 
relatione between cause and effect. Psychology, in general, is 
the study of reactions to stimuli. This concept of psychology 
is not to be confused with the narrow interpretation of beha-
viorists who base all human activities on stimulus-response 
connections. Woodworth simply means to imply that all behavior 
19 Contemporary SchooJLs of Psycholegy. New Yorkt The Ronald 
Press, 1931, P• 216. --
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is related to dynamics, because all activity pro;ceeds from some 
energizing source. The stimulus alone does not constitute the 
entire cause of action, for the individual himself contributes 
much. The very individuality of the person concemed influ-
ences the action which results. Watson, Thorndike, Hunter, and 
others have attempted to trace behavior to S-R bonds which are 
described as isolated unite or events. Woodworth, on the other 
hand, rightly insists that there is no such thing as a single 
reaction within a unified organism. The individual, as a 
whol.e, is always in some way affected whenever a part is 
involved. The stimulus-response units are in themseives sub-
ject to change as weil as whole patterns of activities. It is 
not possible to describe any one kind of activity as rigidly 
stereotyped. Human behavior, especially, is characterized by 
variability in all responses, and complexities arise because of 
goals and purp.ases which are so essential to conscious life. 
Woodworth performed a series of simple experiments for the 
purpose of ascertaining the cause of voluntary movement. TWo 
separate sets of experiments were performed; "one on practice 
in gaining voluntary control of an unfamiliar movement, and one 
on the execution of a familiar movement.•20 The subjects were 
20 ~tThe Cause of a Vo:luntary llo-vement" in Psychological Issues. 
llew York: Columbia University Press, 1939, P• 33. 
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asked to perform certain movements and to note particularly 
what imagery occurred. The subjects were requested to make 
some of the movements hesitatingly, so as to give ample time 
for the appearance of imagery. Other movements were made 
promptly in order t a afford opp~rtuni ties for comparisons. The 
instructions required three types of movements: first, move-
ments which were confined to the person himself, such as open-
ing the mouth, wagging the jaw, winking, opening elosed eye:s, 
flexing or separating the fingers, and flexing the foot; 
secondly, movements were made involving the use of an instru-
ment--scissors, forceps, or the dynamometer; thirdly, choice of 
movements was permitted, such as touching any part of the body, 
or any object in the foreground, flexing or extending the 
fingers, responding to a sound by a. movement of either the hand 
or the foot. Thirteen subjects were used, and the interpreta-
tiona made were based almost entirely on the introspections of 
the subjects. 
~ observations are not adapted 
to statistical treatment. The 
study does not purport to be a 
census, but a rough survey of the 
so,rt of facts that occur. The 
different subjects did not make 
equal numbers .of observations, 
nor was care taken to have the 
movements chosen a. fair sample, 
statistically, of the voluntaf.l 
motor activity of daily life. 
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From his analysis of these introspections, Woodworth 
formed his theory of "conceptual control•. The int'ro:spections 
of the subjects showed that, in a. great number of cases, no 
imagery of any kind appeared in consciousness. Furthermore, 
the subjects frequently experienced movement without any pre-
vious kinaesthetic image o·f it. This observation led to a 
conclusion directly opposed to the main tenet of James's ideo-
motor theory of will, which emphasized the necessity of kin-
&esthetic imagery acting as cues for voluntary mo,vements. 
As might be expected, the subjects 
differed greatly in the sort and 
amount of imagery which they expe-
rienced. Some had motor images in 
advance of most of the movements 
tried; others had none. some cOlll-
monly had visual images, some never. 
Some had auditory images in prepa-
ration for speaking a word, some 
motor, some visual in addition to 
motor. Touch, pain, temperature, 
and semicircular-canal imagery 
cropped out occasionally. Verbal 
imagery, naming the act to be 
performed or the object to be 
moved or touched, was not infre-
quent. Some subjects did not 
anticipate movements in imagery 
of any sort but attended to sen~ 
21Ibid .. , P• 36-3'7. 
sations of the initial po-sition 
and of2khe beginning of the move-ments. 
Since so many of his subjects reported no imagery at all, 
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Woodwo:rth discarded imagery as a cause of voluntary movement. 
Kinaesthetic imagery as an essential precedent to voluntary 
movement was found to be an unwarranted claim. At time~ imagmey 
was t a:t&lly absent. Woodworth found the source of voli t iona.l. 
movements elsewhere, namely in thought itself. Before ane can 
perform any conscious action, there must be knowledge of the 
action to be done. In other words, before voluntary movement 
can take place, there must be perception of the movement and 
the intention to perform it. 
The cue of the act is the thought, 
not the im&ge. The mast d efini te 
feature of the thought is the cause ' 
of the definiteness of the act. 
If it be allowed that there is such 
mental content that is not reduced 
to sensorial imagery, and that some 
of this content usually lies at the 
focus of attention, constituting 
the real point and meaning of the 
thought no reason remains for sup-
posing that there 'must be' a sen-
sorial image O'f the act which shall 
function as the cue of the movement.23 
Up to, this point, ,Noodwo.rth's conclusions are in close accord 
with the scholastic doctrine which maintains that all volitional 
22 
23Ibid., P• 34. Ibid., P• 56. 
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activities must be preceded by intellectual perception. Images 
may or may not be immediate]y present, but there must be cog-
nizance of the action to be performed. Woodwo·rth's investiga-
tions on the causes of a voluntary movement have also produced 
valuable objective evidence in favor of the assertion that a 
volitional activity is necessarily preceded by something more 
than mere kinaesthetic images. 
Besides thought, however, Woodworth mentions one other 
factor as essential to voluntary movement--a neuromuscular set 
directly related to the bodily movement involved. "The comp~te 
determinant of a voluntary motor act--that which specifies 
exactly what act it shall be--is nothing less than the total 
set of the nervous system at the moment."24 
Woodworth's canclusions are sound as far as they go, but 
does voluntary movement consist only of concep.tua]. elements and 
physical set? Woodworth has neglected to describe the most 
essential feature of all, namely the "voluntariness" of such 
movements. It is insufficient to describe voluntary movements 
without including an explanation of their essential consti-
tuents. A movement is voluntary not because it proceeds fram 
thought or because it is dependent upon neuromuscular activ-
ities, but precisely because it proceeds from the fiat of the 
24 Ibid. , p. 59. 
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wil.l. A voluntary movement is one whose very execution depends 
upon its previous acceptance by the self'. All external acts of 
will proceed from the internal a.ct; the two· kinds of volitional 
activities are distinct, for the will may act without any 
external manifestation. 
Now in a voluntary act, there is 
a twofold act, viz., the interior 
act of the will and the external 
act; and each of these acts has 
its object. The end is properly 
the object of the interior act of 
the will, while the object of the 
externa..l action is that on which25 the action is brought to bear ••• 
The a.ct of the will is twofoldr 
one is its immediate act, as it 
were elicited by it namely, to 
will; the other is an act ofthe 
will commanded by it, and put 
into axecution by means of some 
other power; e.g., .t_o w.alk and 12. 
speak, which are commanded by the 
will to be executed by me~3 of 
the power of locomotion... And 
thus it is that we can have the 
voluntary without an act, and this 
sometimes without an outward act, 
but with an interior act, for 
instance, when one wills not to 
act, and sometimes without even 
an interior act, as when one does 
not will to act.27 
25
st. 'thomas Aquinas~ !1!! Summa. Theologica, (ed. by Peg·is) I, 
26xviii, al 7o. 27~., P• I, vi, a. 4, c. Ibid. , a. 3, c. 
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Francis Avel.ing 
Outstanding among the modern experimenters in will psycho-
logy is Dr. Aveling of the King's Col.lege Laboratory at the 
University of London. Experimenters such as Father McCarthy, 
Honoria. WelLls, Stevanovic, and others conducted many researches 
on will, or problems closely related to will, under his able 
direction. He himself has made several intensive studies of 
will phenomena. One of the most important of these is the 
experiment on the infl.uence of volition upon thinking. Other 
influences of will had been successfully studied by Aveling's 
students and co1laborators. 
In a.cco·rdance with the conclusions 
of Ach, whose researches upon the 
will established the existence of 
'determining tendencies' which fol-
low upon volitional acts and, though 
sinking beneath the conscious 
threshold, tend to secure the carry-
ing out of the Willed actiTity, we 
found that other processes than those 
investigated by him were influenced 
in the same way. Thus, for ex&mp1e, 
Saidullah showed that it was pos-
sible by willing to increase the 
span of apprehension; :Messer proved 
that the time of presence of one 
of several alternating visual after-
sensations could in a similar manner 
be lengthened at the expense of the 
others; and Caws showed that W•illing 
to perceiTe a given symbol, exposed 
tachistoscopically among a group of 
symbols too great to allow of s imul-
ta.neous perception, increased the 
likelihood of its being perceiTed.28 
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The purpose of Aveling's experiment was to find out the 
influence of volition on three cognitive processest "the 
cognizing of exp~rience, the awareness of relations between the 
ite•e of experience {whether cognized or merely lived) and the 
production of ideal correlates.•29 
The materials consisted of several groups of monochr,ome 
letters and colored symbol.s drawn on slides. A Iichotte rotary 
projection tachistoscope was used for the exposure of the 
sl.ides. The slides were divided into three different series of 
groups, each series containing twenty-four slides. Within each 
group, nine letters and symbols were arranged in three rows, 
and in each column were three items. 'fhe content of each slide 
was well beyond the perception span of all the subjects. 
The effects of volition were secured by a C·omparison of 
results fol.lowing two sets of instructions& (1) Observe all 
you can and record what ·you see; {2) Look far a given letter 
(or symbol or relation), if it should be shown, and reco~rd all 
that you see. The same materials were presented under each set 
28
•The I~luence of Volition up,on Thinking", The British 
Journal of Psychol.ogy. General. Section, Vol.. XXII-XXIII 
29(1931-19'33) April., 1932, P• 324. Ibid • , p. 325 • 
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of directionij. All the expositions were made in a darkened 
room and each subject recorded his observations immediately 
after every presentation. The subject was asked to draw what 
he had seen and to note all his introspections in the processes 
of perceiving, holding, and recording the similarities which he 
recognized. 30 The results were scored on the basis of indexes 
and va.lue marks devised by the experimenter. For every correct 
item, two marks were given. One of these was substracted if 
there was an error in location or if a similarity was reported 
which did not actually appear. Besides the individual scores, 
three indexes were used to obtain percentages which represented 
expectation, loss due to set, and actual gain over and above 
these two variabl.es. 
The figures obtained showed a definite gain for the tasks 
in which the subjects made a pre-vious determination to appre-
hend the similarities. From these general results, Aveling 
concludes that resolution has a decided positive effect upon 
intellectual perception. Relatians, similarities, and specific 
items are more readily recognized if the observation has been 
preceded· by will-a.cts. While some authors have attempted to 
attribute similar results to imaginal contents or preperceptive 
30Ibid., p. 32'7 • 
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elements, Aveling claims that these mental factors could not 
account for the recognition of relations. Relationships were 
perceived· regardless of positian or external type of figure 
used. 
There was a general lo·ss, however, in the entire amount of 
ma..terial perceived. The subjects themselves acco,unted for this 
deviation in their introspective reports; they were unable to 
retain all that they saw long enough to rec~rd it. Aveling 
explains this loss according to the "drainage theory" proposed 
by :McDougal1. 
Such loss could be explained on 
the ground either of a drainage 
of mental energy towards the item 
for which the subject was lo·oking, 
with or without drainage away in 
the conation itself, or of a 
drainage of energy in holding the 
required item, which would result 
in a speedy sinking beneath the 
threshold of those items and 
relations Which W!ie not relevant 
to the main task. 
If Aveling considers all mental energy in his "drainage theory• 
as something material and measurable, his theory is inadequate 
and even incongruous with the general, high caliber of his 
work. For the most part, however, Aveling's principles are 
based on the essential distinction between rational. and sensory 
31Ibid., P• 329. 
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processes as set forth by the scholastics. But at times the 
influences of the British materialists seem to be reflected in 
certain parts of his writings. 
A further interesting and significant observation was made 
concerning the perception of relations. In spite of the !"act 
that several subjects apprehended only one of the given f"unda-
ments c1early, they w~re still able to perceive the correct 
relationships. It is possible that in some cases the other 
fundament had been perceived but not retained. In any event, 
Aveling infers that these occurrences signified the possibility 
that ~a relation ~ emerge clearly in consciousness and remain 
clear in the absence of one or both of its fundaments." 32 This 
point is substantiated by the experimental conditions them-
selves. Some of the subjects said they were cognizant of look-
ing from one symbol to the other in order to find the 
relationship. But no eye movements were possible during the 
time the slides were exposed. Frequently, the two fundaments 
were so far removed from one another that only one could pos-
sibly have been within the subject's span of perception. 
Aveling demonstrates, by the results of his experiment, 
that there is a noticeable positive influence of volition upon 
thinking. While the same relationships existed in the two 
32 Ibid • , p • 330 • 
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presentations of slides, recognition or perception of these 
relationships occurred, for the most part, only when a definite 
will-act had initiated the observation. 
If we will to observe a given 
object should it be presented 
among a number of other objects, 
there is a tendency fo-r the con-
sciousness of that object to be 
·enhanced and/or held in mind at 
the expense of the others. If 
we are looking for a given 
relation, there is a greater 
probability of our finding it 
or, having found it~3of holding it c1ear1y in view. 
:B. H. Wild 
Based on the hormic theory of McDougall and the principles 
of cognition introduced by Spearman, E. H. Wild performed a 
series of experiments to determine the inf1uences of conation 
on cognition. It will be well fir·st to understand Wild's use 
of the term conation. When he considers the effects of conation 
on the cognitive processes,he is considering the effects of 
attention. JlcDougall described conation as attention; and this 
is the meaning adopted by Wild. 34 Conation, effort, attention, 
and mental energy are used interchangeably. 
33Ibid., p. 331. 
34See a.bo;ve, Chapter I, P• BU. 
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Test material. which would evoke different amounts of 
conation for the given performances.and which would offer a 
wide survey of cognitive processes was selected for the experi-
ments. The fol.lowing tasks were given: simple cancellation, 
same and opposites, sentence completion, number-checking, 
multiplication, complex cancellation, inferences, and instruc-
tions. These tests were similar to the common intelligence-
test forms and were administered to various group.s of students 
both in the colleges and in the grade schools. Some of the 
groups were used to determine the influence of conation on 
rate, while others were designated to find out the effects of 
mental energy upon quality. Before these group tests were per-
formed, the experiment was administered to six psychologists in 
order to secure det.ailed introspections on the various kinds of 
materials used. Mathematical formulae based on Spearman's 
principles were used to compute the objective data. Correla-
tions were made between performances of the same subjects under 
the two types of directions and between the average scores of 
the group under the two sets of conditions. The most signifi-
cant factor here is the method used to produce the difference 
of effects--i.e., to provide for a •conative attitude• or a 
•non-conative attitude.• The whole research is naturally based 
on this condition, and subjective methods of inducing the cona-
tive attitudes were employed for the purpose. •The experimenter 
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used his personal influence to induce the required attitude in 
the subjects and the responsibility rested largely with the 
subject in a voluntary adoption of the attitucle.•35 
In the first of these tests, simple apprehension, for the 
most part, was required; and the results showed a large varia-
tion in rate and quality of conation. The same was true in 
regard to the tests on sentence completion. In the eduction of 
simp:le relations, carried on in the number·-checking exercises, 
it was noticed that the variation of conation produces a cor-
responding variation in rate without any particular change in 
the quality of the cognitive operation. Wild describes multi-
plication as a complex reproductive process; and the effects of 
conation are dependent upon the particular multiplication 
exercise in question • 
• • • in complex rep,roductive proc-
esses, conation is required in 
proportion to the extensity of the 
simultaneous cognitive operations 
(retention in consciousness and 
reproduction); that the possible 
variation in conation is greater 
if the extensity of the operations 
involved is smaller; that increased 
conation produces (a) an improvement 
in quality with unlimited time, by 
repetition of the reproductive proc-
esses for checking purposes, and 
35
•Influence of Conation on Cognition" Part II, The British 
.Journal of Psychology. General Section. Vol.--x'VIII ( 192'7-
1928), .ranua.ry 1928, p. 335. 
(b) an increased rate without 
change in quality under speed 
conditions, by the exclusion of 
all irrelevant cognitive proc-
esses to increase both speed of 
reproduction and extensity of 
cognition, and possibly also by 
increasing the abgglute amount 
of mental energy. 
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Sentence completion involved both the eductive and reproductive 
processes, and the conation expended was in proportion to the 
subject's own facility in recall and the extensity of cognition 
required. In the test on •-same and opposi tee 11 , educt ion took 
place on a conceptual level. The subjects were required by him, 
first, to reproduce mentally the meanings of word-symbols, then 
perceive them, then cognize the relationship existing between 
the meanings. Wild found that the eduction of relatione on the 
conceptual level demanded intense cognition and,therefore,a 
great deal of conation. The same results followed the other 
tests on this level, namely eamplex cancellation, inferences, 
and instructions. The extensity and intensity of cognition was 
eo great in these tasks that all available mental energy was 
needed for success. Not only was it necessary to direct cona-
tional energy towards the task itself, but also towards the 
elimination of all extraneous mental phenomena. In other 
words, intensive concentration was necessary in the perception 
36Ibid., PP• 344-345. 
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of relations and in all other of the higher thought proc-
eases. 
Introspections obtained from the special groups of psycho-
logists were classed as the qualitative experiments. Wild 
found that the results of these reports were of great value in 
the analyses of the quantitative results. The tests had been 
divided into special groups, and the introspections testified 
that the division was adequate. Tests on simple cancellation, 
factual sente-nee completion, and number-checking were judged to 
require minimal conation; tests on complex cancellation, 
inferences, and instructions called for a maximal output of 
mental energy. The introspective reports were evidently limited 
to< a description of the amount of conational release; a descrip-
tion of the actual process or of other mental phenomena. experi-
enced during the time of the test was not included. The 
emphasis in this experiment seemed to have been placed on 
quantitative results, on~ or speed of achievement, and on 
the amount of material covered. 
The general conclusions are much as one would expect. An 
increase in speed or in the amount of material covered demanded 
a corresponding increase of conation. However, effort did not 
seem to depend on the quality of the cognitive processes. No 
more conation was required to apprehend experience than to per-
ceive relations or to educe correlates. In the apprehension of 
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qualitative material, conation increased the intensity of the 
cognition and, therefore, the efficiency of the qualitative 
processes. Likewise, when the goal (a simple task) itself 
required few cognitive operations or little intensity, the 
conational output was accordingly small. The experimenter was 
convinced by the results of his investigations, "that we do 
strive little or greatly, according to the instincts or senti-
mente at work in us at the moment and the degree to which they 
37 
are aroused • • 
In appraising an experiment of this type, it is necessary 
to recall the fundamentals on which the entire work was based 
and interpreted. 
The basic theory on which this 
investigatio:n rests is the Hermie 
Theory of Action as restated by 
McDougall. On this theory all 
hwnan a.cti vi ty springs ultimate~ 
from our instincts; 'by the cona-
tive ••• force of some instinct 
every train of thought ••• , is 
borne along to its end. All 
mental activity is therefore 
purposive, it is a. teleological 
process exhibiting the three 
aspects--cognitive, conative, and 
affective. 'Our intellect or 
cognitive organization, is essen-
tially the instrument of our pur-
poses; it is brought into play in 
the service of our desires, the 
driving forces of the organism, 
which 'are identical with the 
37 Ibid., P• 351. 
impulses, the conative tendencies 
of our instincts.' Accepting this 
fundamental theory of the relation 
'of conation, cognition, and 
affection', an analysis of the 
cognitive aspects of mental proc-
esses was found in Spea.rman's 
Principles of Cognition while 
the analysis of the conative 
aspects was based on Avzging's 
Principles of Conation. 
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From this quotation it is easy to see that a critical estimate 
of the experiment is not an easy task. Wild has based his 
conclusions and interpretations on many diverse theories, and 
it is a difficult process to separate the intricate combination 
which he has formed, and to understand clearly the inference of 
his conclusions. First of all, though he claims to have accepted 
Aveling's connotation of conation, in some respects his own 
description does not conform with Aveling's basic concepts. 
Many references throughout indicate that, for Wild, conation is 
attention or at times a sort of •effortful energy"; his explicit 
acceptance of McDougall's hormic theory reduces conation to a 
form of instinct. Strictly speaking, Wild's exper·iment is not 
an investigation in will psychology, but rather a study of the 
procees of attention. This objection may be offered against 
our criticism: the purpose of Wild's experiment was not to 
investigate influences of will, but, rather, the influence of 
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conation. While this hypothetical objection is true, there is 
still another consideration to be regarded. Many of the influ-
ences which Wild attributes to conation of a sensory kind or to 
cognition are really results of volitional factors. Perception 
of relations is an intellectual process, and no amount of 
instinct or sensory conation alone could evoke a rational proc-
ess. Will is intimately related to intellectual cognition. 
While attention directs cognitive powers to an object, intel-. 
lect and will direct attention. In view of these remarks, 
Wild's experiment, though the procedure, techniques, and methods 
were carefully planned and executed; has contributed only 
negatively to the psychology of will. He ha.s shown both by 
quantitative and qualitative results that cognition is influ-
enced by attention. But even as an investigation on attention, 
we must admit many serious drawbacks in the experiment. It 
will suffice to mention one of the most fundamental of these 
objections; voluntary attention is a. rational process, and, as 
such,is in no sense a derivative of instinct as Wild infers when 
he professedly accepts McDougall's instinct theory. 
Rapha.e 1 McCarthy 
Similar to the experiments of Ach in procedure and content 
is the work of Father McCarthy, s.J. Ach's experiments had 
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revealed that conflict between the determining tendency and the 
associative tendency constituted an interesting and significant 
part of his experiments on will.. In the period of conflict 
arising from opposed motives, Ach had observed that mental 
processes occurred which greatly influenced the ensuing actions. 
Further experimentation was needed to find out what mental 
phenomena intervened to cause the predominance of one tendency 
over the other. Father McCarthy undertook to study precisely 
the conscious mental actiTities which occurred when the subject 
was stimulated to perform two diverse kinds of activities at 
the same time. 
The methods of procedure closely resembled those of Ach. 
The subjects were required to establish specific habits under 
laboratory c ondi tiona. They learned nonsense words in paired 
associates until the appearance of one would immediately evoke 
the other member of the pair. While Ach had established 120 
repetitions as the basis for his •associate equivalent", 
McCarthy required the subjects to repeat the syllables 160 
times. A further significant modification was made: in Ach's 
experiment the subjects were instructed beforehand as to what 
theywere expected to do when the stimulus appeared; McCarthy's 
subjects were not aware of their particular task until after 
the stimulus appeared. In this way he eliminated the expec-
tancy variable. The method of presentation was as follows: 
The stimuli were printed on white 
cards in letters of uniform size 
and shape. If they were red they 
instructed the subject to rhy.me 
the stimulus. If they were green, 
he was to transpose the first and 
last consonant (e.g. the correct 
response for the word DOM, when 
it appeared in green, was MOD). 
When the word was printed in 
black, the subject knew he had to 
change the vowel (to give a re-
sponse DIM, for example, to the 
black DOM). A blue syllable gave 
him a choice of rhyming or trans-
posing as he wished. Before the 
appearance of the stimulus, our 
subjects knew neither what the 
word would be, nor what they were 
t 0 d 0 with it • 
The subjects were previously 
familiarized with the meaning of 
the colore by responding to them 
with a series of words not used 
in the later experiments until the 
Reaction Times fgg each colour were 
fairly constant. 
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Reaction time for each response was measured as well as the 
psychogalvanic reflexes. 
In Ach's experiment, the false reactions of the subjects 
we~e many and were thought to indicate the strength of the 
associative tendency; opposite results follo~ed in McCarthy's 
expe.riments. Ach had reported that hardly any of his subjects 
were able to overcome the associative tendency. Referring to 
39The Measurement o:f Conation. Chicago: The Loyola University 
Press, 1926, pp.~-10. 
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Ach's "false reactions" McCarthy says, "In our experiment this 
kind of false reaction is the rarest exception. Only once in 
the first group was the associate syllable given ae the response 
to the etimulus.•40 Such contradictory results are the more 
remarkable when we recall that McCarthy required even a greater 
number of repetitions to establish the necessary association 
which Ach had set for hie •associative equivalent." 1'he sub-
jects in McCarthy's experiment hardly ever responded to the 
s.timul.us with the learned associate; when they did so:, they 
described it as being dimly present in consciousness. Finally, 
a further change was made in McCarthy's experiment; unfamiliar 
nonsense syllables were presented to the observers by showing 
them irregularly among those already learned. With the intro-
duction of this change in procedure arose the tendency for the 
learned associates to appear. What factor explains the variety 
of results obtained? It is evident that the direction of 
attention is a guiding factor in the responses evoked by dif-
ferent stimuli. Thus, proper reactions are influenced both by 
the previous resolutions and by the concentration of attention 
on the task to be performed. "It seems clear that the appear-
ance or non-appearance of the associate is conditioned by the 
quality or direction of attention. When the subject attends to 
40Ibid., P• 49. 
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the stimulus as a syllable, its companion syllable comes up; 
when he focusses on the colour, the associate fails to emerge 
. 4lL into consc1ousness.• Ach had claimed that success or f'ailure 
to respond with the proper syllable depended upon the strength 
of the will-act. The determining tendency was able to overcome 
the associative equivalent only if it was stronger than the 
habit already established. In mast of Ach's cases, the deter-
mining tendency in each of the subjects did not succeed in pre-
daminating. XcCarthy'e work like that of Lindworsky, Rux, and 
others refuted Ach'e conclusions. Both McCarthy and Lindworsky 
believe that the guiding power in laboratory controlled tasks 
such as these is attention. Experiments such as Ach's do not 
test strength of will, but, rather, give evidence that results 
are dependent both upon the direction and quality of the 
I 
observer's attention. Results showed that, with McCarthy's 
subjects, the companion syllable was evoked if the subject 
attended to the stimulus as a syllable. When they focussed on 
color, the associate failed to come into consciousness. The 
instructions had so directed the attention of the subject to 
the color which was to appear and to the operation which it 
signified that the previously learned associate was literally 
pushed out of consciousness. Consequently, the associate 
41 Ibid., P• 85. 
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syl1&ble, under the conditions of McCarthy's experiment, did 
not. hinder the subjects in the performance of their tasks. 
There is amp·-le evidence, both from results obtained in McCarthy's 
experiments and in the very descriptions and interpretations of 
the determining tendency which Ach himself had offered, that 
the associative equivalent is anything but a scientific 
measurement of will power as it once was claimed to be. 
Other factors in McCarthy's experiment confirmed his refu-
tation of Ach's determining tendency as a scientific measure of 
will activity. At this stage a change was introduced by means 
of the following instructions: ~au will be shown a set of ~1-
lables of different colours. Rhyme everything you see and 
react as quickly as p.ossi ble"; or "Reverse every stimulus", and 
later, •change every vo•e1•. 42 These changes caused a pro-
nounced struggle between the old tendency to react according to 
the original instructions and the tendency to comply with the 
new ones. Ho:wever, from the fourth reaction on, the strength 
of the habit had been weakened and the old tendency rapidly 
grew less intense and was finally subdued completely. McCarthy 
pointe out the existence of two distinct will-acts under the 
changed instructions: "There was one will-act made when the 
subjects accepted the new instructions. There was another 
42Ibid., P• 92. 
191 
distinct will-act when the two tendencies clashed; and it was 
this will-~ct that was immediately responsible for the specific 
reaction in the individual experiments. tt43 In app,lying this 
deacription to ordinary life, McCarthy is cautious in stressing 
the necessity of intentional direction for any volitional 
activity. In the conflict of impulses, one may predominate 
oTer the other without the exercise of volition. Volition 
enters the picture only when there is conscious preference fo·r 
one or the other, or intelligent direction of energy into this 
channel rather than some other. 
A determining tenden~y such as Ach has described is pre-
ba.bly the. result of volition, but, like the many other habitual 
actions which have originated from a volitional source, it ma.y 
continue t~ function in virtue of itself, The subjects, by 
voluntarily accepting the instructio:ns, set up within them-
selves a "determining tendency• to accomplish the given task. 
But in order that the tendency may actually express itself, 
other abilities are n.eeded; it is dependent, to some extent, on 
the capacity to form verbal associations and the like. The 
struggle which ensues is not between will and the force ·of 
association, but between two •blind" associations. Volition 
initiates the process, and the other tendencies or mental 
43 . Ib1d • , p. 97 • 
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energies continue the activities so that the measurement of an 
associative equivalent is only an indirect measure of wi~l at 
the most. 
KeCarthy's experiments brought to light a significant fac-
tor in the psychology of habit. As we have seen, specific 
changes were introduced during the course of the experiment in 
order to break the habits. formed through repetitions of the 
task. The objective results, together with the introspectio.ns 
of the subjects, showed that these well established habits were 
quickly broken when attention was focussed on an antagonistic 
mode of action. Life experiences bear witness to the reliabil-
ity of these conclusions. An over amount of attention to bad 
habits only strengthens them the more. Success in the removal 
of these impediments is achieved more quickly and per.manent1y 
by directing our energy and attention to some opposite activity. 
Because of the interdependence of will and intellect, 
will-acts require foreknowledge of an end or goal. Closely 
related to both will and intellect is attention. Without 
attention there is no cognition; without cognition there is no 
willing. Among these three powers exists an intimate relation-
ship. It is evident that attention is always a significant 
volitional factor in all human activities. But an attempt to 
measure strength of will accurately and in a quantitative way 
is practically impossible. The immateriality of will defies 
193 
objective measurement. The conclusions which McCarthy drew from 
his experimental a.ttempts to measure conation conta.in an honest 
exposition of these facts. 
We began our research with the 
intention of studying conational 
activity with a view of measuring 
it, at least in some rough way. 
We must confess that we baTe not 
succeeded in doing so. Our data 
show that the psychoga1...anic reflex 
is influenced by conation, and that 
the size of the deflection bears 
some proportion to the amount of 
conative energy released during the 
reaction. But the p;sychogalva.nie 
curve is such a complicated one, 
resulting frGm so many different 
causes and modified by such a 
variety of factors, that we do not 
think it is (in the present state 
of our knowledge of it) a service-
able measure of conation. In fact 
our experiments have practically 
convinced us that it is futile to 
hope for anything like an exact 
scientific measurement of conation, 
especially when that conation is 
intentionally directed and thus44 constitutes a real act of will. 
Honoria Wells 
A Tery comprehensive experimental study of volitional con-
sciouaness was made by Honoria Wells at the psychological 
44Ibid., P• 102. 
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laboratory of the UniTersity of London. The purpose of her 
research was an ambitious oner to analyze as completely as 
possible &11 the phenomena invOlTed in acts ofChoice. Intro-
spective methods were used in the investigation and reaction-
time measurements were made throughout. The experimenter was 
particularly interested in determining the influence of aff'ec-
tive states on volitional acts. For these purposes, attention 
was given to physiological factors as well as to the ~nta1 
processes concerned. Physiological concomitants of' emotion and 
feelings were measured and recorded by the psychogalvonometer, 
the pneumograph, and the sphygmograph. 
This particular study is a significant one in the psycho-
logy of will. Previously, a controTersy oTer the nature of' the 
so called "'consciousness of action", had been in progress among 
various psychologists. Michotte and Prftm contended that the 
data in their experiments demo;nstrated the existence of a. defi-
nite "consciousness of action",and that this pehonomenon was, 
indubitably, of a rational nature and irreducible to sensory 
elements. Raymond Wheeler, likewise performed experiments on 
choice; on the basis of :results o·bta.ined fr.om these investiga-
tions he has denied the immaterial nature of' the act of choice, 
and claims that all the phenomena of choice ultimately can be 
analyzed into images and sensations. Honoria Wells, in her veey 
thorough and extensive experimentations, has verified the 
reports of Michotte and PrU.. 
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The materials used and the procedures followed closely 
resemble those of Boyd Barrett's work on ~otive-force a.nd 
Motivation Tracks •. Several different liquids, odorless and 
colorless, and varying in hedonic quality, were presented to 
the subjects. Each taste was de signa ted by a particular non-
sense syllable. The experiment consisted of three stagesr 
(1) Learning the tastes, (2) Recognition Experiments, (3) 
Choice Experiments. During the first stage the subjects 
established a strong association between the taste of the 
. 
liquid and the nonsense syllable which was used as a symbol. 
When these tasks were completed, the recognition experiments 
were given. The reaction-time for each of the associations 
already formed was measured. In this way, the reproduction 
time was kept at a constant, and the experimenter thus elimi-
nated any variable arising from temporal differences. Finally, 
the choice experiments proper were administered. Eight liquids 
were presented, two by two; and fifty-six combinations were 
used. As·UcCartby had modified Ach's technique in order to 
prevent automatic responses resulting from many repeti tiona, 
Wells also introduced.a change about midway through the choices 
for the same reason. How, nonsense syllabl.es, representing 
unevaluated alternatives were used along with the old ones. 
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The experimenter observed that the appearance of the "new 
tastes• occasioned motives of curiosity, and, later on, con-
flicts between certainty and opinion or belief'. 
The interpretation of results is practically the same as 
those of 1Uchotte and Priim. Wells ha.d asked her subjects to 
•choose for a serious reason •; the subjects were then obligated 
to base any and all choices on a motive-value. A process of 
deliber~tion naturally ensued wherein the motive values were 
weighed in the balance. It was during this period tha.t "con-
sciousness of self" was preda.minant. The self as such enters 
into the realm of consciousness and directs action towards one 
or the other goal;. at this point the subject is cognizant of 
the self-in-action. Like Michotte and Prilm, Wells considers 
this particular awareness as the nucleus of the whole voli-
tional process. 
Reaction-time for the process of choosing depended upon 
the motives whichappealed to the subjects. If the immediate 
motive did not c omp;ly with the standard of value first accepted 
by the subject in the instruction, then the process was delayed 
until some further means of strengthening the motive were ob-
tained. These motives were strengthened in many ways, and the 
most important of the means used was •reference to the self". 
Actually, the most frequent method of motive strengthening was 
the intervention of self. When two motives at first appeared 
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equa.l or negative, the motive which was strengthened by 
referral to self was the one which predominated in choice. 
The consciousness of self in action was the phenomena 
which caused the most serious controversy among the experi-
menters on choice. Wheeler strongly contended that the con-
sciousness of willing was merely a derivative of the real basic 
phenomena. Such awareness of the self arises,first of all,from 
kinaesthe-tic sensations and. images. Therefore, the subjects 
can ~yze all volitional consciousness into these simpler 
contents. Wells vigorously apposed such an argument and offer~ 
her own observations and the introspections of her subjects a.s 
substantial proof' for her conclusions. Her subjects ha.d 
reported, definitely, that the consciousness of self-in~etion 
was an experience which differed essentially from any of the 
muscular movements, kinaesthetic images, or visceral sensations 
which they 'BJS.y have had. While all these organic sensations 
\ 
differed from time to time and from person to person, the eon-
sciousness of action was especially characterized by its 
universality and intangible quality. The subjects found dif-
ficulty in describing their "'awareness of self•, but unanimously 
agreed that it was unanalyzable into sensations and feelings. 
While we are entirely in agreement 
with Wheeler and others who hold 
that kinaesthetic and organic 
sensations are always to be found 
in volitional consciousness, we 
can also show that our subjects 
clearly distinguished a phase in 
consciousness when 'self-in-action' 
became momentarily focal. Though 
this immediate awareness of 'self' 
was very fleeting and readily dis-
placed again by the sensory proc-
esses, our subjects were quite 
clear and insistent in emphasizing 
the radically different nature of 
awareness of kinaesthetic and or-
ganic sensations on the one hand, 
and the consciousness of 'self-
activity' on the other. Their 
reports show that they find it 
possible to separate the two when 
(1) consciousness of 'self-activity' 
and kinaesthetic and organic phe-
na.mena are present together in 
consciousness, (2) 'self-activity' 
occupies the focus to tha rela~ive 
exclusion of everything else.4 
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While the experimenter's assertion, that "self-awareness" 
in volitional activity differs entirely from sensory experiences 
is well substantiated by facta, the claim that kinaesthetic and 
organic sensations are always present in vo::litional conscious-
46 
ness is doubtful. These sensory concomitants form no con-
etituent part of the will-act. It is true that they are often 
present as accompaniments, but certainly an internal act of 
will such as acceptance or resolution may take place without 
any corresponding physi~logical movements. A generalization 
45 
"The Phenomenology of Acts of Choice•, The British journal of 
Psychology, Monograph SupplemerLts. Vol.:-fV (1927), No. 11,--
46P• 135. 
See above P• 169. 
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such as Wells has made would seem to make these concomitants a 
necessary, integral part of the volitional process. However, 
others like Wells, have emphasized the general presence of kin-
aesthetic elements in the volitional process. 
During the period of d elibere.tion, when the subjects were 
engaged in weighing their motives, emotional responses were 
scarcely ever evident. This particular stage in the process of 
choice was characterized by its abstract nature, and was con-
fined to a consideration of non-sensory principles. But wh~n 
the subjects were confronted with difficult choices, or when 
the motiTe in view obliged them to choose an unpleasant alter-
native, the forceful direction of energy into an undesirable 
channel brought about physical reactions. Vivid experiences, 
such as were had· in difficult choices, were accompanied by 
noticeable deflections in the psycho-galvanic recordings. 
The experiment of Honoria Wells has not contributed much 
in the way of original findings to those already presented by 
Barrett, Michotte, and PrUm. The modifications which she 
introduced eliminated some of the variables which had proven to 
be noticeable disadvantages in the other experiments on choice. 
One of the chief values of her experiment is the confirmation 
it offers for the re~ults found by Michotte and Prllm. The 
experiment performed by Wells, more scientific in detail and 
execution than its predecessors, further substantiated the 
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eYidence of the irreducible nature of volitional phenomena. 
Wells has provided a worthy objective testimony of well estab-
lished principles, and her experiment has proven to be a strong 
defense against the mat'erialistic contentions of Wheeler and 
others. 
In our summarized account of the classic will experiments, 
there is a noticeable fundamental agreement among the investi-
gators. Though each of these experiments was carried on inde-
pendently of the others, and oftentimes in different countries, 
the results are remarkably similar. In all of the experiments 
we have described, both the experimenter and the subjects re-
ported a special form of "self-awareness" in the volitional 
process. Inevitably, the consciousness of self was found tG be 
indescribable and irreducible. The consensus of opinion among 
all these experimenters is a strong, concrete confirmation of 
scholastic principles. The v:ery objectivity of the evidence 
does much to enhance theoretical principles which are charac-
teristically abstract and, oftentimes, intangible and vague in 
the eyes of modern philosophers and psychologists. If the 
experimentations h&ve done nothing else than produce objective 
corroborations for the essential principles of volition, the 
contribution may be considered well worthwhile. 
CH..A.PTER V 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAlS AND PROCEDURES 
Fram the faregoing investigations on will, as well as from 
our own scholastic concept of the nature of will, it is evident 
that no direct measurement of will is possible. However, the 
effects of will acts are noticeable in everyday life. For 
example, det.ermination, or the will to achieve certain goals, 
is decidedly influential in the actual attainment of such 
goals. In these cases., internal acts of will, whether they be 
decisions, resolutions, or desires, actually direct the course 
of a person~s actions. 
Our problem was to devise certain situations in which we 
might observe the change in mental processes following upon 
certain voluntarily accepted sets of instructions. For our 
particular study, we decided to investigate changes introduced 
by an instruction~ calculated to make the subject exercise some 
deliberate self-initiated control over processes of perception, 
imagination,and thought. In a study such as ours, objective 
data. alone would be insufficient. For this rea.son,we followed 
the traditional procedure for obtaining introspective reports. 
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Through the introspective reports of the subjects, together 
with tabulation of their reactions to the given tasks, we were 
able to compare the results, in the case of a natural sponta-
neous acceptance of the tasks, with those in the case o·f 
deliberately self-initiated or volitionally directed activity. 
Whereas it is obvious that some voluntariness entered bo·th sets 
of performances, still, unless we wish to allow that the 
instructions determined the subjects to act, the further 
effects of volition or of self-directed a.cti vity by the 
subjects themselves. become apparent in the second set of 
experiments. 
In the present chapter we will describe the materials 
used and the procedures followed in our attempt to investigate 
the relationship between volitional factors and other mental 
acts. In the following chapter we will present an analysis ~:f 
the introspections and other responses given by the subjects. 
The present experiment, therefore, proposed to obtain 
objective and introspective data showing some effects of 
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vali tional factors upon perception and the higher processes of 
1-2 
abstraction. By a comparison of results obtained from tests 
performed with an attitude of naive observation, with those 
1
•Beobachtung ist eine aufmerksame, nach gewissen 
Gesichtspunkten planmassig ausgefUhrte Sinneswahrnehmung. 
1. Die gUnstigsten Bedingungen hat man bei willkurlichur 
Beobachtung eines ruhenden Objektes. Die erste Forderung ist, 
eine Zielvorstellung zu haben, sie festzuhalten und dadurch 
die stetige Aufmer·ksamkeitsrichtung festzulegen. Es ist etwa.s 
anderes, ob man ein Bild betrachtet, um moglichst viele 
Einzelobjekte aufzahlen zu konnen, oder um es auf seinen Stil 
zu erforschen. Durch die Zie1vorstellung wird die Beobachtung 
einheitlich; das Wichtige wird dann zu gr5sserer Deutlichkeit 
erhoben, die zur Deutung des Objektes n5tigen Vor·stellungen 
werden angeregt. Gute Beobachter riihmen die Wichtigkeit der 
Willensenergie fur den Erfolg. Eine methodische Beobachtung 
wird dadurch begfrnstigt, dase man eine grosse Menge von 
Gesichtspunkten bereit stehen hat. Dadurch unterscheidet sich 
die Beobachtung des sachverstindigen von der des Laien." 
Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie,Zweiter Band,von 
Joseph F~s, S. J. Ereiburg Im Breisgau: Herder & Co. 
G. M. B. H. Verlagsbuchha.ndlung. 1929, P• 127 ff. 2
"Schon auf die Wahrnehmung kann der Wille einwirken, indem er 
a.us ihr eine a.bsichtliche, nach bestimmten Zielen geordnete 
Beobachtung macht. Besondere auff&llend ist die Beeinflussung 
des Vorstellungsverlaufes, der dadurch zu einer geistigen 
Arbei t, einer Phantasie-oder Denkleistung wird, im Gegensa.tZ: 
zur Triumerei. Beim Traumen ist die Aufeinanderfolge der 
Vorstellungen durch den Zufall bedingt, weshalb gewohnlich 
kein vernunftiges Ziel erreicht wird. Beim absichtlichen 
Sichbesinnen dagegen ist es Sache des Willens, die Aufgabe 
vorzunehmen. Der Wille muss die Aufmerksamkeit auf die 
Vorste1lungen richten, welche in der gewnnschten Linie liegen; 
wir konnen una weiter·Wahrnehmungen verschaffen, welche die 
Vorstellungen festhalten; laut sprechen oder lesen oder unsere 
Gedanken niederschreiben. Unbeschrankt ist diese Macht uber 
die Vorstellungen freilich nicht.• ~., p. 420. 
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obtained after a specific task was assigned, we intend to 
describe some of these effects. We will attempt to observe 
likewise how these effects differ in the case of sensory proc-
esses as compared with those of the rational processes. 
Preliminary investigations were made with our materials on 
twelve practice subjects in order to determine their validity 
for the actual experimentations. 
General Description of Experiment 
For the sake of clarity, we will first give a rather broad 
outline of the experiment as a whole; and then. present a 
detailed .description of the materials used throughout and of 
the pro.cedures followed in each experimental sitting. 
All the materials used were mounted or printed, according 
to the content,· upon large white cards. These cards ranged 
from 6 x 4 to 8 x.5 in size; and they were divided into four 
sets. The first set consisted of ambiguous figures; the second 
set contained specially chosen stimulus words; the third set 
included four kinds of similarities, namely pictures, words, 
numbers, and geometrical designs; the fourth set contained 
incomplete syllogisms. All of these materials will be fully 
described in a later discussion. 
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These four sets of cards required four different tasks. 
The first two sets, namely ambiguous figures and stimulus 
words, composed the sensory data for our experiment. While the 
two latter sets, similarities and incomplete syllogisms, 
provided material for rational acti Ti ties. 
Since the purpose of our experiment was to obsene the 
influence of volitienal factors on mental activities, it was 
necessary to designate the performances of the subjects under 
two headings; •involuntary" and ~voluntary•. Let it be under-
stood from the outset that these designations do not indicate 
a rigid line of demarcation between the two ~xperimental condi-
tions. That is to say, tasks performed in the "involuntary" 
division were not assumed to be entirely lacking in volitional 
activities. These terms are used simply for purposes of con-
venience and clarity, and refer to the tasks as performed under 
the two types of directions. Thus, all four types of cards 
were presented to the subjects; first, with directions propos-
ing merely general observations, and these responses have been 
indicated as "involuntary". Secondly, the same four types of 
cards were presented to the same subjects with directions which 
would be expected to induce, on the part of the subject, special 
voluntary activities. We have designated this second group of 
responses under the term •voluntary". 
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It will be well to notice at this point that, wherever 
possible, we chose new though similar tasks for the voluntary 
trials. This was done in order to prevent the subjects from 
merely repeating the chain of imagery of the first task. In 
the case of ambiguous figures, however, since the task involTed 
an attempt to see ambiguities, it was found that scores could 
not be compared if different figures were used. 
The experiment was divided into three sitting periods. In 
the first one, all four sets of the above mentioned cards were 
presented along ~ith certain directions. These directions 
&eked the subjects merely to observe the materials without 
requiring them to make voluntary selections of specific factors. 
In the second sitting period, the subjects were given the two 
sets of cards dealing with sensory data, namely the ambiguous 
figures and the stimulus words, with directiOn:! calling for 
voluntary selection. In the third sitting period, the experi-
menter presented the two sets of cards dea1ing with rational 
processes, namely the similar,i ties and the incomplete syl-
logisms. Along with this material,directions were also given 
to induce will-acts from the subjects. 
1'he experimenter decided upon three sitting periods for 
several reasons. First, at least two sittings would be needed 
because the four tasks with two different instructions would 
have been too fatiguing for the subjects. Moreover, for all 
the subjects, the tasks performed with naive attitude had to 
precede those with instructions to "seek• etc. Finally, in 
order to preTent undue emphasis on one kind of material in 
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preference to another, during strong volitional activity, this 
three-part division enabled us to alternate the order of pre-
sentation. Thus, the fourfold task with "attitude of seeking" 
was alternated among all the subjects: that is, sensory mate-
rial was preceded by rational material for half the subjects, 
and followed by it for the other· half. 
Since the secondary aim of the experiment was to obtain 
whatever temporal differences in response might occur, a stop-
watch was used to record the time of each performance. 
The experiment was administered to ten subjects. All the 
subjects, including the twelve practice subjects used in the 
preliminary investigations, were ~ntelligent adults of college 
level. Subjects unacquainted with laboratory procedures and 
untrained in fo,rmal logic were purposely chosen for the experi-
ment. Previous training in laboratory work or formal logic 
would seem to prejudice the results. Our purpose was to obtain 
results which would be a rather representative sample of the 
general population. However, each subject was given simple 
preliminary exercises in rep.orting introspective data to make 
clear to him the type of data desired in the experiment. OUr 
results seem to show that intelligent subjects, though 
untrained, are able and willing to report quite freely their 
own introspections. 
The length of time required for the administration of the 
three parts of the experiment to each subject varied from person 
to person, since some were more voluble than othem in reporting 
their introspections. However·, the experiment required at least 
four and a half hours, and most of the time as much as six or ejght hours. 
208 
Sp.ecific Description of the :Materials 
A. ~he Ambiguous Figures. 
Five ambiguous fi'gures were 
used; namely, Jastrow's duck-
Figure 1 
Jastrow's Duck-Rabbit rabbit, the Necker cube, the 
Schroder staircase, the variable 
star, and the Grecian urn. The 
above were chosen particularly because they provided a variety 
in type of ambiguous figures, and also because they are figures 
which have been used to great advantage in the many experiments 
on fluctuations of attention.3 Each figure was drawn in black 
ink on a plain, white card. 
B. Ambiguous Terms. 
Ten words, each capable of arousing two or more distinct 
images because of ambiguous meanings, were chosen for this 
3J. p. Guilford, ~luctuatione of Atten-
tion,"~ American Journal of Peychol-
~' Vol. XXXVIII (1927), PP• 534-83. 
R. W •. George, "The Significance of the 
Ambiguous Figures and in Binocular Ri-
valry... 'rhe Journal of General Psychol-
m_, Vol.ll (1938}, PP• 39-61. 
E. L. H. Porter, ~actors in the Fluc-
tuation of Fifteen Ambiguous Phenamena.• 
~Psychological Record, Vo~. II (1938), 
PP• 231-53. 
Figure 2 
The Grecian Urn 
Figure 3 
The Variable Star 
209 
task. Care was taken in the 
selection of these words so that 
the distinct n~anings attached 
to each might be of the same 
category. For example, terms 
which, in their double meanings, 
commonly partake of both a noun 
and verbal character, were mostly avoided, such as jam, lock, 
bridge, etc. The following words were used: 
Part I (Involuntary): glass, horn, joint, bond, corn. 
Part II (Voluntary) t trunk, cord, star, front, yard. 
Each ward was printed in large letters on a separate, plain, 
white card. 
c. Similarities. 
This test was subdivided into four different parts, each 
part representing a certain type of similarity. 
(1) ~he first type consisted 
of a series of eight pictures mounted 
on white cards, four of which belonged 
to the same specific category. Same 
of these pictures represented objects 
(animals, cutlery, insects, tools, 
etc.); others represented Tarious 
Figure 4 
The Necker Cube 
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activities (feeding birds, 
walking, swimming, etc.} All 
the pictures used for this 
task were taken from The 
Meyers Mental Measure Form 
No. 2. 
Figure 5 
The Schroder Staircase (2) Each of the verbal 
cards contained eight words, 
four of which were more similar than the others. The verbal 
similarities included the following sets of words: 
Part I (Involuntary) 
1. boat, sail, motorcycle, move, horse, 
row, track, train. 
2. round, ellipse, lines, triangle, draw, 
cube, square, circle. 
3. razor, chop, shave, beard, knife, wood, 
whittle, shear. 
Part II (Voluntary) 
1. Street, speech, send, mail, pole, 
messenger, hurry, telephone. 
2. fork, plate, spoon, cup, table, eat, 
saucer, bowl. 
3. mean, bribe, smuggle, take, steal, 
beg, lie, bad. 
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(3) The third set of cards in the similarities group 
consisted of eight numbers on each card. Four of these 
numbers belonged to a specific class. The number cards were 
arranged as follows: 
Part I ( Inv,o1unt ary ) 
1. 9 4 8 7 18 
2. 23 7 53 5 103 
3. 15 ? 23 8 24 
Part II (Voluntary) 
1. 4 9 24 6 17 
2. 8 63 17 81 29 
3. 3 7 16 5 13 
12 
9 
4 
8 
18 
21 
5 
24 
11 
16 
46 
8 
13 
43 
6 
18 
45 
15 
(4) On each of the fourth set of cards was mounted a 
series of eight geometrical figures; and,again, four of these 
were more similar than the others. All the geometrical figures 
used in this exercise were taken from the Otis Group Intel-
ligence Scale: Advanced Examination, Form A and Form B. 
D. Logical Propositions. 
Each of the cards used for this test contained the two 
premises, maj r:rr_~ and minor, of a logical syllogism. These 
statements were chosen so as to represent the four main types 
of propositions: namely, universal affirmative, universal 
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negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative. Two 
of the cards contained false premises, but the form of all of 
them was correct. The following statements were used: 
Part I (Involuntary) 
1. All fruits are sweet 
Spinach is not sweet 
2. Some mushrooms are po;isonous 
Part 
All mushrooms are plants 
3. No cow has wings 
All sparrows have wings 
4. Some trees never decay 
All trees belong to plant 
II (Voluntary) 
1. All anima.JLe have fur· 
A negro has no fur 
2. Some carnations are white 
All carnations are flowers 
3. No angel has a body 
All monkeys have bodies 
4. Some dogs have no feet 
All dogs &re animals 
life 
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ne Procedure and Instructions 
In order to make the introspections thorough, the obser-
vations were broken up into three distinct periods ordinarily 
used in introspective reports: namel.y, a fo.re period, main 
period, and an after period. Failure to thus divide observe.-
tiona have, in past f!xperiments, accounted for failure to 
recount effects of volition. 
Some of the earliest experimental 
studies of voluntary activity 
. failed to produce evidence for 
the existence of will, so far as· 
the immediate observations were 
concerned. 
Subsequent analysis of the 
problem rev~a.led the source of 
difficulty 'in a. fallacy that is 
surprisingly common among psychol-
ogists even today. 'Experimental 
conditions, it appeared, were such 
as to exclude the will-act from 
observation altogether, since vo1i-
tion occurred when the subjects 
accepted the proposed tasks before 
observations were begun. Thus, in 
order to investigate this aspect of 
behavior and experience, it is 
necessary to :fractionate observa-
tions, including a fore period as 4 
well as the main and after periods. 
4rrancis L. Harmon, Principles ,9£ Psycholosy. Jlilwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1943, p. 499. 
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Experimental Sitting I 
Sensory a.nd Rationa~ Process.es--Involuntary 
Three simple preliminary exercises were giTen to the sub-
ject in order to clarify for him what the experimenter meant by 
•introspective reports•. For the first exercise he was given & 
card with a co~ored design on it. The experimenter, by means 
of questions, endeavored to make the subject report his impres-
sions, reactions, images, thoughts, physical feelings, sensa-
tions, etc. The subject was also asked questions concerning 
his impressions before and after the presentation. 
In the second exercise, the experimenter presented a card 
with a simple statement on it; and the same procedure followed. 
In the third exercise, the subject was asked to close his 
eyes, and the experimenter gave him an object to feel. The 
subject was asked again to report all introspective data. 
After these exercises, the subjects seemed to understand 
mo·re clearly the type of information required of him. 
The subjects were then asked to iisten carefully to the 
following general instructions: 
I have a number of cards here 
which contain different types of 
material.. When I present them 
to you, look at them and observe 
an you can. As you look a.t the 
cards, report a]oud the progress 
of your thoughts. Tell all your 
impressions and reactions to 
these cards. The principal 
purpose in this experiment is 
the observation of your own 
mental experiences rather than 
the attainment of any specific 
answers. When you have completed 
each card, I will ask you to tell 
me all the introspections you can 
remember. I want you to tell me 
as much as you can about your own 
impressions before each card is 
presented, during your observation 
of the cards and after you have 
finished· ea.ch card. Remember to· 
report aloud while you are examin-
ing the cards. 
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These instructions were read as often as was necessary, 
and any further questions of the subjects were answered. It 
was made clear to the subject that these instructions applied 
to all the material given in this sitting. Before each set of 
materials was presented, specific instruction for each set was 
al.so given. 
(1) The first test administered was the one using a.mbig-
uous figures. The instructions were as follows: 
On each of these cards a figure 
has been drawn. While looking 
at them you may observe that they 
shift posi tiona. Do not attemp.t 
to control these changes, but keep 
a passive attitude. When I aay 
•ready", look at the picture, 
fixate on the dot, and report any 
fluctuations that occur; and do 
so until I say •stop". After each 
you wil.l be asked to report further 
observations you have made. Retain 
a passive attitude throughout the 
experiment. 
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These directions were modeled on those given by Guilford 
and Braly in their experiment. Their purpose, likewise, was to 
eliminate, in so far as was possible, specific volitional 
5 factors. 
The subject was permitted to observe each card for one 
minute. The time was limited and made the same for each so as 
to permit more accurate comparison of results. The experimenter 
recorded the number of shifts as indicated by the subject. 
(2) Before presentation of the next set of cards, the 
following instructions were given: 
Each one of these cards has a 
word printed on it. When I show 
it to you, I want you to report 
whatever images happen to come to 
your mind. 
No time limit was set for this test, but the time usedfor 
each observation was recorded by means of a stop-watch. 
(3) The similarities were presented next, accompanied by 
the following instructions: 
These cards contain different 
types of material. I want you 
to look at them and observe all 
you can; tell me all about them 
while you are observing. When 
you have finished,put the card 
aside and we will go on to the 
next one. Keep in mind that I 
5 J. p. Guilfo,rd and K. W. Braly, "An Experimental Test of 
McDougall •s n.eory of Introversion-Extroversion." The Journal 
!!.:£ Abnormal ~ Social. Psychology, Vol. m ( 1930), PP• 382-89. 
want you to describe your own 
reactie>ns as well as the cards 
before you. 
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Two cards of each type were,given to the aubject and the time 
used for each observation wae likewise recorded. 
(4) The fourth test was the one on logical p,ropositions: 
Here are some statements which I 
want you to read. When you have 
read them, tell me what you think 
about them. I am particularly 
interested to know your own thoughts 
and impressions about each card. 
In this test the time was recorded not only for the observation 
in general, but al..so in regard to length of time taken to 
arrive at a conclusion, if one was made. 
Experimental Sitting II 
Sensory Pro;eesses--Vol.untary 
Dr. Aveling, in his experiments on the •Influence o.f Voli-
tion on Thinking", found that when a subject was to]d to· l.ook 
for a given object or relation he would have to exert his voli-
tional pW~ers in order to accomplish the task. On the other 
hand, instructions which required the subject merely to observe 
6 
the material before him did not have such results. 
6 -~British Jour.nal of Psychology, Vol. XXII-XXIII (1931-1933) 
April 1932, P• 32'7. 
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In our experiments, we alf!:!O made uee of this di:t;:f'eren-
tiation. The general instructions regarding introspections 
were much the same as those used for the previous experiment. 
In the special instructions preceding each test, the subject 
was now required to perform a specific operation or to l2..Q.! !2!: 
a definite relationship. 
Procedure 
The subject was again comfortably seated at the table. 
The experimenter, by means of his instructions, endeavored tOJ 
induce the subject to do his very best. While in the previous 
experiment the subject was asked merely to give his impression 
on the cards presented to him, in this experiment he was told, 
definitely, to seek for a certain type of objective. In doing 
so, we hoped to evoke in the subject an attitude of deter.mina-
tion. The subject was encouraged to try as much as possibLe to 
do well in performing the given tasks. The fallowing general 
instructions were given to the subjectt 
In this experiment, I am going to 
present to you cards similar to 
the ones you had before. Again, 
I want you_to observe as carefully 
as possible your own mental experi-
ences. Report a].oud the progress 
of your thoughts, and after you 
have completed the task I will ask 
you to tell any further introspec-
tions that you can remember. 
A. The Ambiguous Figures. 
Now I am going to present to you 
the ambiguous figures. This time, 
however, I want you to try to 
shift the figure to different 
p,osi tiona, back and forth, as 
fast as you can. Fixate on the 
dot and report each shift by 
saying "now, now", etc. I will 
give you a trial on each of the 
different figures and record the 
number of shifts for each. After 
every trial I will ask you to 
describe your experiences. 
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Each one of the figures was presented in turn,' and the rate of 
oscillation for one minute was recorded. Immediately after-
wards, the subject was asked to repo,rt his introspections. 
After a suitable rest period was had, the subject was given 
Part II of this experiment. The instructions were as follows: 
Each of these cards ha.s one word 
printed on it, words similar to 
the ones you saw in the last test. 
This time I w.ant to see how many 
different kinds of things you can 
picture to yourself when you see 
each one. Try to do your very 
best. Remember also to observe 
all. your mental experiences during 
this task. 
As in all the other tests, the subject was asked to report his 
introspections before, during, and after the presentation of 
the cards. 
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Experimental Sitting III 
Rational Processes--Vo~untar.y 
In this final series of tests,. the same type of material 
was used for the rational pr-ocesses as in the first experiment. 
However, the instructions were entirely different. This time 
the subject was asked to ~ ~ the similarities in the 
pictures, words, numbers, and geometrical figures, and to draw 
a conclusion from the logical propositions. The subject was 
asked to direct his mind toward the achievement of a specific 
goal, and the experimenter encouraged him to do as well as 
possible. The instructions for the similarities were as 
follows: 
I have four different_ kinds o-f 
cards here. In each of the cards 
I want you to look for a definite 
similarity. :For exa.mpl.e, among 
the series of pictures you will 
find several which are more al.ike 
than all the rest. Look and see 
which ones they are. Try to do 
your very best. Remember to 
rep-o:rt al.oud the pro.gress of 
your thoughts. After you have 
finished, put the card aside and 
we will go on to the next one. 
The experimenter then presented three cards of each typ-e: 
namely, pictures, words, numbers, and geometrical figures. 
After each, the subject was asked to report further intro-
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specti one. By means of a stop-watch we r,ecord ed the time taken. 
to find the relationship. 
After a sufficient rest period had been provided, the 
subject was given the instructions for the logicai propositions. 
There are two statements on each 
of these cards. I want you to 
read them carefully, and then 
tell me what conclusion you would 
draw from such statements. 
Remember to report your intro-
spections. 
By directLy asking the subject to look for a conclusion, the 
experimenter deliberately introduces the volitional element 
into the test. Dr. Moore reminds us, and we agree, that draw-
ing a conclusion sometimes depends on the will to do so. 
"Wilhelm found that when subjects are presented with twa 
premises and they are told merely to read and understand them, 
they do not necessarily draw a conclusion. Drawing a conclu-
sion, therefore, depends on the will to do so. •7 
7
cognitive Psychology. Chicago and New York: J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1939, p. 378. 
CHA:PrER VI 
INTROSPECTIVE ANALYSES AND CONCIIJSIONS 
Interest in the influence of wil1 on the thought processes 
has been prevalent in the works of most great philosophers. 
Aristotle, and more especially St. !fhomas Aquinas, devoted many 
dissertations to this widely discussed to"pic. It is a well 
established metaphysical principle that volitional factors often 
inf1uence thought. Again, therefore~ let it be ciearly under-
stood that the purpose of our experimental investigation was 
neither to question this principle nor to prove it. We have 
merely attempted to describe more fully the manner in which 
these volitional effects are manifested in both the sensory 
processes and in the higher thought processes. 
As we stated above in the description of our experimental 
procedures, we endeavored to reveal. the effects of volitional 
factors principally by means of our directions. While the 
first set of cards was presented in such a way as to evoke 
general observations, the second part of the experiment was 
given with directions specifically designated to induce 
voluntary activities. One of the.cardinal principles of 
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Thomistic psychology is the essential unity of man's hylomor~ 
nature. st. Thomas repeatedly insists that it is-impossible, 
at any time, to observe a single human process in an isolated 
fashion. In the most insignificant of human operations, as 
well as in the most complicated processee of thought, the whole 
man is concerned. However, it is evident that while man as a 
whole is involved in each of hie activities, at times, one 
process may dominate the pattern of hie actions. We do not 
assume, then, that volitional factors were totally lacking in 
the first part of our experiment. On the contrary, we maintain 
that the very acceptance of the task is a volitional act. In 
both parte of our experiment, volition, in the form of accep-
tance of the task, is present. We might state our purpose more 
definitively by saying that we attempted to discover, under 
controlled conditions, the qualitative aspects of the processes 
of perception and of abstraction, when volitional factors 
dominated the pattern of these activities. 
In the first stage of our experiment, the reactions of the 
subjects were principally passive, i.e., after the task was 
accepted they made no positive attempts to discover· any parti-
cular aspect of the stimulus. They observed the materia~ in 
front of them, reported numerous associations, images, etc. 
However, when the same subjects were instructed to observe 
certain features of the stimulus cards, both on the sensory 
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level and on the intellectual, a positive dynamic element 
operated which evidently was not present in the previous stage 
of the experiment. In the first part, the external stimulus 
largely occupied the attention of the subject; but in the 
second part, his reactions were clearly stimulated by energies 
originating in the person himself. 
For the sake of clarity, we will discuss each section of 
the experiment separately, before making general comparisons 
and conclusions. 
A. The Ambiguous Figures, Spontaneously and Voluntarily Shifted. 
The most outstanding objective difference between the two 
reactions to the ambiguous figures was the rate of shift; and 
this proved to be a very noticeable one. While the subjects 
sometimes failed to see any change of position whatso:ever when 
they were asked to maintain a passive attitude, they frequently 
obtained a very high rate of shift when they were induced to do 
so voluntarily. Table I shows the rate of shift for one minute 
under the two types of conditions. 
Besides the vo,litiona.J. effects on rate of shift, there 
were others which concerned the type of shift observed. 'fhe 
oscillations noticed by the subjects in the first test con-
sisted, for the most part, in two or three positions commonly 
observed in a random observation. In the second part of the 
Subjects 
K. c. 
s. R. 
R. L. 
A. D. 
s. L. 
I. B. 
}[. H. 
P. c. 
D. s. 
s. A. 
Table I 
Ra.te of Involuntary and Voluntary 
Shifts on the Ambiguous Figures 
Duck- Grecian Variable Necker 
Rabbit Urn Star Cube 
Inv. Vo~. Inv. Vol.. Inv. Vol.. Inv. Vol. 
0 42 0 14 5 51 3 28 
6 67 11 56 7 30 5 12 
0 0 l 74 3 37 5 9 
0 20 0 29 2 21 4 7 
0 3 0 24 6 16 7 18 
. 
0 6'1 0 24 4 80 2 4'1 
0 40 0 34 5 2'1 3 '1 
0 14 2 22 6 20 3 16 
2 7 4 10 6 25 4 10 
0 4'7 4 44 3 33 4 22 
22.5 
Schroder 
Staircase 
Inv. Vol. 
3 35 
6 9 
3 2'1 
0 19 
6 17 
3 52 
2 43 
0 10 
4 11 
3 19 
experiment, when they definiteliy put forth volitional effort 
to increase their rate of speed, the subjects also increased 
the variability in the kind of shifts observed. The fol1owing 
are introspections of the same subject on the variable star 
figure. 
Involuntary: •this is some kind 
of e. floor pattern or ceiling · 
pattern. It 1ooks just like the 
one we have in Church. Looks like 
drawings I haTe seen, too. Some-
times it looks like it might be a 
pile of blocks--just now they 
shifted their position.• 
Voluntary: ~ere were various 
positions of b1ocks; first they 
seemed to be at the left, then 
they shifted to the right. Then 
again, it looked like a star; 
then in all different positions 
of diamond shaped figures. Some-
times it seemed to fold up and 
then assumed the position of f1&t 
shaped diamonds; then back to the 
blocks again." 
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Hence, when the mind of the subject was directed to a more 
specific task, he was able to narrow his field of operation; 
consequently, he obtained a. quite different result. In the 
absence of this directing influence, im&ges were abundant in 
-the reports of the subjects; but they were o.f a. type which 
interfered with the varied perception of the stimulus before 
them. When vo1untary effort was lacking, the figures served 
more as stimuli for recall of other incidents, experiences, 
objects, etc., which were irre1evant to the present task. 
In a previous work on voluntary shift of attention with 
ambiguous figures, it was found that persons who showed a high 
rate of vo1untary shift were those who had a corresponding wide 
22'7 
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span of perception. In our present experiment) we are con-
cerned only with these relationships within the indiTidual him-
self. However, if the ability to shift a figure rapidly is 
dependent upon span of perception, may we not say also, since 
great differentiations of speed were evident in each individual 
under differing conditions, that voluntary effort itself, 
within limits, increases the span of perception for each indi-
vidual. A mere volition is not able to increase the natiTe 
capacity .for breadth of perception with which the indiTidual is 
endowed, but there is evidence that volitional factors tend to 
actualize the existing potentialities. The same c~pacity for 
shifting these figures was present in both parts of the experi-
ment. However, under the influence of voluntary effort exerted 
in the second part of this test, the subjects were activated to 
perform far more efficiently;. they perceived details and 
attained rates of speed, which, under a passive attitude, 
remained unknown to them. In some cases, the will to see,a1ong 
with the added effort induced by the instructions, brought 
about the perception of a figure. which the subject had missed 
completely in the previous test. This was especially the case 
with J&strow's Duck-Rabbit figure. Eight out of ten subjects 
lsister )[aria.n DalLores, I!l!. Relationship Between Span !!!. 
Perception~· Volluntary Shift of Attention. ){asters Thesis, 
Loyola University, 1944. 
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were unable to see the rabbit position in Test I, while in 
Test II, all but one subject perceived both the duck and the 
rabbit •. 
The Limitations of volitional influence were manifested in 
the reports of the subjects when they complained of their 
failure to shift as rapidly as they desired. At times t~ey 
found themselves helpless in spite of their greatest attempts. 
On such occasions, expressions of dissatisfaction and of 
irritation were numerous. The faJLlowing are examples o.f these 
experiences. 
"I just felt like pushing it and 
was provoked because it wouldn't 
go faster.• 
"I didn't think this was working 
fast enough. ETen when I think 
hard I couldn't make it go as 
fast as I wanted it to.• 
"bice I seemed 
trated feeling. 
it go back when 
go.• 
to have a frus-
I cOluldn • t :make 
I wanted it to 
~en I saw how different the 
shifts could be, I tried hard 
to see now many possible kinds 
there would be. I fel-t like 
pushing it, yet I JLooked only 
at the dot.• 
•Took me a long time to change 
from the diamonds to find the 
cubes. I couldn't get rid of 
the diamonds and it bothered me 
because I couldn't find the 
cubes ~ickly enough." 
On fifteen different occasions, feelings of irritation and 
dissatisfaction were displ.ayed by the subjects in their 
attempts to shift the ambiguous figures. 
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While the stimulus itself and the faculty of perception 
are indispensable in a task of the kind just described, we h&ve 
much evidence that vo:.litional factors, because of their direc-
tive p.owers and energizing capacities, equip the subject with 
the determination needed to evoke the latent responses within 
him, which otherwise remain dormant. When volitional :!act ora 
dominate the process of perception, not only is the field of 
perception enlarged, but the time required to perceive the 
stimulus is greatly lessened. In both parts of the test, the 
subjects were aware that the figures shifted; yet only when 
vol.itional factors were introduced were they able to shift the 
figures quickly or to perceive the many different kinds of 
posit ions in each ease. 
B. Ambiguous Words. 
The particular words used for this test were chosen 
because, in our preliminary work, they were found to be words 
which tended to· arouse many different kinds of images in the 
observer. In the test requiring general observation only, the 
reports of the subjects were characterized by typical. free 
associations and revery. The stimul.us word at once evoked some 
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familiar experience, and from there on the images which occurred 
followed from one association to the other. The images were 
numerous but unrelated for the most part. While the sum total 
of the images reported often reached a large number for each 
individual, perhaps not more than one or two of these images 
actually were related to the stimulus word itself. The fellow-
ing introspections are typical responses to the stimulus words 
in the first part of the test on ambiguous words. 
Glass 1 "G]a.ss makes me think of the 
glass that was broken just 
today. J4y sister put her knee 
through the book case; and the 
broken pieces were all over and 
we were all picking them up. 
When my brother came the last 
time, his glasses were broken 
and he had them taped together. 
I wonder when he will come 
again. Xaybe the folks will 
drive down to see me. I haven't 
heard from him for a long time. 
J4y brother is going to New York 
to attend Cornell. He usee to 
read boJoks in the moonlight and 
practically ruined his eyes. He 
broke his glasses so often. He 
has bad eyes and hardly made the 
army--he couldn't be a. pilot.• 
Carnr •I can see lots of corn growing 
in fields; it's about three feet 
high now. I am recalling the day 
we saw those fields after a big 
rain. 1'hey were flooded with 
water and the green against the 
blue sky was beautiful. In the 
movie, •Adventure•, the fellow~ 
and girl stale some chickens and 
ran through the cornfields and 
they got away from the far.mer 
who ha.d a gun. Those far.ms 
around the lake were certainly 
beautiful ones.• 
~l "'Little boy blue come bl.ow your 
horn•. We had a. play; and a 
little neighbor boy was boy blue 
and had a cute blue suit. The 
little girl was 'Mary quite 
contr.&rY'• A bunch of little 
girls were the flowers in the 
garden, and li ttl.e boy blue had 
a horn, a little brass one. 
'The pretty maids all in a row' 
sang and I can just hear the tune 
they sang. I am going through 
all the parte of the play. I 
know a girl ~ed Carol Horne, 
but her name has an e on the end 
of it. She doesn't do eo well 
in school, neither does another 
little boy I know. • 
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In the second part of the. test, the subjects were asked to 
try to evo,ke as many different kinds of images as they could 
when they were given each word. Here, each subject himself was 
engaged in activel.y performing the task, and was not merely 
assuming a passiTe attitude to-ward the stimulus in front o.f 
him. Previously, the cognitive and a.ssociati ve processes had 
dominated hie field of activity; now the subject. striving to 
accomplish his task well, experienced some order in these 
activities. As a result, the images which occurred, numero:us 
as they were, formed an entirely different pattern of response. 
The subject did not relate incidents or recall associations, 
but set out to search for all possibl.e typ,es of images related 
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to the stimulus word. Consequently, his introspective reports 
were given in the for.m of enumerations, reflecting the direc-
tive and organizing powers of volition. If other associations 
were ~de, they were brief in duration and the subject quickly 
endeavored to switch his powers of imagery to a more related 
field. Although no time limit was set in either test, a great 
diff"erence existed in the amount of time used for perlormanees. 
The subject, in Part I, leisurely recalled and related the 
imagery which £"lowed through his mind in the form of free 
associations. However, in Part II, the subjects earnestly 
endeavored to report as quickly and as briefly as po.ssib~e the 
images which they experienced. While the introspections of the 
first test were almost entire]y lacking in manifestations of 
striving, those of the second test always revealed the Toli-
tional factors actua]ly at work. Introspections from the 
vol.untary tests: 
Start "Stars so bright over the lake, 
movie star, 'star boarder', star 
costume, artificial stars, 'When 
you wish upon a star', star eyes--
that's all I can see, there should 
be more but I can't 'catch' them. 
Sometimes when I try bard, things 
seem to blur a bit and then stop 
coming. I wish I could get more." 
Cord t •A string, a. viol.in 'chord', 
cord in the nerves,_ a spinal 
cord. I can see all kinds of 
string for packages, shoe laces 
are cords, a.nd a. scissors' 
c o rd, electric wires are called 
cords, a silk cord on a lampshade. 
I am trying to see if there are 
cords in any other class except 
in the line of strings, but I 
guess not. Perhaps I can get 
more if I try , though. I know 
I've heard of another cord, but 
I can't seem to see any others." 
Stare "Star on a cow's forehead for a 
brand mark, star in the sky, star 
over the crib, movie star, Star-
fish--kind of pinkish tan colLor, 
mo,rning star, 'see stars' when 
you are hit on the head, a star 
pupil. Trying to see other kinds 
of stars. Let's see now, the 
'Star', a name of a newspaper--
there should be others. I can 
see a store named, 'The Star'. 
Guess that's all I can get though 
I a.m still trying to see others." 
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The ta.tal number of images reported in the test performed 
under the influence of volitional factors was not much greater 
than the total.. number· obtained in Part I. However, the chief 
differentiation occurred in the number of "associate" images; 
i.e~, those images immediately relevant to the stimulus word. 
TablLe II shows the contrast existing between the two tests and 
the di~ferences in number of unrelated images as campared with 
' 
"associate" images under the two sets of dir·ections. Table II 
also reveals the high positive correlation between the two t·ypes 
of images in the voluntary and invo·luntary tests. The number 
of associate images is low for a]l words in the involuntary 
tests and high for the volluntary ones. The rand om images 
Table II 
Scores for "Associate" Dnages (A) and Random ~ages (R) 
in the Involuntary and Voluntary Tests 
Invol · v.llnntarv 
lw ... ,..~. Gl8S8· Jo:_nt Bond Hor-n Corn r ... +.., Ya:•d I"'"' .1. Co~d St!lr Fr.)nt ft'ft.fo.J:a'l 
R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A ~ A 
Subjects 
K. c. 13 5 8 2 12 2 9 4 10 4 69 2 8 0 5 2 7 1 7 1 6 39 
s. R. 11 3 3 2 7 2 11 2 7 2 60 2 6 2 6 1 8 0 16 3 7 51 
R. L. 16 3 5 3 13 2 14 3 11 2 82 4 6 1 5 2 11 0 15 0 12 56 
A. D. 7 3 5 2 5 '4 6 1 7 2 42 0 5 2 5 1 6 1 9 0 7 36 
s. L. 13 2 7 1 8 1 10 2 11 2 57 1 7 0 5 1 8 0 4 0 6 32 
I. B. 11 0 1 2 11 1 16 3 10 1 66 2 7 2 5 2 8 0 8 0 4 38 
M. H. 2 2 3 2 4 2 7 2 ·6 2 32 3 7 2 3 1 5 0 6 2 7 36 
P. c. 12 4 0 2 11 2 5 3 11 1 61 3 6 1 2 2 7 0 7 1 7 36 
D. s. 11 1 0 2 11 2 9 2- 10 2 60 2 4 2. 5 0 6 0 5 3 3 30 
S. A. 9 3 7 1 13 2 11 2 9 3 70 0 9 2 8 1 8 0 14 0 8 50 
Ave. R. lo.? ~.9 9.5 9.8 9.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.2 tw 
Ave. A. 2.6 ;1..9 2.0 2A 2J. 6.5 4.9 7.4 9.l 6.7 
Ave. R. Involuntary 
- 7.7 Ave. A. Involuntary - 2.2 
Ave. R. Voluntary 
- 1.1 Ave. A. Voluntary - 6.9 
I 
Total Ave. Involuntary - 12.0 Total Ave. Voluntary - 8.1 
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scored high in all words in the involuntary tests and low in 
the voluntary tests. These figures show that the effects of 
volitional factors were consistent for all the given stimulus 
words. When volitional factors predominated, the associate 
images likewise predominated; when they did not, the random 
images greatly outweighed the associate images in number~ 
From these results it would seem that volitional factors 
tend to produce a twofold effect. While they direct the search 
for imagery related to the stimulus, at the same time, they 
exclude images which are only remotely concerned with the pre-
sented word. The directive activity of volition itself 
operates in such a way as to suppress the many free associa-
tions which occur at random under other circumstances. 
Volitional factors a1so seem to make the subjects more 
conscious of the time element. In Part I, the subjects,in 
general., made no attempts t.o perform quickly, nor were they 
concerned about the amount of time it took for them to report 
their introspections. In the second part of this test, they 
became keenly aware of the time which elapsed between their 
responses. Though the directions did not include any reference 
to time, the subjects often mentioned their desire to evoke 
and enumerate the images quickly. The subjects usually became 
quite concerned if they could report only one or two images 
successively. All diligently tried to produce the different 
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images as rapidly as possible, and noticeably rejected other 
interfering images which came to their minds. 
c. Similarities. 
Four types of similarities were selected: numbers, words, 
pictures, and geometric designs. This material was chosen for 
the purpose of evoking thought processes of a relational 
nature. Actually, however, the introspectiTe reports in the 
involuntary tests show that a great deal of free association 
imagery accompanied the relational thinking. Though the sub-
jects described freely the imagery which occurred, they seemed 
to be aware that these particular carda contained sa.mething 
more than concrete objects. This "awareness• was completely 
lacking in the reactions to the sensory materia1. This factor 
would seem to indicate that the subjects perceived a difference 
between the sensory material and the similarities, even though, 
in most instances, they gained insight and perceived relation-
ships only in the voluntary test on similarities. The follow-
ing introspections illustrate this •awareness" of the subjects. 
Involuntary 
Geametrical designs& "No. 1 and 
2 are in different positions; all 
look alike. They are angular and 
look like packages. One is like 
a mirror. I feel there should be 
more, but I simply don't know what 
it could be .• 
Numbers: "I like to combine 
numbers; is there any special 
order here or what? Every 13 
years I'm lucky and win some-
thing. I won a car and the 
gas stove in our kitchen. Some 
of these numbers have a common 
denominator. I'm coaching some 
children in arithmetic. I am 
wondering about that card and 
what the purpose of it is--
there is one but I am afraid 
I missed it." 
Wordst "I can see the shavings 
of wood because I saw the words 
whittle and wood. Razor and 
knife remind me of shaving a 
beard. There is not much that 
goes with shear. I'm thinking 
of the time when I used to whittle 
wood and m&ke daggers. I suppose 
I could think of all kinds of 
experiences I've had with these 
things. I just have a feeling 
of incompletion; and that if 
this is all there is to these 
things there should be more. I 
feel like something is sort of 
sllipping from me--just as if I 
just about had something but 
didn't quite get it. Something 
else is here, I don't know what.• 
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Similar manifestations were made in thirty-nine other intro-
spective reports on the similarities. 
It is interesting to note that, while these subjec'ts 
expressed their assurance of a missing element, they made no 
actual effort to find or to look for the missing connection. 
In the voluntary tests, these same subjects diligently applied 
themselves in seeking out the most fundamental similarity 
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contained in each card. As a result many of them achieved a 
high "insight score"; while in the involuntary tests, the sub-
jects made no score at all. Does this means to say tliat intel-
lectual insight is entirely dependent on will? Decidedly not. 
But in our experiments, results seem to indicate that intel-
lectual insight, necessary for the.perception of the most 
fundamental relationships in our similarity tests, was lacking 
when volitional factors were in the background. The introspec-
tions contribute a description of mental ope:r:atio:ns of the 
subjects, when reacting to similar stimuli in different situa-
.tions: first, when volitional factors are in the background; 
secondly, when volitional factors predominate. It would seem 
that while intellect is active in both cases, the completion of 
the task was accomplished only when added effort and motives 
were operating. Similan· instances occur in everyday experience. 
Moreover, it would seem that in the forming of human character, 
the power of intellectual processes does not suffice; over and 
above knowledge, there is the necessity for the exercise of 
will. Though intellectual capcity is always present and is more 
nr less unchanging, there is a certain dependence of intellect 
upon will for the achievement of full knowledge. In our tests, 
the actual selection or the acceptance of a perceiTed relation-
ship seemed to occur only when volitional factors dominated the 
picture. 
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In the similarities, one of the most conspicuous effects 
of volitional factors was the dispersion of images. Intro-
spections from the involuntary tests contained numerous images, 
while t4ose from the voluntary tests were often entirely lack-
ing in imagery·. When images did occur in the latter tests, the 
subjects often described them as fleeting or fragmentary; thes.e 
images also were more intimately connected with the materiai 
presented than the images reported in the first tests. Acts of 
striving, of looking for, of trying, so engrossed the subjects, 
that, for the most part, images were unable to gain entrance 
into consciousness. '!'he more volitional facto:rs predominated, 
the fewer were the conscious images which occurred. 
Words 
I Involuntary' "'!'here should be 
some order here. That word 
should be ship, not bo-at; navy 
people say ship. I am imagining 
myself on a trip"to Europe. 
Horse, track, and train remind 
me of my Father. He worked for 
the railroad. There were eight 
pictures on those other cards, 
and now there are eight words 
on each card. I wonder why. I 
am wondering what the purpose of 
all this is. The word, sail, 
reminds me of the trip I want to 
take. I have images of a ship 
on the ocean, a big steamship--
! can see the deck chains, and 
now the docks with people throng-
ing around • " 
Voluntary: "Speech, messenger, 
mai~, telephone are all means of 
communication. Send and hurry 
are connected with them, but in 
a different way. I got that o·ne 
immediately. I could see it as 
soon as I tried. I like words 
better than pictures or figures.• 
II Involunta;y: •These all have some-
thing to do with drawing. I had 
a lot of these figures in Art, 
especially in perspectiTe. I 
have an image of my teacher, a 
B.V.M. nun, also the girls. I 
can see the colored pencils, our 
easels, and some of the pictures 
I drew. I have a notion that 
there is more to these words 
than I am saying. Maybe I should 
do moreo" 
Voluntacyr •These are all con-
nected; they are implements for 
eating. Plate, cup, saucer, and 
bowl are all more alike because 
they are dishes. I choose these 
as being most a]ike because they 
are all made of the same stuff. 
I started immediately to look 
for connections. Rarely do I 
think of any of these objects 
in a concrete fashion. I have 
a desire to do more of these. 
HaTe feelings of satisfaction. 
Just now, the dishes reminded 
me of our table at home all set." 
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Four types of similarities were presented to the subjects 
and each type included three cards. The subjects could achieve 
a. p·ossible score of 3 in each set of analogies if they per-
ceiTed the correct relationship in each card. Table III 
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illustrates the differentiations of results under the two sets 
of directions. 
The results seem to show that volitional factors aid in 
the perception of relationships in the type of similarities we 
used. The directions in the second part of the experiment 
prop:osed a more specific objectiTe than those in the first; the 
second set of directions incited volitional factors. Since our 
purpose was precisely to induce greater voluntary effort in the 
second part, we think that the perception of the relations was, 
at least in part, attributable to volition. Perfect •insight 
scores" were not obtained. This might be because, while voli-
tional factors are influential in actualizing the present 
potentialities, they are powerless to exceed the capacity of a 
given person. In the involuntary testa, the subjects often 
made comparisons, gave descriptions of the stimuli, recognized 
certain values, categorized in a more superficial manner; yet 
\ 
arrived at no specific conclusion. When volitional factors 
intervened, the comparisons were more defined and of a far more 
camplicated nature. The subjects weighed and balanced the 
various possible combinations in their quest for the specific 
relationship contained in each card. The comparisons were 
always followed by evaluations, a final decision, and choice. 
While the subjects recognized similarities in the first tests, 
they made no effort to evaluate them or to: make any selection. 
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Table III 
Insight Scores for the Anaiogies 
Pictures Words Numbers: Geometric 
Subjects Designs 
Inv. Vol. Inv. Voli. Inv. Vol. Inv. Vol. 
K. c. 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
s. R. 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 3 
R. L. 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 1 
A. D. 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 
s. L. 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 1 
I. B. 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 l 
:u:. H. 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 
P. c. 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 
D. s. 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 
s. A. 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 2 
These operations were performed only when volitional factors 
were directing the processes of thought. 
Geometrical Designs 
Involuntary: "These must be 
patterns or designs. One of the 
teachers in our school had some 
on a bulletin board. These are 
all somewhat similar, some more 
than others. No. 1 and No. 2 
are angular. The patterns on 
the bulletin board are on a 
black setting. Perhaps there 
is more to this card than I 
have not iced." 
Voluntary: "I have seen figures 
like these before. I am looking 
and comparing one with the other. 
Some of these are like crosses--
Nos. 1, 3, and 7. Now I find 
that 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7--and 8 
are alike. But No. 1, 4, 5, and 
7 are straightline figures. I 
haven't a good reason for choos-
ing these, but I'll have to choose 
them because I can't see anything 
better. I don't like these 
figures. I prefer something more 
concrete. I know I didn't get 
it, and I have a feeling of incom-
pleteness." 
D. Logical Statements. 
243 
The results obtained in this part of our experiment are 
much-the same as those described in the section on similarities. 
When the logical statements were presented with directions 
asking for general observations, the introspections of the 
subjects showed that, while judgments were formed and reflected 
upon, no attempt was made to reach a final conclusion. Imagery 
and free associations also were numerous in the reports from 
the first test. 
Involuntary 
statement: Some trees never decay 
All trees belong to plant life 
"All trees decay--this card is 
wrong because everything living 
dies. I can see a rotten tree, 
standing, all twisted, hardly 
any branches, no twigs, and 
hollowed out on one side. It 
looks as if a wind would take 
it out by the roots. I have 
images of other trees, too. I 
wonder why that statement was 
put that way. tt 
Vol.untary 
Statement: Some carnations are white 
All carnations are flowers 
"I guess you would say all 
flowers are white, but that 
isn't true. The other two 
are right. I don't know how 
that works. Something is 
funny. The first two are true 
and what·r said is not. All 
white flowers are carnations--
that's worsel But you can't 
get a true conclusion from 
that; I'm still trying to find 
one. I think I could have said--
some white carnations are flowers 
or some flowers are white--that's 
best. I didn't think of it 
before." 
Involuntary 
Statement: All fruits are sweet 
Spinach is not sweet 
"Spinach is not a fruit to 
begin with. Tomatoes are fruits 
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and are not sweet. It is dif-
ficult to say '&1~', for there 
is usually an exeeptien. I 
think spinach is good and I can 
see some real dark green spinach. 
I like all fruits; I have a 
sensation of sweetness, like an 
apple or orange taste. I'm 
thinking now that I am not a 
good reader. I stumbled over 
those words when I read them, 
and I can see myself reading 
aloud in class. I'm wondering 
if my Mother has any oranges 
for my breakfast tomorrow. BY 
girl friend and I used to ta1k 
about food all the time." 
Voluntary 
Statement: All animals ha.ve fur 
A negre has no fur· 
"A negra is no animal; there-
fore a negro has no fur. Is 
that right? I really don't 
think all animals ha~e fur, 
but the conclusion I ha~e is 
right. I had an image of a 
negro, but no others. Almost 
as soon ae I looked at the state-
ments, that connection was clear 
to me. I feel satisfied with 
my conclusion because I know that 
it's true anyway. • 
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These introspections seem to show the mutual. interdepen-
dence of intellectual and volitional factors for the completion 
of a logical statement. While thinking supplied material for 
further thought, willing aided in the directien of thought. 
Deliberations and reflections occurred in both of our 
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tests, but the actual conclusion was drawn when the subject was 
told to look for it. st. Thomas has commented on this parti-
cular function of will. •It is quite true that it is for the 
reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it 
is called~ decision or judgment, to be followed by choice. 
And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the aet 
of choice, as to that which results from it."2 
However, if the conclusion is perceived immediately upon 
presentation of the premises, it may be an intellectual insight 
without any deliberate or formal act of willo It is quite 
probable that such would often be the case with those well 
versed in the skill of syllogistic reasoning. On the other 
hand, persons unacquainted with such techniques seem to require 
definite volitional acts and stimulation for the completion of 
reasoning processes. 
One of the most noticeable effects of volitional factors 
upon the subjects' reactions to our propositions was the 
attempt to evaluate truth and evidence. In the involunatry 
tests, the subjects were not greatly concerned about the truth 
or falsity of the statements, though they sometimes offered 
their opinions on the matter. But in the voluntary tests, the 
2 The Summa Theologica (ed. Pegis) I-II, xiii, a.l, ad 2 um. 
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subjects debated back and forth with themselves about the truth 
of each statement. The activities of deliberation and choice 
were especially pronounced. Introspections contain reports of 
tentative acceptance, doubt, indecision, and reexamination, 
back and forth, several times before the conclusion was actuaDcy 
drawn. Oftentimes, doubts persisted after the conclusion was 
given, and the subject continued to battle for a more ~atis­
factory conclusion. In this part of our experiment, will fac-
tors made the subject more conscious of truth and falsity. 
Furthermore, whereas in the involuntary tests, the subjects 
looked upon the statements as more or less isolated sentences, 
they dil~gently endeavored to find a relationship between the 
given statements in the for.m of a proper conclusion when voli-
tional factors were dominant. 
Throughout the entire experiment, certain definite effects 
of volitional factors were commonly noticeable in all the 
introspective reports. In the sensory as well as in the . 
rational involuntary tests, manifestations of "strivingsn, 
whether conat·ive or volitional, were very few. Imagery was 
abundant in all the tests requiring general observations only. 
In the similarities and logical statements, intellectual cogni-
tions as well as· imagery were reported frequently by the sub-
jects in the involuntary tests. 
248 
The most significant general effect of volitional factors 
in this experiment was the awareness of self-activity which 
these factors evoked in the subjects. From time to time 
throughout the different voluntary tests, the subjects mani-
fested a keen realization of their own strivings. This 
realization was totally absent in all the introspections given 
in the involuntary tests. In the latter, our subjects were 
often aware that they were •missing something" or that they had 
given incomplete answers; but only in the voluntary tests do 
they seem to have a cognizance of their own volitional. actions.· 
This realization was evident in the tests on sensory material 
a.s well as in those requiring rational processes. Throughout 
the voluntary introspective data, a consciousness of self-
activity was reported one hundred and ninety-six different 
times. 
.Voluntary Tests 
I Shifts on the Grecian Urn. 
"Ohl I see two profiles. I 
had a feeling that !-was estab-
lishing a rhythm pattern of 
beats, and I was trying to 
change it and make it faster·. 
I concentrated on the shifting 
and had no other images. I 
guess I was too thoroughly 
occupied with the shifting. 
I think one excludes every-
thing else during concentration." 
II Word Similarities. 
"These are all table utensils. 
Perhaps some are more closely 
related. Cup, bowl, eaucer, 
plate are all dishes made put 
of crockery; so they are more 
alike. Fven when I find a 
similarity I always try to see 
if there are other points which 
make them even more connected. 
I'm thinking that I'm working 
hard. One has to be more alert 
now. The last time you gave me 
these cards they ~re easier. I 
really feel satisfied with my 
choice this time. I think it 
is right.• 
III Picture Similarities. 
"I can't find the similaritieso 
These pictures are all about 
boys. Ohl there are three that 
represent charity. Now I'm 
looking to see if there are more. 
I had no images, but I was con-
scious of the fact that I was 
trying and looking. Now I'm 
wondering if there is any method 
other than my own to find these 
things. I think I could do 
better. I should have said four 
act~ of charity. I remember-nDW 
that there was another picture 
in the same category and I missed 
it. I'm so sorry." 
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Besides the realization of self activity, the subjects 
experienced another effect of volitional factors in practically 
all of the given tests; name~y, feelings of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction. Accampanying the acts of striving, looking 
for, and of penetrating the objectivity of words, pictures, or 
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numbers, were feelings of satisfaction or disappointment. 
These expressions seemed to be more psychological than physio-
logical, though at times a mixture of the two might have been 
present. The subjects, intent upon the solution of their prob-
lem and the apprehension of a relationship, experienced an 
intellectual delight when their goal was reached. When the 
search was abandoned, or when a selection was made because the 
subject could find nothing better, the introspections were 
interspersed with expressions of annoyance, keen disappoint-
ment, dissatisfaction, and the likeo In the involuntary teats, 
expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction rarely occurred; 
most of those reported were concerned with experiences recalled 
in free associations and were not precisely related to the task 
at hand. The following introspections are typical of the 
responses under the two different circumstances. 
Numbe~· Similarities 
Involunta;y: "Good night, 
numbersl Pinball machines have 
lots of numbers and you can get 
a score. I notice that some of 
these end in 3. These are funny. 
I have images of red and green 
lights that flash in those 
machines and of the colored 
designs inside the glass. They 
remind me of my brother, a 
sailor. I have images of 
coins; coppers, nickels, and 
dimes. Thought of a task I 
have to do--make a phone call. 
Have an image of a girl and a 
phone.• 
Voluntary: "I don't like these 
numbers, they are too intangible. 
It's hard to find the connections 
because they are so abstract. I 
am adding some of them and now 
I'm comparing them, but no luck. 
It's annoying. 1, 81, and 18 all. 
have an 8 in them. There really 
must be something else but I 
simply can't find the real rela-
tionship. I had an image of one 
of my teachers. I feel very 
dissatisfied and I am still 
trying to find the answer." 
Word Similarities 
Involuntary: "Some of these 
words kind of go together--there 
are sails on a boat, and you have 
to row some boats to move them. 
The boys have a sailboat and they 
are trying to get money to fix it. 
I went speedboat riding. Another 
time I went in a row-boat. The 
.other girl did all the rowing; 
Jean and I just sunned ourselves. 
I was afraid to go on the motor-
cycles at the lake. The bus was 
eo crowded; we should have gone 
on the train. I still have images 
of that train." 
Number Similarities 
Invoiuntar~: "The only thing 
here that means much to me is 23. 
My brother is 23. 7 and 9 were 
in the last card, too. My brother's 
birthday was a little while back. 
He graduated in 1943. I can see 
the auditorium where he graduated, 
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the diplomas, and.the kids all 
dressed up. Have images of caps 
and gowns. We had them, too. We 
certainly had fun in high school. 
We were always doing something. 
I 1ike to add these numbers 
together." 
Voluntan: "The odd numbers 
predominate, I can see that in a 
glance; 63, 71, 45, 21. But there 
must be something else and I'm 
trying harder now. There& 63, 
81, 45, 18, are all divisible by 
.9 • That ' s it l Oh how good it is 
to find it. These numbers remind 
me of some tests we took. I'm so 
happy that I found it. I have 
the feeling that I found something 
which had sort of slipped from me. •• 
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Since the invo~untary tests included so few manifestations of 
strivings, the attitude of the subjects seem to be one of pas-
sivity or indifference. But when volitional factors were more 
strongly introduced and the subject was urged to activity, 
there were always expressions of tttrying", "looking", "finding", 
as well as of satisfaction or dissatisfaction following success 
or failure, respectively. 
The effects of volitional factors were evident in both the 
sensory and rational processes; but our results indicate that 
these factors were most effective in regard to the rational 
material. The differences in these effects were apparent in 
the number of strivings. (See Table IV). Images were abundant 
in the involuntary tests on both the sensory and rational 
T:a.ble IV 
Objective Effects of Volitional Factors 
on Sensory and Rational Processes 
Involuntary Voluntary 
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Seneory Rationa1 Sensory Rational 
Images Strivings Images Strivmgs Images Strivings Images Strivings 
678 26 1182 47 489 211 82 792 
material. However, the change in number, due to volitional 
factors, was far greater on the rational level than on the 
sensory. But an even more significant difference is noticeable 
in the number of strivings. In the tests on both the senso,ry 
and the rational material, the directions induced the subjects 
to engage their· volitional powers as much as possible. From 
our introspective reports, we find that the rational material 
required a much greater number of volitional acts than the 
sensory material. As is shown in Table IV, the subjects were 
engaged in many more acts of "looking for", "trying•, •examin-
ing", "comparing•, etc., when their aim was to perceive and 
abstract relation ship than when they were endeavoring to evo:ke 
images. Even in the involuntary tests, when volitional factors 
were presumably in the background, acts of striving were more 
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numerous in the tests on rational materials than in those on 
sensory perception and imagery. 
It would seem, then, that some special exercise of voli-
tion is needed or at least helpful in engaging in abstractive 
and logical thinking. Such is not the case in r-egard to the 
use of our sensory faculties. Sensory perception takes place 
without any special act of will, and random images seem to 
abound the more in the absence of voluntary effort. Thus, whe~ 
the subjects were asked to shift the ambiguous figures and to 
evoke specific images as best they could, volitional factors 
were induced but were less effective than they were in regard 
to the rational processes, We might suggest various reasons 
for this difference. Rational processes require more concen-
tration and .more volitional effort than sensory processes. On 
the other hand, volitional powers can change thought from one 
object to another more readily than they can control sensory 
perceptions and imagery. A still more important reason for 
these differences stems from the very nature of will which, 
like intellect, is essentially rational. A far· more intimate 
relationship exists between will and the processes of thought 
than between will and sensory perception. Hence, whenever 
intellect is at work, will is close at hand and readily coop-
erates to give finality to the thought processes. In man it is 
impossible to separate will even from sensory perception; yet 
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sensory processes because of their different nature are lees 
responsive to the commands of will than the rational processes 
which partake of the same nature as will itself. 
Summary 
In general, the factors called into play in the second 
situation tended to synthesize and to unify the .end results of 
both perception and abstraction. They were influential in 
clearing away superfluous and interfering mental phenomena, and 
they directed the cognitive powers in the shortest path towards 
the attainment of the goal. There was a rejectim of objects 
which were incompatible with the intended aim, -and an acceptance 
of others more in line with the task. Volitional factors gave 
a species of finality to the activities of other powers by 
presenting what was sought, and thus put an end to delibera-
tions and diminished random association. Above all, they 
produced in the subjects a keen awareness of their own self-
activity. Before the second instructions were given, the sub-
jects remained passive and were content to relate the 
spontaneous impressions to one another and to objects from their 
previous individual exper-iences. Volitional factors changed 
the mental picture decidedly--from one of passivity to one of 
striving and of repeated and persistent efforts and desires. 
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It is not our purpose to overemphasize the influence of 
volitional factors on the processes of perception and abstrac-
tion. Since our aim was to study volitional effects in parti-
cular, we have endeavored, primarily, to describe the activities 
of volitional factors as they occurred in our experiment and to 
interpret the results obtained ·from them. No attempt is made 
here to generalize upon the findings we have recorded. The 
introspections, however, have clearly revealed that, in regard 
to our particular subjects, volitional factors wield much 
influence in the process of abstracting relationships and in 
sensory perception as well. The cognitive faculties, spurred 
on by the orectic power of will, are enabled to work more 
rapidly and to exercise their own potentialities to a fuller 
and richer degree. 
Our contribution, then, consists chiefly in the presenta-
tion of objective data: namelly, responses and introspective 
descriptions which show the positive influence of volitional 
factors upon sensory perception and intellectual abstraction. 
The objective data. revealed both an increase in frequency of 
correct responses and a significant difference in the qualita-
tive results when the subjects were induced to work with special 
voluntary efforts. 
APPENDIX 
The primary purpose of our experiment was to obserTe and 
describe the qualitatiTe effects of Tolitienal factors by means 
of introspectiTe reports. HoweTer, it is interesting to note, 
that the quantitative data, obtained from correlations between 
the scores from the Tarious tests, present a more complete 
picture of these effects. Owing to the small sample used in 
the experiment, the results cannot do more than indicate a 
trend. No claim is made for predictive value in these 
findings. 
The Rank Differ·ence method was used and correlations were 
computed as follows: (1) between the ayerage scores obtained 
in the Toluntary analogy tests and those from voluntary !3hif'ts 
in ambiguous figures; (2) between average scores from the 
Toluntary shifts of ambiguous figures and average scores from 
the voluntary tests on images; (3) between average scores fram 
the voluntary similarities and the average scores from the 
voluntary tests on images; (4) between average scores on volun-
tary ~associate• images and those from the voluntary similar-
ities. Since many of the involuntary scores in the tests on 
25'1 
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both rational and sensory material were zero, we were unable to 
use them in the correlations. ~able V sh.-s the aTerage scores 
from each of the tests used in the comparisons as well as the 
co·efficient of each correlation and the probable error. 
The fairly high poaitiTe correlation between the two sets 
of scores obtained from the sensory tests indicates that those 
subjects who haTe a high rate of voluntary shift on ambiguous 
figures tend to have facility in producing images Toluntarily. 
A person, then, who can shift his perceptions rapidly should be 
able to produce images easily. Since these abilities are 
closely related and both on the sensory level, it is quite 
probable that these results constitute a representative sample. 
The low positive but unreliable correlation between volun-
tary shift of ambiguous figures and voluntary pereeptien of 
similarities shows that little relationship exists between 
these two abilities. While a person may haTe great facility in 
voluntarily shifting ambiguous figures, he may encounter dif-
ficulties in the perception of abstract relationships. Skill 
in perceiving sensory material, therefore, while it is an 
extrinsic aid, does not necessarily give us an index of the 
individual's intellectual ability. This particular finding is 
in close agreement with the Thomistic principle which states 
that intellect is only extrinsically dependent upon the senses. 
Certainly, one who is able voluntarily to shift his perceptions 
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Table V 
Average Scores and Correlations 
Average Scores 
Subjects Voluntary Vol. Shifts on Voluntary Voluntary Similarities .Ambiguous Figures !mages "Aasociate" !mages 
K. c. 1.50 34 7.8 6.6 
s. R. 2.50 37 10.2 8.6 
R. L. 2.00 29 11.2 9.8 
A. D. 2.50 19 7.2 6.4 
s. L. 2.00 16 6.4 6.0 
I. B. 1.75 54 7.6 6.4 
M. H. 1.25 30 7.2 5.6 
P. c. 1.75 16 7.2 5.8 
D. s. 1.25 13 6.0 5.2 
s. A. 2.25 37 10.0 9.4 
Correlations 
Between Vol. Similarities Vol. !mages Vol. Simila.rit:les \OJ. . :-... ties 
Vol. Shifts on Vol. Shi:fts on Vo1. Images Vo 1. Assooi.ate 
Ambiguous Figures Ambiguous Figures !mages 
Correlatkm. .20 .74 .37 .67 
P. E. 
-21 -.10 -.19 -.12 
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rapidiy is not necessarily one who perceives intellectual rela-
tionships easily, since these two operations are perfor.med by 
two essentialiy different faculties. 
A like result is found in the correlation between volun-
tary similarities and voluntary production af images. Here, 
our findings are somewhat contradictory to those from other 
types of tests. It is often supposed that free associations 
which contain numerous images are indicative of high intelli-
gence. Our results do not lead to this conclusi.n. Subjects 
who vol.unta.rily eToked a large number of images were not always 
able to achieve a high insight score in the similarity testa. 
Another somewhat il~uminating result was obtained from the 
correlation between 'Voluntary similarities and Toluntary •a.ase-
ciate" images. In this ca.se~ the correlation was poaitiTe and 
reliable; the correlati•n between Toluntary similarities and 
Toluntary random images was only a low positiTe one. This 
comparison seems to indicate that the ability to eToke •asso-
ciate• images differs somewhat from the ability to produce 
images at random, i.e., images of no particular class. Is it 
possible that the pro-duction of •associate" images requires 
more than the exercise of sensory faculties only? Since the 
subjects had to depend, to a certain extent at least, on their 
facility of recall, it is quite probable that this test con-
tained an admixture of sensory a.nd intellectual operations, but 
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with the sensory predominating. Certainly, the task was more 
difficult when the subjects were required to eToke a specific 
type of image than when they were free to report all and any 
images which occurred. 'l'hus, the facility to eToke, TOlun-
ta.rily, "associate• images is more closely rel.a.ted to voluntary 
perception of relationships than is the ability to shift per-
ceptions rapidly or to produce images at rand om. 1'he more 
specific the task, the more likely will there be a relationship 
. 
with and dependency on the higher thought processes. 
These correlation coefficients (See Table V) present a 
pattern of gradations from a low positive to a fair1y high 
positive relationship. This pattern bears out the basie prin-
ciples already established in Thomistic psychology. While 
sensory abilities are interrelated to a fairly high degree, the 
same is not true when we are comparing sensory capacities with 
rational capacities. The latter two are interdependent in ~ 
extrinsic manner; but sensory skills giTe little light, if any, 
l 
on the intellectual abilities of the same indiTidual. 
lor. Charles Spearman, Psychology 12.!.!!! ill Ages. London: 
Macmillan a.nd Company, Ltd., 193'7, Vol. II, Chapter XL-XLI. 
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